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Contents

List of Plates

Maps

Preface

References and abbreviations

Chapter I: Sources and Modern Studies

Chapter II: Background

Chapter III: Childhood and Early Career: 451–416

Chapter IV: The Sicilian Expedition and Alcibiades' Exile: 415–413

Chapter V: Sparta, Persia and Athens: 413–411

Chapter VI: Alcibiades and the Athenian Navy: 411–406

Chapter VII: Final Years: 406–404/3

Notes

Bibliography

Index

List of Plates

1. Bust possibly of Alcibiades (photo: Ole Haupt, Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek, Copenhagen)
2. Bust of Pericles in the British Museum (© kmiragaya, from shutterstock.com)
3. Bust of Socrates (photo: Ole Haupt, Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek, Copenhagen)
4. Athenian vase by the Agrigento Painter, showing boys undergoing a music lesson (© Trustees of the British Museum)
5. Athens: acropolis from south-west (© P. J. Rhodes)
6. Athens: agora, model of west side (photo: American School of Classical Studies at Athens: Agora Excavations)
7. Athens: Pnyx, speaker's platform (photo: American School of Classical Studies at Athens: Agora Excavations)
8. *Ostraka* used for voting against Alcibiades (photo: American School of Classical Studies at Athens: Agora Excavations)
9. *Ostrakon* used for voting against Hyperbolus (photo: American School of Classical Studies at Athens: Agora Excavations)
10. Eggesta: temple (© pseudolongino, from shutterstock.com)
11. The Pan Painter: mixing bowl (bell krater); Greek early classical period, c. 470 BC; place of manufacture, Greece, Attica, Athens; ceramic, red figure; height 37 cm, diameter 42.5 cm; Museum of Fine Arts, Boston; James Fund and Museum purchase with funds donated by contribution, 10.185 (photograph © 2011 Museum of Fine Arts, Boston)
12. Eleusis: *telesterion* (photo: Konstantinos Kourtidis; by permission of the 3rd Ephoreia of Prehistoric and Classical Antiquities)
13. Eleusis: figurine of an initiate's sacrificial pig (photo: Konstantinos Kourtidis; by permission of the 3rd Ephoreia of Prehistoric and Classical Antiquities)


14. Fragment from the 'Attic *stelai*' (photo: American School of Classical Studies at Athens: Agora Excavations)
15. Piraeus (© Kostas Rossidis, from www.airphotos.gr)
16. *Olympias*, replica Greek trireme (photo: John Coates / Trireme Trust)
17. *Kyrenia II*, replica Greek merchant ship (Hellenic Institute for the Preservation of Nautical Tradition; THALASSA Agia Napa Municipal Museum, Cyprus)
18. Coin of Persian satrap Tissaphernes (photo: Hirmer Fotoarchiv, München)
19. Athens: fifth-century 'owl' four-drachma coin (Alpha Bank Numismatic Collection, inv. no. 2137)
20. Istanbul: site of ancient Byzantium (© Alex Garaev, from shutterstock.com)

Maps


1. The Greek World
2. Attica
3. The Hellespont, Propontis and Bosphorus



Map 1. The Greek World



Map 2. Attica



Map 3. The Hellespont, Propontis and Bosphorus

Preface

In 1984, in order to talk about the study of ancient history, I delivered my inaugural lecture as Professor of Ancient History at Durham on '*What Alcibiades Did and What Happened to Him*' (the formulation used in Aristotle's *Poetics* to characterize history in contrast to poetry). For this opportunity to write at greater length about what that flamboyant and intriguing man did and what happened to him I thank Mr. P. Sidnell and Pen and Sword Books, Dr. S. English, who put us in touch with each other, and everybody else who has been involved in the production of this book. In particular I thank all those who have supplied and given me permission to use the illustrations reproduced here; also Dr. A. Makres, who helped me to obtain some of the illustrations I wanted, Prof. L. Rubinstein, for the draft of an article on Alcibiades' chariot-team, and Dr. P. Thonemann, for allowing me to use the results of his work on Melissa, where Alcibiades is said to have died.

P.J.R.

References and Abbreviations

For ancient texts I use the abbreviations of the third edition of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, or occasionally a slightly fuller form. For Plutarch's *Lives* I subdivide the chapters into sections as in the Budé and Teubner editions, but readers are warned that the Loeb edition subdivides the chapters into fewer, larger sections. For modern works I use short references in the notes and give full details in the Bibliography (noting there the abbreviations which I use for a few frequently-cited works); titles of academic periodicals are abbreviated as in *L'Année philologique*, with the usual anglophone modifications (principally *AJP* etc. where *L' Année philologique* uses *AJPh* etc.). Superior figures (as in CQ²) denote the second and subsequent editions of a book, and the second and subsequent series of a periodical.

Chapter I

Sources and Modern Studies

Ancient Sources

As one of the leading public figures of his time, Alcibiades appears in the history of Thucydides (down to autumn 411, where the text breaks off) and the *Hellenica* of Xenophon (which began approximately where Thucydides' text ends); also in the universal history written in the first century BC by Diodorus Siculus (for this part of its Greek history derived from the fourth-century historian Ephorus: based on Thucydides down to 411 but independent of Xenophon afterwards).¹ We also have two biographies of him: a short one in Latin by Cornelius Nepos, written in the first century BC,² and a longer one in Greek in the series of *Parallel Lives* written by Plutarch c. AD 100 (his Roman counterpart is Coriolanus; he appears in some of the other *Lives* too). Plutarch used a wide variety of sources, some earlier and some more reliable than others, but he identifies sources for particular items only intermittently (often when remarking on a disagreement). Among other writers who supply material on Alcibiades is Athenaeus, whose *Deipnosophists* ('intellectuals at dinner'), written c. AD 200, contains a large amount of material, more often frivolous than serious, derived again from a wide range of sources and often quoting from fifth-century Athenian drama. In later antiquity Alcibiades was a favourite subject for rhetorical exercises, using and embroidering what was known about him, (for instance) to attack him or defend him at a particular critical point in his life.³

Thucydides was born some time before 454, was related to Cimon and Thucydides son of Melesias, who had been leading opponents of Pericles in the mid fifth century, but himself became a strong admirer of Pericles; he was an Athenian general in 424/3, but as a result of his failure to keep the city of Amphipolis out of the hands of the Spartans he was exiled for the remainder of the Peloponnesian War. He has appealed to modern scholars as a historian who was highly intelligent and determined to get at the truth; but he was a man who must have had his own prejudices, and cannot have been the

dispassionate, scientific historian he was once taken to be. His history of the Peloponnesian War of 431–404 (which includes in book I a sketch of the growth of Athenian power after 478, written to show how that led Sparta to make war on Athens) is narrowly focused on the war, and does not range as widely as many modern readers would have wished.

Thucydides seems to have been particularly well informed about Alcibiades, and his information extends beyond facts in the public domain to private conversations.⁴ As noted above, Thucydides was exiled from Athens from 424/3 until the end of the war, and he was a man who had interests in Thrace;⁵ Alcibiades was in exile from 415 to 407 (though serving with the Athenian navy from 411) and again after 406, and in 406 he too went to Thrace, where he seems already to have had interests.⁶ It is possible that Thucydides could have met Alcibiades towards the end of the war, and it has been suggested that he did so and that Alcibiades was indeed one of Thucydides' sources.⁷ If he did not derive information from Alcibiades himself he must surely have done so from somebody who was closely involved with Alcibiades,⁸ and that he did have contact with Alcibiades himself is an attractive possibility. This may have led Thucydides to regard Alcibiades' influence on the course of events as greater than it actually was, particularly when it is suggested that he was responsible for Sparta's sending help to Syracuse in 414 and establishing a fort at Decelea in 413;⁹ in 412/1 Thucydides seems at first to regard Alcibiades as extremely influential with Tissaphernes but later becomes more sceptical.¹⁰ Certainly, he is not consistently and uncritically admiring of Alcibiades.¹¹

Alcibiades appears also in contemporary literature. There are allusions to him in the comedies of Aristophanes and in fragments quoted from lost comedies (though a recent claim to detect previously unrecognised allusions to Pericles and Alcibiades, in Aristophanes and elsewhere, has gone much too far¹²). Preserved with the speeches of Andocides there is (IV) *Against Alcibiades*, which purports to be a speech delivered by Phaeax, one of the men who along with Alcibiades were threatened with ostracism in 415, but which is probably a later rhetorical exercise; some of the stories to be found in it, but not all, are mentioned by other sources too.¹³ He features also in law-court speeches written in connection with his son, Alcibiades IV. Isocrates' (XVI) *Chariot-Team* is the defence speech of Alcibiades IV when charged c. 397 that his father had wrongfully deprived the prosecutor of a chariot-team for the Olympic games of 416;¹⁴ and two speeches of Lysias, (XIV) *Against Alcibiades i* and (XV) *Against Alcibiades ii*, were written as supporting speeches for the prosecution of Alcibiades IV on a charge of failing to serve in the army when required, c. 395. Because our Alcibiades had been one of the young men who associated with the philosopher Socrates, he appears also in the dialogues of Plato: in particular, he bursts riotously into the *Symposium* to praise Socrates; the dialogue known as *Alcibiades i* is accepted by some scholars but not by all as an authentic work by Plato, but *Alcibiades ii* is

generally regarded as a later composition.

We also have the evidence of some Athenian public documents inscribed on stone in Alcibiades' lifetime; I mention here those which are of particular significance. One, recently discovered, is the beginning of a decree of the Athenian assembly proposed by him in 422/1, slightly earlier than any other reliable attestation of him as a public figure.¹⁵ There is a frustrating set of fragments which seem to record decisions concerning the Sicilian expedition of 415, earlier than and superseded by what Thucydides reports.¹⁶ The 'Attic *stelai*' are a collection of texts recording the sale of property confiscated from men condemned for involvement in the religious scandals of 415, including Alcibiades, listing items of various kinds and the prices which they fetched.¹⁷ One other text gives us a treaty made by the Athenian fleet with Selymbria, on the Propontis, in 408, when Alcibiades was acting as a commander of the fleet but his condemnation in 415 had not yet been annulled, followed by the decree of the Athenian assembly to ratify the treaty which Alcibiades proposed in 407 after his return to Athens (and we have a smaller fragment of a similar text for a body of exiles from Clazomenae, on the Aegean coast of Asia Minor).¹⁸

Modern Studies

In modern work as in ancient, Alcibiades appears in general histories of the period, such as the *Cambridge Ancient History*,¹⁹ and he appears in the four-volume history of the Peloponnesian War and its antecedents by D. Kagan.²⁰ J.K. Davies' *Athenian Propertied Families* is not always easy to use, but is a very rich collection of evidence for and discussion of family connections and property.

The best of the earlier books devoted specifically to Alcibiades is in French and dates from the mid twentieth century: J. Hatzfeld, *Alcibiade*. An article by M.F. McGregor, 'The Genius of Alcibiades', was uncritically admiring;²¹ at the other extreme, E.F. Bloedow, *Alcibiades Reexamined*, argued that Alcibiades was both unsuccessful and unimportant. W.M. Ellis, *Alcibiades*, is like this book an account of Alcibiades written for a wide readership. D. Gribble, *Alcibiades and Athens*, is as its sub-title (*A Study in Literary Presentation*) indicates not a life of Alcibiades but a study of the presentation of him in Greek literature. A recent book in German, C. Mann, *Die Demagogen und das Volk*, argues that Alcibiades marked a fundamental break with the kind of political leader Athens had in the century before him. I outlined Alcibiades' career and significance briefly in my inaugural lecture, 'What Alcibiades Did or What Happened to Him'.

Chapter II

Background

Fifth-Century Greece

In the fifth century the world of Greece and the Aegean came to be polarised between the two major city states of Athens and Sparta. Both were much larger than most Greek states. Athens controlled the region of Attica, about 1,000 square miles / 2,600km², and all free adult male Athenians were citizens of Athens (in the 430s there were perhaps about 60,000 citizens, 240,000 citizens with their families and a total population of 500,000). Sparta controlled Laconia and neighbouring Messenia, about 2,400 square miles / 6,200km², in the south-west of the Peloponnese, but citizen rights were limited to a privileged minority (declining from about 8,000 at the beginning of the fifth century to 1,000 or fewer by the middle of the fourth). The rest of the population consisted of *perioikoi* ('those living around'), free to run the local affairs of their own communities but subject to Sparta in foreign policy, and helots ('captives'), serfs farming the land for the Spartan citizens who owned it. By contrast, most Greek states were much smaller: it has been estimated that of all the Greek city states, including those elsewhere around the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, 79 per cent had an area of under 77 square miles / 200km² and another 11 per cent 77–193 square miles / 200–500km².²¹

By the beginning of the fifth century Sparta had become the strongest power on the Greek mainland, with most states in the Peloponnese attached to it through a network of alliances in which Sparta was the leading partner, which modern scholars refer to as the Peloponnesian League. In the course of wars against the invading Persians, in 490 and 480–479, in which Sparta was the overall commander of the mainland Greeks resisting the invaders, Athens spent a surplus from its silver mines on an up-to-date navy of two hundred triremes (ships with three banks of oars, which were thus made more powerful than simpler ships without being impracticably long), far more than any other state possessed. When, after that, the Spartans withdrew from an on-going war against the Persians (to prevent or resist another Persian invasion, and to

liberate those Greeks, particularly on the Aegean coast of Asia Minor, who were still subject to Persia), Athens became the leader of the Greeks who did want to persevere, in an alliance which modern scholars call the Delian League, because its original headquarters was the sacred island of Delos (in the centre of the Cyclades, the islands of the southern Aegean).

At first the Delian League and the Peloponnesian League coexisted; but from c. 460 Athens, while continuing to fight against Persia not only in the Aegean but also in Cyprus and Egypt, also began to build up its power on the Greek mainland, and that led to conflict with Sparta and its allies, in the First Peloponnesian War. But the Athenians were overstretching themselves: regular warfare against Persia came to an end after c. 450 (but there is no good fifth-century evidence for a peace treaty: the so-called Peace of Callias was probably invented to make the glorious past more vivid after a treaty of 387/6 had returned the Asiatic Greeks to Persia²), and in 447–446 Athens lost most of what it had gained on the mainland. The Thirty Years' Peace of 446/5 recognised the existence of a Spartan bloc based on the mainland and an Athenian bloc based on the Aegean. This seemed to represent a victory for Sparta, but the lesson which Athens took from it was that it could not expand in Sparta's orbit but could still expand elsewhere, and the allies in the Delian League were increasingly subjected to Athens in what can fairly be described as an Athenian empire.

The two great states of Athens and Sparta came to be seen, and to see themselves, as opposite in many ways. Athens had a large citizen body, and, with its power based on the navy whose ships were rowed by the poorer citizens, had developed a participatory form of government in which considerable power was exercised by the whole citizen body. By c. 460 the term *demo-kratia* ('people's power') had been coined to refer to this form of government, and Athens began to encourage, and occasionally demand, democratic governments among its allies. Sparta's citizens were a privileged minority within the total population; their communal military life-style produced a degree of political equality among them (though they were not economically equal), but powerful positions were occupied by their two kings and an aristocracy of privileged families, and far more power was exercised by the authorities than in Athens, and far less by the citizens at large. *Aristo-kratia* ('best men's power') and *olig-archia* ('few men's rule') had been coined to refer to undemocratic régimes, and Sparta encouraged such régimes among its allies.

Athens was economically active (its harbour, the Piraeus, became the chief trading centre of the Aegean), while Sparta, further from the sea, aimed much more at self-sufficiency. Athens built up a large financial reserve, while Sparta did not even issue coins of its own. The Athenians enjoyed (by the standards of the time) comfortable and varied lives without much regimentation, while the Spartans by the fifth century were proudly cultivating an old-fashioned and austere military life-style. Athens in the fifth and fourth

centuries (though not earlier or later) was the chief intellectual and artistic centre of the Greek world: although by no means all the practitioners were themselves Athenians, most of the literature which survives from this period was written in Athens, the best-known thinkers of the period spent at least part of their careers in Athens, fine buildings were erected on a much larger scale in Athens than anywhere else (except in distant Sicily),³ much of the best sculpture was produced for Athens, Athenian painted pottery was the most highly prized. Thucydides (himself an Athenian) represents Athens' political leader Pericles as claiming that Athens was 'an education for Greece', and that the Athenians 'lived in the city that was greatest and best provided in all respects'.⁴ Earlier in his history the Corinthians say to the Spartans, 'They [the Athenians] are innovative, and quick to make plans and to fulfil in practice what they decide: your habit is to preserve what you have, and not to make new plans but to fail to accomplish in practice even what is needful. They again are daring even beyond their strength, willing to take risks even beyond their judgment and optimistic even in adversity: your character is not to act in accordance with your strength, not to trust in your judgment even when it is firmly based and to think you will never escape from adversity.'⁵

The Thirty Years' Peace of 446/5 failed to establish a sustainable balance between Athens and Sparta. Athens did continue to increase its interests and power outside mainland Greece, in ways which could be seen as a threat to Sparta's standing. In episodes in the 430s, particularly involving Corinth, the strongest and the most independent-minded of Sparta's allies, Athens behaved in ways which probably did not break the letter of the peace treaty but were more provocative than would have been appropriate if Athens had sincerely wanted to avoid trouble. In 431, after only fifteen of the thirty years, under pressure from Corinth, Sparta and its allies embarked on the Peloponnesian War against Athens. They had persuaded themselves that Athens was in breach of the treaty, but their ultimate objective was to destroy Athens' power. Sparta's final demand to the Athenians was, 'The Spartans want peace, and there could be peace if you would leave the Greeks free.'⁶ In response to that Thucydides gives Pericles a speech in which he tells the Athenians that appeasement would not work; if there must be war, let there be war, and the Athenians are well placed to win it:⁷

We don't want to fight, but by jingo! if we do,
We've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the money too.⁸

The problem was that a land power was setting out to defeat a sea power. Sparta's own hoplites (heavy infantry) were better trained than any others in the Greek world, and with its allies Sparta could outnumber the Athenian land forces. But, thanks to the 'long walls' built in the middle of the century, Athens and the Piraeus were combined in a single well-fortified area (siege machinery was still primitive, and at this time walled cities were rarely taken by force); Athens had the best-trained sailors and could outnumber the

Peloponnesian naval forces; and as long as Athens controlled the sea it could ignore the enemy's devastation of its countryside and import what it needed from elsewhere. If each side concentrated on its strengths, each could avoid defeat but could not secure victory. Thucydides attributes to Pericles a strategy aimed at survival on this basis: there are signs that Pericles' strategy was not in fact as passive as Thucydides would have us think, but, even so, Pericles' aim was probably no more than to emphasise Athens' invulnerability and force the Spartans to acknowledge that they could not win.

Between 430 and 427/6 a plague, worsened by the concentration of the people inside the fortified area, killed about a third of Athens' population, and among those who died from it was Pericles. After his death the Athenians attempted more adventurous strategies, which might have led to positive victory. In the mid 420s they had a run of successes, including the capture at Pylos on the coast of Messenia of a force of Spartans whom they were able to hold as hostages; but that was followed by setbacks, which were due particularly to an uncharacteristically adventurous Spartan, Brasidas. In 422 a battle at Amphipolis, a short distance inland from the north coast of the Aegean, resulted in the death both of Brasidas and of Cleon, an Athenian particularly eager for energetic action against Sparta, and with both of these removed the way was open for those in favour of a settlement to negotiate a treaty. In 421 the Peace of Nicias (named after the Athenian most associated with it) brought the war to an apparent end: in general conquests were to be returned and the situation of 431 was to be restored. Sparta had failed to destroy Athenian power.

But the peace was flawed, and not only because a situation which had not been stable in 431 would not be stable in 421. Several of Sparta's allies did not share its desire for peace and refused to swear to the treaty. Athens threw away its advantage by returning its captives from Pylos before realising that the peace would not be complete and that Sparta would not fully implement it. And, to add to the instability, a treaty between Sparta and Argos, the one major Peloponnesian city which had never accepted Spartan leadership, had kept Argos out of the first phase of the war but expired in 421. Some of Sparta's disgruntled allies joined Argos in a new alliance, and in 420 Alcibiades, born in 451/0 and now old enough to aspire to a leading role, contrived another new alliance in which Athens joined with Argos and some of the others. From now to the end of the war Alcibiades was to be one of the major actors. This alliance offered Athens the prospect, which had not been feasible before, of standing up to Sparta on land in the Peloponnese; but when a battle was fought, at Mantinea in 418, although the Spartans were caught unprepared their discipline still enabled them to defeat their disorganised opponents.

The possibility had already been considered before the war that the Greeks of Sicily and southern Italy might be drawn into it. Athenian intervention to support allies in Sicily, in 427, had to be abandoned in 424 when the Sicilian

Greeks agreed to resolve their disputes on their own without interference from outside, and a further exploratory mission in 422 met with little welcome. But in 416, when a quarrel between Egesta and Selinus in the west of Sicily threatened to expand as Selinus appealed to Sicily's strongest city, Syracuse, Egesta appealed to Athens. Alcibiades was eager to respond. Nicias was not, but his opposition led to the Athenian expedition's being made larger and more ambitious than had originally been intended, and both men were among the generals appointed to command. Two further complications arose before the expedition sailed, in 415. A politician called Hyperbolus called for an ostracism (a procedure by which, once a year, the Athenians had the opportunity to send one man into a kind of honourable exile for ten years), presumably intending that either Alcibiades or Nicias should be removed; but they and their supporters joined forces and it was Hyperbolus himself who was ostracised. And a religious scandal, perhaps originally intended as a last-ditch attempt to prevent the Sicilian expedition, led to charges that Alcibiades and others had been involved in impious mock celebrations of the Eleusinian Mysteries.

Alcibiades left Athens with the expedition, but he was soon recalled to stand trial, and fled into exile in Sparta. The Athenians began a siege of Syracuse, and came close to obtaining its surrender, but a Peloponnesian force with a Spartan commander arrived just in time to put new heart and new energy into the resistance; and in 413, after sizeable reinforcements had not managed to restore the advantage to them, the Athenians had to abandon the siege and the survivors were caught as they tried to withdraw over land. Meanwhile in Greece, in spite of conflicts in various places, the pretence that the Peace of Nicias still held was maintained until in 414 Athens joined Argos in a raid on Spartan territory. Provoked by that and encouraged by the reduction of the manpower still in Athens, in 413 the Spartans established a raiding-post at Decelea in northern Attica. Both the sending of help to Syracuse and the intervention in Attica might have happened even if Alcibiades was not in Sparta, but Thucydides gives the impression that his advice was a crucial factor.

After their failure in Sicily the Athenians no longer seemed invincible, but they resolved to fight on. Some members of the Delian League now made contact with Sparta, and so too did two Persian satraps (provincial governors), Pharnabazus in north-western Asia Minor and Tissaphernes in western Asia Minor. Since the beginning of the war Sparta had hoped to obtain Persian support to redress the financial imbalance, though Persia in return wanted to recover control of the Asiatic Greeks. Recently Athens had been supporting a Persian rebel in Asia Minor, and that helped to bring the satraps off the fence. Sparta could choose between a Hellespont strategy, with the prospect of cutting off Athens' grain supply from the Black Sea, and an Aegean strategy, helped by Chios, which by now was almost the only member of the Delian League which still had warships of its own, and Alcibiades does seem to have

contributed to the decision to start in the Aegean.

However, by now an increasing number of Spartans distrusted Alcibiades. In 412/1 he made his way to the court of Tissaphernes, and from there he made approaches to the Athenians at Samos (which had become their navy's main base in the eastern Aegean), suggesting that if he were recalled and the democracy which had exiled him were replaced by an oligarchy he could divert Persian support from Sparta to Athens. The democracy cost money in stipends (cf. below), and was no longer delivering success. The Persians confirmed their support for Sparta, but in the summer of 411, without Persian support and without Alcibiades, an oligarchic revolution went ahead in Athens, while the Athenian fleet at Samos repudiated the oligarchic movement and invited Alcibiades to join it. The oligarchs in Athens tried unsuccessfully to make peace with Sparta, and in the autumn they were overthrown and replaced by an intermediate régime which cooperated with the fleet. In 410 the full democracy was restored.

A new Spartan naval commander took the war north to the Hellespont, and the Athenians followed. There was then a series of Athenian successes, to which Alcibiades contributed: he had not yet been formally reinstated in Athens, but he acted as one of the commanders of the fleet because the fleet let him do so. He did finally return in 407: his condemnation in absence in 415 was annulled, and he was elected not merely as a regular general but as supreme commander for 407/6.

Continuing hopes that Persia might yet switch to supporting Athens were finally dashed when the King sent his son, Cyrus, to support the Spartans. In 406 a friend of Alcibiades, commanding the fleet while Alcibiades himself was elsewhere, was enticed at Notium into fighting a battle which he lost, and Alcibiades retired into exile again, to the European side of the Hellespont. Tension mounted, and the Athenians won a battle later in the year. In 405 the fleets returned to the Hellespont for the last time, with the Spartans on the Asiatic side and the Athenians opposite them. Alcibiades approached the Athenians once more, but they rebuffed him and then they were defeated by the Spartans and lost most of their ships. Athens was blockaded during the winter, and in 404 surrendered and was made a subordinate ally of Sparta with a Spartan-backed oligarchy.

For Athens this was not the end. The democracy was restored in 403, in 395 Athens joined some former allies of Sparta in a new war against Sparta, and Sparta's conduct in the Greek world was such that Athens gained considerable support when in 378 it founded a new league to champion the freedom of the Greeks against Sparta. For Alcibiades it was the end: he now joined the satrap Pharnabazus, but his Athenian enemies persuaded the Spartans and the Spartans persuaded Pharnabazus that he should be put to death.

Fifth-Century Athens

(For public places in Athens see plates 5–7.) By *c.* 500 most Greek cities had a form of constitutional government based on regularly (usually annually) appointed officials, a manageably small council and an assembly of citizens. There was room for local variation over such issues as qualifications (in terms of birth and of property) for holding office, for membership of the assembly and for the other basic rights of citizens, and the relative powers of officials, council and assembly, but by this time in most places men rich enough to fight as hoplites enjoyed a measure of political power. Many cities, in the course of reaching that stage, had been through a phase of ‘tyranny’, in which one man seized power and controlled the state, sometimes benignly but sometimes not, sometimes working through but sometimes suppressing the existing constitutional machinery.

Athens had been ruled by tyrants from *c.* 546 to 510, and in 508/7 Cleisthenes, in the course of competing against a political rival, had been responsible for a new articulation of the citizen body, in ten artificial ‘tribes’, each composed of three ‘thirds’ in different regions of Attica (the city, the coast apart from the strip of it which was included in the city region, and the inland), and the thirds in turn composed of one or more local units known as demes, in such a way that the demes comprising a ‘third’ were often but not always neighbouring demes.⁹ This structure henceforth formed the basis of many aspects of the Athenians’ civic life, and in particular the council of five hundred which prepared the assembly’s business was recruited from all the demes in proportion to their size. The result was to unify the citizen community as a whole, by cutting across old loyalties (though older associations were not abolished), and by requiring large-scale participation at local as well as at city level it made the Athenians accustomed to political activity. Membership of these units was hereditary: rich families might own property in more than one place; there seems not to have been much mobility before the Peloponnesian War,¹⁰ but by the beginning of the fourth century many Athenians no longer lived in the deme in which their family had been registered when the system was set up.

What led Athens to a fuller democracy was partly practice in working that system, and partly the growing importance of the navy, which meant that the poorest citizens could feel that they mattered for the success of the state as they did not in other states. In 462/1 the Areopagus, an ancient council comprising all former holders of the office of archon (in the sixth century the nine archons had been Athens’ most important officials) was deprived of judicial powers of political significance, in 457/6 the archonship and presumably most other offices were opened to all but the poorest citizens,¹¹ and about the same time payment for serving on juries was introduced, as the first of a range of payments intended to make it easier for the poorer men to devote some of their time to public service.

In Athens, in accordance with widespread Greek practice, the council of five hundred prepared the assembly's business. What was distinctive about the Athenian version of this practice was, first, that on very many matters great and small the final right of decision lay with the assembly, and, secondly, that although when the council referred a matter to the assembly it could make a positive recommendation, it did not have to do so, and in any case, when the matter reached the assembly, any citizen could make a speech, and could put forward a proposal or an amendment to somebody else's proposal. Decisions were taken (as usual in Greece) by a simple majority, usually on a show of hands which was probably estimated rather than precisely counted. Political parties, with programmes, members and discipline, did not exist: there will have been some men who commonly supported Pericles (for a variety of reasons), some who commonly opposed him, and many who made up their minds on individual issues. No leader, however popular, could be sure that the assembly would always vote as he wanted: when we say that at a certain time Pericles was dominant we mean only that he was one of the most prominent politicians and that the assembly voted as he wanted more often than not; Thucydides' comment that under Pericles Athens had 'in theory democracy but in fact rule by the first man'¹² was the result of wishful thinking.

Administrative work was shared out among a large number of citizen officials, often boards of ten, appointed for one year, mostly by lot from volunteers: the thinking was that the citizens should be involved rather than that the work should be done by those best qualified. Most positions a man could hold only once in his life, so many men were needed to fill the positions, though presumably some men held a number of different appointments in different years. It was, however, recognised that military commanders needed ability as well as public-spiritedness: the ten generals and the officers below them were elected and could be re-elected indefinitely, and for much of the fifth century, when Athens was at the head of the Delian League, the generalship was often held by prominent politicians, so that in effect the Athenians elected their political leaders.

Athens had some special judicial procedures for particular charges, but a typical lawsuit in the second half of the fifth century involved a prosecution by an individual citizen (the injured party or a relative in 'private' suits; any citizen in 'public' suits), and a trial lasting not longer than one day in a court where the presiding official controlled procedure (but was an ordinary citizen doing that job for that year, not a legal expert), where prosecutor and defendant presented their own cases (they could assign part of their time to supporting speakers, and if rich enough could pay to have a speech written for them, but again there were no expert advocates), and where the decision lay with a jury of hundreds or thousands. In 453/2 thirty travelling magistrates were instituted, amateurs like other officials, to travel round the demes and decide the smallest 'private' cases locally.

Athens' alliance, the Delian League, began as a free alliance of

independent states formally committed to having the same friends and enemies and in fact aimed at continuing the war against the Persians. As it became more of an empire, especially after the middle of the century, Athens interfered in the internal affairs of the members in various ways — not merely levying money ('tribute') from them, but sometimes imposing a democratic constitution, sometimes imposing Athenian governors and garrisons, sometimes confiscating land and giving it to Athenians who would act as an informal garrison, transferring lawsuits to Athenian courts, requiring offerings at Athenian religious festivals — but the member states remained technically autonomous states with their own laws and their own governments, and in view of the Greeks' widespread attachment to the autonomy of their own communities, they would probably have considered it more oppressive to be deprived of that autonomy even if in return they were given citizenship of a greater Athens. In these respects the Athenian empire resembled the Soviet empire in eastern Europe rather than the Roman empire or the empires of the western European nation-states.

As everywhere until recently, women had no political rights in Athens (but from 451/0 they were important in that to be a citizen a man had to have an Athenian mother as well as an Athenian father); as still today, children had no political rights (men acquired most of their rights, including membership of the assembly, at eighteen, but could not hold office or serve on juries until they were thirty). The population also included many non-Athenians: metics ('migrants') who had come to Athens from elsewhere, and who might be rewarded with citizenship for exceptional services but whose families could otherwise remain in Athens for generations without acquiring an entitlement to citizenship; and slaves, non-Athenian and often non-Greek, acquired by capture in war or by purchase, who were the property of their owners and had only minimal protection against maltreatment. It was partly because of the availability of non-citizens to do other kinds of work that the citizens were able to devote so much time to public affairs.


Athens was not like any modern state, either in the ways in which the citizens took part in public life or in the kinds of non-citizen to be found within it. (But it was more like a modern state than were many Greek states, in that probably, because of its size and complexity — for much of the fifth century running the Delian League as well as its own community — it did more through formal institutions and less through informal contacts between friends than did smaller and simpler states.) For the men who were born Athenian it went as far as was practicable in the direction of involving everybody in the running of the state. But that still did not and could not mean total equality. Even with the provision of stipends, it was easier for rich men than for poor men to spend large amounts of time on public affairs; men living in or near the city could participate in business transacted in the city more easily than men living 30 miles / 50km away; educated men could cope with the business more successfully than uneducated men (various institutions

presuppose that the normal politically-involved citizen had a minimum of literacy, more so in the fourth century than in the fifth, but we do not know what proportion of citizens actually had that minimum).

Leaders were still needed. Down to the time of the Peloponnesian War they seem mostly to have come from the families which had dominated Athens for the past two hundred years or more, an aristocracy not in the sense of having been formally ennobled (though some laid claim to divine or heroic ancestors) but in that they were the families which had emerged most successful, owning the largest quantities of good land and enjoying the most influence, from the ‘dark age’ of the centuries around 1000 BC. Since the early sixth century political rights had formally been based on wealth rather than family, and the range of ways in which wealth could be gained or lost had increased, but this had not immediately produced a dramatic change in the class of men most powerful in Athens. But from the 420s rich men from families which had not been important before increasingly rose to prominence, and we shall see that in his generation Alcibiades was unusual, as an aristocrat (as defined here) at a time when most leaders were not.

Alcibiades’ Family¹³

We learn from Isocrates that Alcibiades was a Eupatrid on his father’s side and an Alcmaeonid on his mother’s.¹⁴ The two labels are not comparable. Eupatrid (‘well-born’) refers in general to that aristocracy which dominated Athens from its emergence from the dark age until the late fifth century, and does not identify a particular family or group of families within it. Alcmaeonid does denote a particular extended family in Athens, which played a prominent but controversial role in politics from the late seventh century to the late fifth (Pericles also was an Alcmaeonid on his mother’s side: see below). The father’s family cannot be traced further back than the great-great-grandfather Alcibiades I, said to have been involved in the overthrow of the tyranny at the end of the sixth century;¹⁵ it is possible that they belonged to the *genos* known as the *Salaminioi*, a group associated with Athens’ interest in the island of Salamis from c. 600 onwards.¹⁶ The Alcmaeonids were Eupatrid but seem to have been unusual in not having a strong link with any particular cults, and to have sought to compensate by building up their power base in other ways.¹⁷ Our Alcibiades (III) thus belonged to a large and complex network of intermarried families which includes a high proportion of the Athenians who were most prominent in the sixth and fifth centuries.¹⁸



The Family of Alcibiades

This selective table shows the people most closely related to Alcibiades. Individuals are numbered as in Davies, A.P.F.; the subject of this book is Alcibiades III.

The great-grandfather Cleinias I was sufficiently rich and ambitious to contribute a trireme and its crew at his own expense to the fleet which fought against the Persians at Artemisium in 480.¹⁹ The grandfather, Alcibiades II, was ostracised c. 460.²⁰ It was presumably at the same time, when under Ephialtes and Pericles Athens was abandoning the pro-Spartan policy which it had followed in the 470s and 460s, that he renounced his position as *proxenos* for Sparta (an Athenian who looked after Spartans and Spartan interests in Athens).²¹ We learn from Thucydides that Alcibiades was a Spartan name, which had come into the Athenian family through its Spartan connection, so that connection must reach well back into the sixth century.²² The father, Cleinias II, was killed at the battle of Coronea in 447–446, when Boeotia, to the north of Attica, rose against Athens.²³ It used often to be thought that he was the Cleinias who proposed a decree about the collection of tribute from the Delian League, but there were many Athenians called Cleinias, and it now appears that the decree should be dated c. 425–424.²⁴

Our Alcibiades' mother, the wife of Cleinias II, was Deinomache, the daughter of the Megacles (IV) who was ostracised in 486, the head of the Alcmaeonid family in his generation; and she had a brother, Megacles V.²⁵ Agariste II, the mother of Pericles I, was a sister of that Megacles.²⁶ Cleinias II had a brother, Axiochus, who with our Alcibiades was condemned for the profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries in 415;²⁷ and an Alcibiades of the deme Phegus, also involved in the scandals of 415, was probably the son of a sister of Cleinias II and Axiochus.²⁸ Our Alcibiades (III) had a younger brother, Cleinias IV, who seems to have been a seriously unstable person.²⁹

Alcibiades himself married in the late 420s Hipparete I, the daughter of Hipponicus; her father was from an outstandingly rich family, and her mother had previously been married to Pericles. Two children are known, a daughter and a son, Alcibiades IV; there may well have been an older son, named Cleinias after his grandfather, who died in infancy; and four illegitimate

children by four different non-Athenian women are alleged.³⁰ We are told that he not only received the enormous dowry of 10 talents with Hipparete, but demanded a further 10 talents when the first child was born.³¹ Distressed by his womanising, Hipparete first went to live with her brother Callias, and later applied for a divorce, in which case he would have had to return the dowry: when she did that, Alcibiades seized her and took her back to his house, but she died not long afterwards.³² It was alleged that Callias was so afraid of Alcibiades that he made over his property to the state if he should die without an heir, so that Alcibiades should not be able to claim it.³³

In the system of tribes, thirds and demes described above, as was appropriate for a family which was prominent in public life, the Alcibiades–Cleinias line belonged to the deme Scambonidae, in the northernmost part of the area inside the city walls of Athens: its tribe was Leontis. (It was one of five demes inside the walls, which were assigned to five of the ten tribes.)

Chapter III

Childhood and Early Career: 451–416

Alcibiades (for a bust which is possibly of him see plate 1) is first attested as one of Athens' ten generals in 420/19.¹ It is very likely that the generals like other officials had to be at least thirty years old, and we may guess that the ambitious Alcibiades would hold the position at the earliest possible opportunity, in which case he will have been born in 451/0. He is first attested as an ordinary soldier in 432/1,² and if he was born in 451/0 that will have been the first year in which, as a man who had reached the age of eighteen, he was eligible for military service. Since he was given his paternal grandfather's name, we can assume that he was the elder of his father's two sons, and that his father Cleinias II was born *c.* 480 and married Deinomache not long before Alcibiades was born. Alcibiades' brother Cleinias IV will have been born about two years later.³

In the ceremony called *amphidromia*, perhaps on the fifth day from birth, the new-born child was carried round the hearth, and at a family occasion on the tenth day the child was named. Boys were not registered in their demes until they came of age, at eighteen, but Athenians normally belonged also to one of the older hereditary units known as *phratries* ('brotherhoods'), and every year in the autumn at the festival known as *Apaturia* fathers presented to their *phratry* sons (and perhaps also daughters) who had been born in the past year. At another festival, the *Anthesteria* in the spring, boys (and perhaps girls) in their fourth year took part in the ceremony of the *choes* ('jugs') and were presented with a miniature wine-jug.

In upper-class families a wet-nurse (*tithe*) for infants was commonly employed. Spartan nurses were particularly valued, and we know that Alcibiades, whose family as we have seen had Spartan connections, had a Spartan nurse, Amycla.⁴ Children normally lived in the women's part of the house until the age of about six; in Alcibiades' case this phase may have ended slightly early, when in 447 his father died and he was transferred to the house of Pericles (see plate 2), whose own sons were a few years older (below). As an upper-class boy grew older, a *paidagogos* would be engaged to look after him: in Alcibiades' case the *paidagogos* employed by Pericles was

the Thracian Zopyrus, described in the Platonic *Alcibiades i* as ‘the most useless of his household slaves owing to his old age’.⁵ Literally the word means ‘child-leader’, the attendant who took the boy to and from school, but he will also have had considerable responsibility for the boy at home. In Athens as in most Greek states (but not in Sparta) providing education and availing oneself of what was provided were private matters, though Aeschines in the fourth century quotes laws governing the conduct of schools with a view to protecting the pupils from abuse:⁶ separate institutions taught reading, writing and literature, together with arithmetic, gymnastics, and music. About the age of sixteen a boy was again presented to his father’s phratry, and through the *koureotis* (‘hair-cutting’) was formally admitted to membership of it. Finally, after reaching the age of eighteen, in Alcibiades’ case in 432, he was registered as a member of his deme, the act by which he was formally accepted as an adult citizen, eligible to attend the assembly and to fight in the army. We do not know at what age Alcibiades may have started associating with Socrates (see plate 3) and other sophists, but he was already intimate with Socrates when he served in the army in 432/1 (below).

About 457, in the course of the aggressive policy in mainland Greece which it had adopted, Athens gained control of Boeotia, the region immediately to the north of Attica, in which the strongest of several cities was Thebes. By the late 450s that policy had run out of steam, and in 447 a series of events which was to result in the loss of most of Athens’ mainland acquisitions began with a rising in Boeotia. The Athenians sent an army commanded by Tolmides, which captured Chaeronea, in the northwest of Boeotia, but was then defeated at Coronea, further south. Tolmides was among those killed, and so too was Alcibiades’ father Cleinias II, serving as a soldier in the army.⁷ Normally the responsibility for Alcibiades and his brother would have passed to the nearest male relative, Cleinias II’s brother Axiochus if he was old enough, or else Deinomache’s brother Megacles V.⁸ Since that is not what happened, Cleinias II must have made his wishes clear, in a will or otherwise.⁹ According to Plutarch, Pericles I and his older brother Ariphron II, cousins of Deinomache, were appointed guardians; other texts suggest that Pericles was the effective guardian, though one states that Cleinias IV was sent to Ariphron but Ariphron returned him after six months.¹⁰

According to Nepos, the reason why Pericles became guardian was that Alcibiades was said to be Pericles’ step-son,¹¹ which would mean that Alcibiades’ mother Deinomache was the otherwise unknown relative of Pericles who had been married to Pericles and to Hipponicus II (and that Alcibiades’ own wife, Hipparete II, was also his step-sister). Some scholars have been inclined to believe that;¹² but almost certainly, if it were true, we should find more, and more explicit, references to it in our sources, and more probably what Nepos reports as rumour was simply invented to explain why Pericles became Alcibiades’ guardian.¹³

Pericles' wife had borne him two sons before their divorce *c.* 455, Xanthippus II and Paralus; and he had a further son, Pericles II, by Aspasia of Miletus not later than 440.¹⁴ In spite of being chosen by Cleinias, he was probably not the best man to act as guardian of two head-strong boys. He had a reputation for being aloof, and not much interested in the affairs of his household or in ordinary social life.¹⁵ Upper-class children generally spent more time in the company of slaves than of their parents (*cf.* above), and this is likely to have been particularly true in Pericles' household. He is twice cited by Plato as a father who had his sons taught all the standard upper-class accomplishments, such as horse-riding, music and athletics, but who could not teach them to be good men;¹⁶ and Plutarch reports that his sons found him far less generous than they would have liked in supporting them and their wives, and Xanthippus openly quarrelled with him.¹⁷

One story told by several writers links Alcibiades with Pericles: Alcibiades once went to see him, but was told that he was busy considering how to submit his accounts (as Athenian officials were required to do each year) — and Alcibiades remarked that it would be better for him to consider how not to submit his accounts.¹⁸ The Socratic memoirs of Xenophon, known as the *Memorabilia*, include a conversation between Alcibiades ('not yet twenty years old') and Pericles on the nature of law, which displays similar cleverness: Alcibiades induces Pericles to say that law is whatever the assembly enacts, or indeed whatever the ruling body of whatever kind in any state enacts; but he then argues that whatever the ruling body, even a democratic assembly, enacts without gaining the consent of the subjects is violence and illegality. Then Pericles remarks that he was clever at that kind of argumentation when he was Alcibiades' age, and Alcibiades replies that he wishes he had known Pericles then.¹⁹ This is commonly taken to be an example of Alcibiades' perversely using the style of argument he had learned from Socrates; but that is a style of Plato's Socrates rather than Xenophon's Socrates, and in the story Pericles also had favoured that style when he was young, so it may be that Xenophon's point in 'not yet twenty years old' is precisely to exonerate Socrates.²⁰

In another passage, which certainly aims to exonerate Socrates, Xenophon in writing of Critias (a relative of Plato, and the leader of the Thirty who ruled Athens in 404/3) and Alcibiades as two disciples of Socrates reports the accusation that Critias was the most self-serving and violent of the men in the oligarchy and Alcibiades the most uncontrolled and outrageous of those in the democracy: in reply he says that he cannot defend them in so far as they harmed the city, but they were both exceptionally ambitious for power and fame, they associated with Socrates in order to learn the necessary political skills, and they left him once they had learned those skills. They were able to master their improper desires while they associated with Socrates, and fell into bad habits only after they had parted from him (Alcibiades attracted women, and his political influence led to his being corrupted by flatterers).

Socrates should be praised for his good influence while they were with him, not blamed for their degeneration afterwards.²¹

Plutarch has a number of stories about the young Alcibiades. Most of them are not attributed to a named source: we cannot tell whether they at least have a basis in fact or are wholly invented, but they are at any rate true to the character of the kind of person Alcibiades was believed to have been, and the appearance of some of them in earlier texts indicates that those were at any rate already current in the fourth century.

Physically, Alcibiades was at all ages very attractive.²² As a result of an impediment in his speech (strictly, not a lisp, the English word which is often used), he pronounced *r* as if it were *l*: this is remarked on by Aristophanes, and the fact that it was one of the characteristics of his which his son deliberately imitated is remarked on in a fragment from another comedian, Archippus.²³ He was said to be a clever speaker,²⁴ but also one who frequently stumbled in his speech as he searched for the right words.²⁵ He was well enough known to appear already in Aristophanes' first play, the now-lost *Banqueters* of 427, and in the *Acharnians* of 425, as a wordy man fond of fancy vocabulary;²⁶ and in a fragment from the *Banqueters* and fragments from other comedians he appears as a womaniser, and he seems to have been the subject of Aristophanes' *Triphales* (triple phallus).²⁷ According to Plutarch and Athenaeus, perhaps taking too seriously what was alleged in a comedy, Alcibiades had a gilded shield, decorated not with the usual kind of emblem but with Eros, sexual love, wielding a thunderbolt.²⁸ One account of the end of the comedian Eupolis had him drowned by Alcibiades on the way to Sicily in 415, but it was already realised in antiquity that that could not be true since some of Eupolis' plays were written later than 415.²⁹

Once when wrestling Alcibiades bit his opponent's arm: the opponent accused him of biting like a woman, but he replied that he bit like a lion.³⁰ On an occasion when he was playing knucklebones in the street a waggon approached: Alcibiades called out to the driver to stop, but he did not, so Alcibiades then lay down in front of the waggon, daring the driver to continue, and then he abruptly did stop.³¹ When subjected to the usual upper-class education in music (see plate 4), he was happy with stringed instruments; but he objected to the *aulos* (a double-reed pipe, like an oboe), because it deformed the face, and because it was impossible to play that and to sing at the same time — and according to Plutarch his refusal to play the *aulos* set a new fashion.³² However great or little Alcibiades' responsibility, it does seem to be the case that playing the *aulos* went out of fashion for upper-class men in the late fifth century, partly perhaps for the reasons attributed to Alcibiades (and the story was invented that the goddess Athena had objected to the effect on the face), and partly because the music was becoming more elaborate and, as in other fields such as athletics, expert professionals were beginning to take the place of upper-class amateurs.³³

Plutarch continues with two stories attributed to the late-fifth-century

orator Antiphon, warning that they are suspect because Antiphon admitted to hating Alcibiades. On one occasion Alcibiades ran away to Democrates, one of his lovers, and Ariphton wanted to have him publicly proclaimed as a runaway but Pericles prevented that on the grounds that it would achieve nothing. And in a *palaistra* (wrestling-ground) Alcibiades once killed an attendant by striking him violently with a stick.³⁴ Athenaeus also has a story from Antiphon's 'Attack on Alcibiades' that as soon as he came of age he went to Abydos on the Hellespont to take lessons in wickedness from the local women.³⁵ The work does not survive, and we do not know whether it was by Antiphon, or was at any rate written during the lifetimes of Antiphon and Alcibiades, or was a later fabrication.

In the Greek world homosexual relationships were associated with particular stages in a man's life rather than with particular individuals. Further stories are focused on Alcibiades' wilful and usually ungracious treatment of various lovers, to provide a background for the philosopher Socrates' attachment to him and for his much better response to Socrates — most of the time, but sometimes he slipped away and Socrates had to fetch him back. Socrates was born in 469/8,³⁶ so was eighteen years older than Alcibiades. He is a man about whom the truth is exceptionally hard to rescue from the caricature of him by Aristophanes in *Clouds* in 423 and from the presentations of him by Plato and by Xenophon in the fourth century, but it seems clear that, from whatever mixture of motives on his side and on theirs, he did attract upper-class young men to him, and he did among other things see it as his duty to teach them how to think. One other lover is said to have been well treated by Alcibiades. A metic (resident foreigner) sold all that he had and brought the proceeds to Alcibiades: Alcibiades feasted him, returned the money and gave him his backing to bid for a tax-collecting contract, letting him withdraw his bid only when the regular contractors offered him the substantial sum of 1 talent to do so.³⁷

In other stories, Alcibiades hit one teacher who had no text of Homer, but regarded as wasted on boys another teacher who not merely had a text but had corrected it himself.³⁸ Without any serious pretext, but simply for a bet, he hit Hipponicus (II, who was later to become his father-in-law), and the next day invited Hipponicus to punish him.³⁹ He had the tail of his dog cut off, allegedly so that the Athenians should talk about that rather than about worse things he had done.⁴⁰ He kept the painter Agatharchus under arrest in his house, forcing him to abandon other commitments while he decorated the house: according to a speech written by Demosthenes in the 340s, this was a punishment after Agatharchus had been caught in intercourse with Alcibiades' concubine; according to the speech written as if for Phaeax, after three months Agatharchus escaped leaving the work unfinished; according to Plutarch, he did complete the work and then was generously rewarded.⁴¹ When a man called Taureas was a rival *choregos* (rich man appointed to sponsor a team of performers) at a festival, and perhaps objected to a non-Athenian among the

boys in Alcibiades' chorus, Alcibiades hit him in the face in the presence of the audience.⁴² When the parodist Hegemon of Thasos was prosecuted in Athens, he went with the actors' guild to Alcibiades, and Alcibiades went to the Metroum, where documents were kept (that detail at least cannot be true, since the Metroum as a depository of documents was not instituted until after Alcibiades' death) and wiped out the prosecution (which by implication had been written in charcoal on a whitewashed board, a common practice with documents needed only for a short time).⁴³ The general picture which we receive is of an arrogant and violent man, who took no notice of the ordinary restraints on selfish conduct and positively enjoyed shocking people.

In 432, in one of the incidents leading up to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Athens began a siege of Potidaea, in Chalcidice, in the north-west of the Aegean. Both Alcibiades and Socrates served in the force taken by Phormio to reinforce the original contingent. They were not members of the same tribe (Socrates' deme was Alopece, just outside the city walls to the south, and formed part of the tribe Antiochis); but, although the army fought in tribal regiments, we are told that they shared a tent, and, while we might suspect that the story has been improved in the telling, it is unlikely that that would have been stated by Plato if it was known to be impossible.⁴⁴ Alcibiades was wounded, and Socrates both saved him and supported the proposal that the prize for bravery should be awarded to him.⁴⁵ Alcibiades was able to return the favour in the autumn of 424. As part of a multi-pronged attack on Boeotia, an Athenian army under Hippocrates (the son of Pericles' brother Ariphron II) marched into the south-eastern corner of Boeotia and fortified a sanctuary of Delian Apollo ('Delium'). Most of the force then set out on the return march to Athens, but was attacked and defeated by the Boeotians.⁴⁶ Socrates was serving as a hoplite again, Alcibiades this time as a member of the cavalry.⁴⁷ In the course of the Athenians' flight after the battle, Alcibiades came across Socrates and Laches, and saw them safely away from the battlefield.⁴⁸ According to the speech written as if for Phaeax, Alcibiades' father-in-law Hipponicus was killed when serving as a general in that battle; but almost certainly the writer has confused Hipponicus with Hippocrates, the one general mentioned for this campaign by Thucydides, and there is no other reason to believe that (now aged about sixty) Hipponicus served on this campaign in any capacity.⁴⁹

Meanwhile, in the early years of the Peloponnesian War, from 430 to 426/5, Athens suffered from a plague which killed about a third of the population.⁵⁰ Thucydides gives a detailed account, on the basis of which various guesses at the identity of the disease have been made and continue to be made; but there is a strong case for believing that, in view of the mutation of diseases over a period of many centuries, we should not expect to be able to identify it with any disease current today.⁵¹ Among the victims were the sister and the two legitimate sons of Alcibiades' guardian Pericles, and finally Pericles himself, who died in the autumn of 429. According to Plutarch, in

public Pericles maintained his composure until the funeral of his second son, Paralus, but he then gave way to dejection until Alcibiades and others persuaded him to return to public life.⁵² After the death of his two legitimate sons, in breach of Pericles' own law on the criteria for citizenship, the Athenians made his son by Aspasia, Pericles II, a citizen.⁵³

Plutarch mentions, without a date but as Alcibiades' first entrance into public life, an occasion when the assembly was inviting voluntary financial contributions (*epidoseis*). Alcibiades was passing by, outside, heard the applause and asked the reason for it. He then went inside and offered a contribution himself, the people applauded — and a quail which Alcibiades was carrying in his cloak flew away and had to be caught.⁵⁴ The story of the quail is the kind of thing that might have been remembered, though without its context, but the rest of the story cannot be regarded as certain. Voluntary contributions by the rich were possible in the fifth century, as in the case of the trireme contributed in 480 by Cleinias I and that contributed by Alcibiades himself in 415,⁵⁵ but the kind of scenario assumed in this story is attested in the fourth century but not earlier.⁵⁶

Also doubtful is an allegation in the speech written as if for Phaeax that (presumably in 425, when we know from an inscription that there was an extraordinary reassessment of the tribute paid by the member states of the Delian League, resulting in substantial increases) Alcibiades persuaded the assembly to undertake the operation and was one of the ten *taktai* (assessors) who did the work.⁵⁷ It is possible that Alcibiades spoke in support of the operation (though the formal proposer of the decree was Thudippus), but it is highly unlikely that when only in his mid twenties he was influential in the discussion of policy, and we may assume that the *taktai* like other officials had to be at least thirty years old. It is also unlikely that any major figure in Athens as early as c. 415 would have suggested that increasing the tribute to help pay for the war was wrong, and this passage provides one reason for thinking that the text is not a genuine work of the late fifth century but a later composition.

One other item relating to the mid 420s is vouched for by Thucydides and can be accepted. In 425 an Athenian force bound for Corcyra and Sicily fortified Pylos, on the west coast of Spartan-ruled Messenia. The Spartans tried to dislodge the Athenians, but the Athenians got control of the bay, and eventually captured and took back to Athens 292 Spartan citizens from a force which had been landed on Sphacteria, the island at the entrance to the bay.⁵⁸ Thucydides when he first mentions Alcibiades says that he wanted to renew the position of Spartan *proxenos* which his grandfather had renounced, and therefore saw to it that these Spartan prisoners were well treated.⁵⁹

An inscription found in 1988 provides us with reliable evidence for Alcibiades' activity in the assembly slightly earlier than had been attested before (but does not tell us as much as we might have hoped). It is one of a

number of cases where a decree enacted and inscribed under the democracy before 404 was demolished by the oligarchic régime of the Thirty in 404/3, and was then reinscribed after the restoration of the democracy in 403. In this case for the original decree we are given the date of 422/1, and the name of Alcibiades as proposer; the purpose of the decree was to honour Polypeithes from the island of Siphnos, who had continued the support for Athens already displayed by his father and grandfather.⁶⁰ We do not know of any particular connection between Alcibiades' family and this family, or Siphnos more generally, to explain why he should have been the proposer of this decree; and Siphnos is not mentioned at all by Thucydides, or with one exception in other fifth-century Athenian inscriptions apart from those concerned with the tribute of the Delian League.⁶¹

We come next to an important episode in which Alcibiades hoped to be involved but was not, the making of peace between Athens and Sparta at the end of the 420s. By the spring of 423 there were some Spartans who were willing to abandon their aim of destroying the Athenian empire, and their promises to their allies, in order to recover the men captured by the Athenians at Pylos, and Athens' run of successes in the mid 420s was now being followed by a run of setbacks. A one-year truce was negotiated in spring 423, in the hope that during the year a more lasting settlement could be worked out.⁶² Because of a dispute as to whether Scione, in Chalcidice, had defected from Athens to Sparta before or after the truce was made, conflict in that region continued, but the truce did hold elsewhere, and it appears from a corrupt passage in Thucydides that in spring 422 it was renewed, and lasted for about five months longer before it finally lapsed.⁶³ Later in that summer, a battle outside Amphipolis resulted in the death of the Athenian Cleon and the Spartan Brasidas, the men on each side who were most eager for the war to continue,⁶⁴ and in the spring of 421 those who wanted peace were able to make a treaty, the so-called Peace of Nicias, and an alliance with Sparta to reinforce it.

As we saw in ch. II,⁶⁵ the peace was seriously flawed, and although it appeared to have ended the war it produced an extremely unstable situation. Alcibiades wanted not to keep the peace but to align Athens with Argos (now available after the expiry of its thirty-year treaty with Sparta) and fight against Sparta in the Peloponnese, and Thucydides (un-characteristically accepting both reasons rather than considering one genuine and the other a sham) tells us both that Alcibiades thought that a better policy for Athens and also that he was offended because the treaty had been negotiated through Nicias (who was to be a major rival of his in the next few years) and Laches, while he had been spurned because of his youth (he was approaching thirty), and his family's connection with Sparta which (as we saw above) he had been trying to reactivate had not been allowed to tip the balance in his favour.⁶⁶ How much Alcibiades had done for the Spartan prisoners, and how conspicuously, and

whether he had been formally appointed Spartan *proxenos*, we do not know; but in view of his notorious character, and the fact that (as far as we yet know) proposing the decree for Polypeithes had been his only formal involvement in public affairs, it is at any rate not surprising that those working for peace chose not to make use of him.

For what follows Thucydides gives us a narrative which it is hard to accept exactly as it stands.⁶⁷ By the summer of 420 an attempt to add the Boeotians to the Argive alliance had misfired, and Sparta by making a separate alliance with Boeotia had broken an alliance of 421 with Athens with which it had tried to cement the peace treaty. That aroused indignation in Athens, and Argos and its Peloponnesian allies, prompted by Alcibiades, made an approach to Athens. Sparta sent a deputation of its own to Athens, trying to rescue the peace treaty, and one of the three Spartan envoys was Endius, a member of the family with which Alcibiades' family had a long-standing connection.⁶⁸ As Thucydides tells the story, in accordance with normal practice, the Spartans appeared first before the council of five hundred, where they said that they had been given full power (had been made *autokratores*) to resolve all outstanding issues. Alcibiades was afraid that, if they acknowledged that in the assembly, the issues would be resolved and the Peace of Nicias would be saved; so he spoke privately to the Spartans, promising that, if they did not acknowledge to the assembly that they were *autokratores*, he would secure the return of Pylos to them and a settlement of the other matters. (Pylos should have been returned under the peace, but because the Spartans were not fulfilling all their obligations the Athenians had merely withdrawn from it the former helots who had been stationed there to raid Spartan territory, and were still holding on to the site.) Accordingly, they appeared before the assembly and did not acknowledge that they were *autokratores* — and then Alcibiades denounced their mission as a waste of time.

How much freedom did the Spartan envoys have? Greek states had a tendency to make men *autokratores* on particular occasions without spelling out in what ways and to what extent their powers were greater than they would otherwise have been, and it always remained open to the state's assembly to disown their actions and punish them afterwards if the results seemed unsatisfactory. Here it is hard to think that the Spartans were prepared to make serious concessions to Athens, or that they took the risk of committing themselves in advance to whatever terms their envoys might be induced to agree to. Plutarch, elaborating the story but probably not on the basis of reliable evidence, says that Alcibiades told the Spartans that the council tended to be reasonable but the assembly not, and that if they admitted to having full power the assembly would make unacceptable demands.⁶⁹ A further problem is that, even though Alcibiades was now pursuing an anti-Spartan policy, it is hard to believe that he tricked and humiliated Endius in the way which Thucydides describes, and that, if he did so, Endius should

nevertheless have been willing to cooperate with him as he did in 413/2.⁷⁰

It has been argued that, even though the term *autokratores* was used, the Spartan envoys could not have been authorised to accept any demands that Athens might make, and far from tricking them and the Athenians Alcibiades exposed the truth about their mission.⁷¹ Another suggestion has been that Athens and Argos were thrown together by the logic of the situation, and that Alcibiades' intervention in fact made little difference but Alcibiades exaggerated its importance when he himself (as the champion of this view believed) told Thucydides about it later.⁷² One commentator, sympathising with the view that the Spartan envoys were not authorised to accept whatever Athens demanded, thought that perhaps 'Thucydides' judgement was seduced by a touched-up version of the story'.⁷³ Recently it has been remarked that Thucydides 'enjoyed recounting a clever ruse' and 'we should not worry too much about the holes in a good story'.⁷⁴ It must at least have been a public fact that in the assembly Alcibiades denounced the Spartan embassy, although Endius was a member of it, and argued against a settlement with Sparta. What happened in the council and in private conversations must be less certain. It may be that the Spartans had used the term *autokratores* without meaning to give their envoys unlimited power to agree on terms; their response to Nicias afterwards (cf. below) makes it clear that they were not prepared to accept whatever demands Athens might make, and at least to the extent that Alcibiades exposed that fact the first view cited above should be right.

But next a writer more religious than Thucydides might have said that the gods intervened. While the meeting was in progress there was an earthquake, and the assembly was dissolved. It reconvened the next day, and Nicias persuaded it to send a deputation including himself to Sparta, to put Athens' demands to the Spartans directly. The Spartans were influenced by men not in favour of a peaceful settlement with Athens:⁷⁵ Athens' demands were rejected, and all that Nicias obtained was an extra renewal of Sparta's oaths to the treaties of 421. That angered the Athenians, and (although neither side chose to regard the Peace of Nicias as having come to an end until 414–413) they did then make an alliance with Argos, Mantinea and Elis. Alcibiades had obtained for Athens the new alignment which he wanted.

That probably happened towards the end of the Athenian year 421/0. Plutarch has Alcibiades elected general between the collapse of the negotiations with Sparta and the making of the alliance with Argos: if that is to be taken at all seriously, it will mean that he was elected for 420/19; and the first campaign for which Thucydides mentions him as a general is probably to be dated to the end of that year, early summer 419.⁷⁶ He took a small force from Athens to the Peloponnese and, with Athens' new allies, went to Patrae on the south side of the Gulf of Corinth, persuading the people to join their city to the coast with long walls, comparable to those which had joined Athens to the harbour town of the Piraeus since the 450s. He also planned to build a fort at Rhium, to the north-east of Patrae, where the channel

was narrowest (Antirrhium, opposite on the north side of the channel, had been in the hands of friends of Athens at the beginning of the war, but Molycrium, in whose territory it was, was captured by the Peloponnesians in 426 and we do not know what became of it after that:⁷⁷ possession of both would give Athens effective control of entrance to and exit from the inner gulf). However, a demonstration of force by Corinth and Sicyon was enough to prevent that.⁷⁸ On this episode of ‘cocking a snook at Sparta’ it has been remarked that ‘its daring, such as it was, its theatricality, and its small practical value, were alike characteristic of Alcibiades’.⁷⁹

Thucydides attributes both to Alcibiades and to Argos a desire to bring on to their side Epidaurus, on the side of the Argolid facing Athens across the Saronic Gulf, and usually friendly to Sparta as Argos usually was not, ‘in order to keep Corinth quiet’ (though it is not easy to see how it would have that effect) and to make for easier communications between Argos and Athens; and in addition Argos had a grievance about a festival in which Argos and Epidaurus both had an interest.⁸⁰ So began a war which continued intermittently for some time. In one of the campaigns of 419 an Argive attack on Epidaurus was supported by an Athenian force commanded by Alcibiades: this was towards the end of the summer, so Alcibiades will have been re-elected as general for 419/8. In the winter the Argives claimed that by not preventing the Spartans from sending support to Epidaurus by sea the Athenians were in breach of a clause in their alliance by which the participants undertook not to allow hostile forces passage through their territory or by sea: probably they were referring to the Saronic Gulf, as Athens’ home waters, and did not mean that all the sea belonged to Athens and Athens had an obligation to prevent the Spartans from sailing anywhere.⁸¹ On the proposal of Alcibiades the Athenians did not declare the Peace of Nicias to be at an end, but they added to the copy inscribed in Athens a note that the Spartans were in breach of it; and, as the Argives had asked, they reinstated in Pylos the former helots whom they had withdrawn in 421, so that they could resume their raids.⁸²

By the beginning of 418, then, Alcibiades had played an important part in turning Athens to a harder line against Sparta, and he had served as a general commanding Athenian forces sent into the Peloponnese.

The summer of 418 was to see the most important military action in this phase of the war: first, a confrontation between Sparta and Argos outside Argos, which was ended not by a battle but by a truce; and later a major battle outside Mantinea, in which the Spartans might well have been defeated but were in fact victorious.

On the first occasion Athenian forces did not arrive until after the truce had been agreed. Sparta and its allies marched against Argos by three routes from Phlius, to the north; the Argive army went out along the main road in the direction of Phlius; and the upshot was that Sparta’s own division found itself

between the Argive army and the city of Argos, while the Argive army found itself between two divisions of the Spartan army; Thucydides gives the impression that the Argive position was in fact the weaker. What then happened was that the commanders on the two sides agreed to a four-month truce, but in each case found themselves in trouble for throwing away what their own citizens thought had been a prospect of victory.⁸³ After that an Athenian contingent arrived, with two generals, Laches and Nicostratus (the expedition seems at any rate to have been authorised and paid for before the end of 419/8⁸⁴). The Argives at first wanted to send them away on account of the truce, but they were persuaded by the men of Mantinea and Elis, and by Alcibiades, who was present as an envoy, that a truce not accepted by all the alliance was not binding and they should fight on.⁸⁵

It is striking that the Athenian contingent did not arrive until after the truce, and that when it did arrive Alcibiades was not one of the generals in command but was serving only as an envoy. The Spartans had not begun their campaign against Argos until 'the middle of the summer',⁸⁶ later than the usual beginning of fighting, and the mustering of their Peloponnesian allies will have taken some time and have become widely known: it would be surprising if, as has been suggested, the Athenians' late arrival was due only to logistical problems.⁸⁷ Probably the description of Alcibiades as an envoy means that he was not merely not in command of that force but he was not one of the generals for 418/7;⁸⁸ and, without conjuring up anachronistic views of a 'peace party' and a 'war party', we may wonder if the non-election of Alcibiades (even if not for reasons of policy but 'through some lawless prank which temporarily lost him his popularity'⁸⁹) and the late arrival of this contingent are connected, to the extent that, whether because there was less commitment to the Argive alliance or because there was less trust in Alcibiades, the Athenians did not in the spring of 418 show as much enthusiasm for the war in the Peloponnese as they might have done.

This means that Alcibiades did not, as far as we know, take part in the battle of Mantinea later in 418, the largest set-piece land battle of the Peloponnesian War. The forces of Argos, Mantinea and Athens took up a position by Mantinea in the northern part of an hour-glass-shaped plain in Arcadia, and the Spartans went to Tegea in the southern part of the plain to prevent it from going over to the anti-Spartan alliance (the contingent from Elis had returned home after the allies had voted to campaign there rather than against enemies of Elis). The Spartans, marching northwards, were caught unprepared by their enemies, marching southwards, and in an attempt to reform so as to engage effectively they created a gap in the middle of their own line. If they were ever to be defeated on land, it should have happened now; but their enemies were not sufficiently experienced in fighting together, and the Spartans' own discipline enabled them to obtain the victory in spite of their inauspicious start.⁹⁰ Immediately, the war between Argos and Epidaurus continued, and while the Spartans were celebrating a festival Argos and its

allies (including Elis once more) began to invest Epidaurus.⁹¹ However, the battle which might have ended the Spartans' predominance in the Peloponnese in fact enabled them to reassert it; the hopes with which Alcibiades had led Athens into the alliance of 420 had been dashed.

In the winter of 418/7 the Spartans made an approach to Argos, hoping that after the battle of Mantinea the Argives opposed to their city's current democracy would be able to achieve a change of constitution and an alliance with Sparta. Alcibiades was present as an envoy once more, but he was unable to prevent the alliance, Mantinea also came to terms with Sparta, and the Athenians were obliged to withdraw from the siege of Epidaurus.⁹² But in the following summer the democrats in Argos recovered the upper hand, and, with a view to renewing their alliance with Athens, with Athenian help they started building long walls to join their city to its harbour — a plan attributed by Plutarch to Alcibiades, plausibly enough.⁹³ The alliance was not formally renewed until the spring of 416;⁹⁴ and it will have been about that time that Alcibiades, who had been elected general once more for 417/6, went with a squadron of ships to Argos and took three hundred Spartan sympathisers as hostages.⁹⁵ In 415 Alcibiades' own friends in Argos were suspected of opposition to the democracy, and Athens returned the hostages to Argos to be executed.⁹⁶

Thucydides does not mention Alcibiades at all in connection with Athens' siege and capture of Melos, which claimed (whether correctly or not) to have been founded from Sparta, and was the only island state in the Aegean still holding out against Athens' power, in the winter of 416/5. Athens had made an attempt on Melos during the Archidamian War, and in 425 had included it in the optimistic list of states assessed to pay tribute;⁹⁷ but as far as we know it had never even briefly gained control of Melos, and we know no reason for the decision to attack in 416 (but the fact that Athens' allies joined in the attack suggests that some justification was claimed).⁹⁸ In the end Melos was betrayed to the Athenians, the men still on the island were killed and the women and children were enslaved. Thucydides writes up this episode at length, with a dialogue between the hard-headed Athenians and the Melians who hope in vain that the gods or the Spartans will save them, presumably intending to contrast Athens' crushing of Melos with its disastrous overreaching itself in the Sicilian expedition of 415–413 immediately afterwards,⁹⁹ and in the fourth century this was particularly cited as a 'war crime',¹⁰⁰ but it was not unprecedented: indeed, immediately before it Thucydides writes of Sparta's equally cruel treatment of Hysiae, in the Argolid, in 417/6, but in just eighteen words.¹⁰¹

In the speech written as if for Phaeax (which will be discussed in the following chapter), and in Plutarch's *Alcibiades*, it is alleged that Alcibiades spoke in the assembly in support of the treatment meted out to the Melians, and also that he himself bought one of the women captives and had a son by her.¹⁰² That he supported the proposal in the assembly is entirely possible

(neither text suggests that he was its originator). That he had a son by one of the women enslaved when Melos fell to Athens would be in character (which does not help us to decide whether it is true or a plausible invention), but even if (as I believe) the ostracism in connection with which the speech purports to be written is to be given its latest possible date, the spring of 415, the boy could not have been born as soon as then, and this is one reason for believing that the speech cannot in fact have been written at the time of that ostracism.

Chapter IV

The Sicilian Expedition and Alcibiades’ Exile: 415–413

Thucydides writes only about the Peloponnesian War and matters which he considers relevant to it, but passing allusions can be combined with later texts to show the position which Alcibiades came to occupy in Athens in the years after the Peace of Nicias.

We have seen already that Alcibiades took offence at the Athenians’ use of Nicias rather than himself to make peace with Sparta in 421, and that in 420 he set about making Athens an ally of Argos, in the hope of challenging Sparta in the Peloponnese, while Nicias defended his treaty.¹ Alcibiades and Nicias became political and personal rivals — and they were men of very different kinds. Nicias was twenty years or so older than Alcibiades.² While Alcibiades belonged to the old aristocracy but behaved in flamboyant ways, Nicias was a first-generation politician, though one who tried to behave like and to make himself acceptable to the aristocrats, who had gone into public life after his father had grown rich through contracts to work the silver mines. While Alcibiades was an adventurous man, whose hope of joining Argos to defeat Sparta on land fits his character, Nicias was a cautious man, who had served well enough as a general in perhaps every year since 427/6,³ but who seems to have been more anxious to avoid defeat than to gain success. Nicias was pious in a conventional way — and Thucydides, who does not himself come across as a religious man, writes in connection with his death in Sicily in 413 that ‘he was the least deserving of the Greeks in [Thucydides’] time to reach such an extreme of misfortune, because his whole life had been conducted with a view to virtue’⁴ — but Alcibiades, as we have seen, was shamelessly outrageous.

The rivalry between the two men is shown nicely by their involvement in two festivals. The Athenians had ‘purified’ the Ionians’ sacred island of Delos, by removing all bodies buried there and forbidding births and deaths there, in 426/5, and they had established or re-established a major four-yearly festival of Apollo there.⁵ Rich Athenians were required to perform ‘liturgies’ (public services) at their own expense, by supporting participants in a festival

or a ship in the navy, and Nicias was an enthusiastic performer of festival liturgies. In particular, in 417 he went to great effort and expense in leading Athens' delegation to that year's Delian festival.⁶ In 416 Alcibiades was involved spectacularly in the Olympic games, in a more self-centred way. It is alleged that he was provided with a magnificent tent by the city of Ephesus, fodder for his horses and animals for sacrifice by Chios and other provisions by Lesbos. In the chariot race he entered seven teams, and his best three came first, second and fourth. There were also charges of sharp practice: he borrowed the gold and silver plate of the official Athenian delegation and used the items as if they were his own; and, after buying a chariot with a team of horses from the city of Argos on behalf of another Athenian, he entered that in the race as if it were his own.⁷ The incident of the chariot led to the prosecution of Alcibiades' son, Alcibiades IV, when he came of age c. 397;⁸ we do not know the outcome of the trial. He seems also in the years before that to have competed at other festivals — the Nemean games, the Pythian games, and probably in 418 the Great Panathenaea — and it seems likely that he had been using up his capital at a rate which would in any case have led to financial trouble at some time.⁹

There were, of course, a number of other prominent politicians in Athens at this time, and two of them deserve mention at this point. Hyperbolus was a populist man of the kind for which the word 'demagogue' (*demagogos*, 'people-leader') had been coined; and after Cleon, the most influential demagogue of the 420s, had been killed in a battle in 422 he aspired to succeed to Cleon's position. He seems to have been a member of the council in 421/0,¹⁰ and passages from comedy suggest that he was an advocate of adventurous policies, and that for some reason not made clear to us he was considered particularly contemptible.¹¹ Phaeax, another man mentioned in connection with the ostracism to which we shall come next, seems on the evidence available to us to have been somewhat less prominent, but he had served as an envoy to Sicily and Italy in 422, and he is mentioned by the comedians as a speaker but not an admired speaker.¹²

Ostracism was a device by which the Athenian assembly could vote each year to send a man into a kind of honourable exile for ten years, without finding him guilty of any offence. First, about January, the assembly had to decide whether to hold an ostracism; if it voted to do so, then about March/April there was a special session in the agora at which there was no list of candidates but each voter would hand in an *ostrakon* (potsherd) on which he had written (or had got somebody to write for him) the name of the man he wanted to exile; and as long as at least 6,000 votes were cast in total the man with the highest number had to go. Probably some voters named a man against whom they had a private grudge — 'the man who cut down my vines' or 'who raped my daughter', for instance — but the men who attracted large numbers of votes were public figures, voted against for one or more aspects of their public persona. Ostracism had in fact become a contest between rival

political leaders, in which the more popular was left in Athens and the less popular was removed: for instance, c. 443 Pericles was left in Athens and his opponent Thucydides the son of Melesias was ostracised. Several thousands of the *ostraka* have survived, mostly from the earliest ostracisms, in the 480s and the 470s: most give just the intended victim's name, sometimes with his father's name and/or his deme, but a few add comments of various kinds (one cast against Aristides 'the just' in 482 is restored to specify 'Aristides son of Lysimachus, who drove away [or 'who killed'] the suppliants'¹³). For *ostraka* used against Alcibiades and Hyperbolus see plates 8–9.

Not later than 415 what was to be Athens' last ostracism took place. According to Plutarch, who tells the story three times in different *Lives*, Hyperbolus proposed an ostracism, in which he intended the people to choose between Alcibiades and Nicias (or, according to one of Plutarch's sources, but less probably, between Alcibiades and Phaeax); but the supporters of Alcibiades and of Nicias (or of Phaeax) joined forces to vote against Hyperbolus, and it was Hyperbolus who attracted the largest number of votes and was ostracised.¹⁴ There are thirty or so surviving *ostraka* which can be associated with this episode: Alcibiades, Nicias, Phaeax and Hyperbolus are all represented, along with seven other men including Cleophon, who was to be a leading demagogue in the last years of the Peloponnesian War, and a brother of his. Although there were no organised and disciplined political parties, leading politicians tended to have some men on whose support they could normally rely and others whom they could at any rate sometimes persuade to support them; *ostraka* written by the same hand or on sherds from the same pot could be evidence for an attempt to organise votes against a candidate (two of the five against Alcibiades are by the same hand, on joining fragments of the same tile¹⁵), and the story of collusion between Alcibiades and Nicias could be true. Hyperbolus would presumably have preferred to exile Alcibiades, who was a greater threat to himself, because he was a champion of adventurous policies as Hyperbolus was, and was an aristocrat who was beating the upstart demagogues at their own game. Probably what happened was that the clever Alcibiades suggested to Nicias that he (Nicias) was in danger of being ostracised, and by this ruse he both removed Hyperbolus and placed Nicias under an obligation to him. Though the annual vote on whether to hold an ostracism continued into the fourth century, no ostracism was held after this: it was not (as our sources claim) that the wretched Hyperbolus was considered an unworthy victim, but the unexpected outcome showed that ostracism was a weapon which might not hit its intended target, and instead politicians attacked their rivals through lawsuits aimed specifically at them or at men connected with them.

This ostracism cannot have been held later than 415: by the end of that year Nicias was in Sicily, from which he would not return alive, and Alcibiades was in Sparta, condemned to death in his absence for involvement in religious scandals at which we shall look below.¹⁶ Hyperbolus was

murdered in Samos in 412/1, and a fragment from the fourth-century historian Theopompus appears to say that he was ostracised for six years,¹⁷ which seemed to point to an ostracism in 417 if one assumes exclusive counting or 416 if inclusive. However, there is an inscription which has been restored to show Hyperbolus still in Athens in the summer of 417;¹⁸ and it has plausibly been suggested that Theopompus actually produced a list, of a kind of which the Greeks were fond, in which Cleon had been leading demagogue for x years [to his death in 422] and next Hyperbolus for six years — and that would point to a date for the ostracism of 416 or 415. A credible scenario can be constructed for any of the years in question: 417 in the aftermath of the battle of Mantinea; 416 when Athens' alliance with Argos was finally renewed (and the delay may be seen as a sign of ongoing disagreement within Athens); 415 when the contentious plans for the great Sicilian expedition were being discussed.¹⁹

I have mentioned several times above a speech written as if for Phaeax but transmitted to us as [Andocides] (IV) *Against Alcibiades*. In it the decision to hold an ostracism has already been taken; the speaker assumes that the potential victims are Alcibiades, Nicias and himself (apparently Phaeax, though the name is not given), and concentrates on attacking Alcibiades. While there may have been speeches on the occasion when the assembly decided whether to hold an ostracism, we have no indication that speeches were made at any later point in connection with the ostracism, so there is no credible occasion when this speech could have been delivered. What was circulated as a pamphlet might have been written in the form of a speech (like most of Isocrates' 'speeches'), but there are things in this text which it is hard to accept as written at that time: in particular, the comment on Alcibiades and the Delian League's tribute, and the allegation that Alcibiades had a son by a woman captured in Melos.²⁰ So the speech is probably not a contemporary work but a later rhetorical exercise (not necessarily much later: it could have been written in the fourth century). It refers to Melos, and to Alcibiades' involvement in the Olympic games in the summer of 416,²¹ but it does not mention the Sicilian expedition, which was being planned by the spring of 415. The best explanation is that the author is envisaging an ostracism in spring 415, but has not thought carefully enough about the context, and so mentions a child who could not have been born until slightly later and omits the Sicilian expedition which at that point was under discussion. But I am prepared to assume that he tried to set his speech in 415 because he knew that that was when this ostracism took place, and I therefore consider 415 to be the most likely date for this ostracism. Whatever the date, the outcome was that, while Hyperbolus was removed, Alcibiades and Nicias were left in Athens to continue their rivalry. That came to a climax in connection with the great Sicilian expedition.

Athens began to take an interest in Sicily and southern Italy, an area containing a large number of Greek colonies, not later than about the middle

of the fifth century: in 433/2 already-existing alliances with Rhegium, on the toe of Italy, and Leontini, in eastern Sicily, were reaffirmed as the Peloponnesian War approached and the involvement of the west in it seemed likely.²² Most of the powerful states in the west belonged to the Dorian strand of the Greek people, and Sparta hoped for their support in the Peloponnesian War, but they sent no help until 412.²³ Between 427 and 424 there were Athenian forces in the west, sent originally to support Leontini against its neighbour Syracuse, the strongest city in Sicily, but eventually involving sixty or more ships, and a hope that they would get control of Sicily for Athens. They had to withdraw in 424 when Hermocrates of Syracuse frightened the Sicilians with his view of Athens' ambitions and persuaded them to resolve their disputes on their own without the intervention of outsiders — which left Syracuse unrivalled in Sicily and enabled it to take over Leontini.²⁴ Another attempt by Athens to intervene in the west, a diplomatic mission in 422 led by Phaeax, was abandoned when he found less support for Athens than he had hoped.²⁵

One city in Sicily which was an ally of Athens was Egesta, in the northwest, non-Greek but hellenised (see plate 10). An inscription which has often been dated to the 450s now seems to belong to 418/7 (only the last two letters of the archon's name, -on, are clearly visible, but repeated work on the stone has enabled enough to be read of the name [An]tiphon), and is best interpreted as recording the reaffirmation in that year of an alliance made c. 427.²⁶ Egesta became involved in a war with Selinus, on the south coast in the west of the island, and, when Selinus had gained the support of Syracuse, in the winter of 416/5 Egesta appealed to Athens. Some Athenians saw this as an opportunity not only to help Selinus but also to refound an independent Leontini and 'to settle the other affairs in Sicily in the way they judged best for the Athenians'.²⁷ Some may have hoped for more even than that. The most extravagant version of Athens' ambitions is attributed to Alcibiades in a speech which he made in Sparta when he had arrived there as an exile later in 415: 'We sailed to Sicily first, if we could, to conquer the Sicilian Greeks, after them the Italian Greeks too, and after that to make an attempt on the Carthaginian empire and Carthage itself' — and then Athens could return with greater strength to attack the Peloponnesians.²⁸ Egesta offered to pay the costs of an Athenian campaign, and the Athenians began by sending envoys to find out about the state of the war and the state of Egesta's finances.²⁹ Thucydides' detailed narrative begins in the spring of 415: the envoys returned with an Egestan delegation and an advance payment of 60 talents (enough to pay the crew of sixty triremes for a month) — but later he reveals that the Athenians had been fooled, being taken to parties in different houses on different days and seeing what were in fact the same items of silver plate again and again.³⁰ As with the story of Alcibiades' tricking the Spartan envoys in 420,³¹ it is hard to believe that what actually happened was as simple as Thucydides' account of it, but evidently Athens' envoys wanted to be

persuaded, and were persuaded too easily.

Thucydides jumps to the Athenians' formal decision to send a force of sixty ships with three generals, Alcibiades, Nicias and Lamachus;³² Alcibiades was keen on the expedition; Nicias was opposed to it, but was appointed, presumably because he had a sufficient body of support in the assembly rather than because the Athenians hoped that he and Alcibiades would each counteract the excesses of the other;³³ Lamachus was another older man, who had served often as a general and seems to have been in favour of energetic campaigning.³⁴ We learn not from Thucydides but from fragments of an inscription that at one point the Athenians seem to have contemplated sending not three generals but just one (presumably Alcibiades), and possibly that (despite their hopes of funding from Egesta) they set aside for financing the campaign the substantial sum of 3,000 talents.³⁵

Four days after that formal decision, at an assembly to make further arrangements for the expedition, Nicias tried to get the decision reversed. Thucydides' account begins with a speech by him, arguing that Athens still has enemies near at hand, and ought not to look for distant conquests which it might achieve in the short term but would have difficulty in retaining in the long term, and casting doubt on Alcibiades' motives for supporting the expedition. Alcibiades replies that his ostentatious lifestyle is good for Athens' reputation as well as for himself, and defends the expedition and predicts success for it. Nicias in a second speech stresses the strength of the Sicilians and the forces which will be needed to defeat them. Nicias' arguments had the opposite effect to what he had intended: the assembly voted for the larger forces which he demanded, and assumed that with those larger forces victory would be certain.³⁶ Thucydides had himself been in exile since 424/3, and cannot have been present at that debate. He claims that his aim in the speeches in his history was to represent 'what [he] judged it most appropriate for the individual speakers to say with regard to the current circumstances, while keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of what was actually said'.³⁷ Here as always we cannot be sure what mixture he has given of what the speakers were known to have said and what he would have expected them to say, but there is no need to doubt the outline, that Nicias attacked both the policy and Alcibiades' personality, but Alcibiades was able to sustain the people's enthusiasm for the project and the undertaking was not abandoned but enlarged. The force actually sent in 415 comprised 136 warships, 100 of them Athenian, 5,100 hoplites, 1,500 of them Athenian, various light-armed soldiers and 30 horses.³⁸

In 420 Alcibiades' attempt to end Athens' uneasy settlement with Sparta and instead to make an alliance with Argos had been delayed by an earthquake.³⁹ In 415 the dispatch of the Sicilian expedition was threatened by religious scandals.⁴⁰ In a single night towards the end of May most of the 'herms' in Athens (blocks of stone with a head of the god Hermes and a phallus: see plate 11) were damaged. There had been previous occasions when

statues had been damaged by drunken young men, and those episodes had not been taken very seriously, but as the time for the departure of the Sicilian expedition was approaching the Athenians were in a tense state, and there were fears that the incident might be an unfavourable omen for the expedition and/or a sign of a plot against the democratic constitution. Manoeuvres of enemy forces near the frontiers added to the fears.

An enquiry was set up, and elicited information at first not about the herms but about mock celebrations of the Eleusinian mysteries (see plates 12–13) in private houses, involving Alcibiades and others. Apart from general allegations that the two matters were connected, and that the ostentatious and ambitious Alcibiades was behind everything and intended to set himself up as a tyrant, it was never claimed that Alcibiades was involved in damaging the herms. But Thucydides comments that opponents of his were jealous because he prevented them from becoming predominant as popular leaders, and that they cited against him ‘the undemocratic lawlessness of his life-style’.⁴¹ Alcibiades wanted to stand trial immediately, but his opponents thought he would too easily secure an acquittal if he were tried when the expedition was about to set out, so it was decided that he should sail with the expedition and be recalled to stand trial later. His son in the speech written by Isocrates c. 397 does his best to put a favourable gloss on the events: those who established the régime of the Four Hundred in 411 (that is conflated with the events of 415) invited Alcibiades to join them but he would not, since he was a loyal supporter of the masses; at an assembly he proved his innocence and was elected general to Sicily [in fact he had already been elected general, but probably what happened at an assembly was not that he persuaded the people that he was innocent but that it was decided, despite his own wish for an immediate trial, that he should sail with the expedition and be recalled for trial later].⁴² Alcibiades alone was so powerful that he was accused of aiming at tyranny, but in fact, the son alleges, he believed in political equality.⁴³

Conflicting accusations were made, and various men were arrested on one charge or on both. In the end Andocides (the anonymous informant of Thucydides’ account) was persuaded to turn state’s evidence, and various men were tried (in their absence if they had fled from Athens) and sentenced to death. (Among those condemned was Alcibiades’ cousin, Alcibiades of Phegus, whom we shall encounter in 409.⁴⁴) Thucydides was distressed that good men were condemned on the evidence of worthless men, and remarked that it was not certain either at the time or later whether Andocides’ account was the truth, but that belief that the truth had been found allowed the city to recover from its feverish state. Substantial fragments survive from a series of inscriptions subsequently referred to as the ‘Attic *stelai*’, which listed the men condemned, stating whether with regard to the herms or the mysteries or both, and recording the sale of the property confiscated from them and the prices which the various items fetched in these unusual circumstances.⁴⁵ Some of Alcibiades’ property is included in the surviving fragments: there is one item

of real property, but the other attested possessions are all household equipment, personal effects and slaves; there is a total price for the items listed at one point of slightly under 5,000 drachmae (for the sale of some slaves of Alcibiades, see plate 14).⁴⁶

What are we to make of all this? Damaging the herms was a public act, presumably intended to shock. According to Andocides it was carried out by the *hetaireia* (social/religious/political association of upper-class young men) to which he belonged, as a ‘pledge’ to bind the members to one another by their shared guilt. It was proposed at a party but done some time later; Andocides claims that he opposed the plan, and after falling from a horse and injuring himself he was in any case unable to take part.⁴⁷ There is no reason to think that anybody was yet plotting against the democracy — that was to happen after the failure of the Sicilian expedition, when the democracy was no longer delivering success — but if there were even fears of a plot that suggests that the stability of the democracy was beginning to wear thin. It is possible that men who were opposed to the Sicilian expedition as Nicias was, but were not pious as Nicias was, were hoping by means of an unfavourable omen to prevent the sailing of the Sicilian expedition. The mock celebrations of the mysteries (which Andocides does not admit to involvement in, but members of his family were accused and it is possible that he was involved) took place in private, and were presumably not intended to become public knowledge; they will perhaps have appealed to men who thought of themselves as non-religious but who had enough residual religion to derive a guilty thrill from mocking religious rites and daring the gods to punish them, and we can well believe that Alcibiades would have enjoyed antics performed in that spirit.

Some men were found guilty on both charges, others only on one. What links the two affairs, apart from the overlap of personnel, is that, once the damage to the herms had created the initial shock, men were ready with accusations against Alcibiades and others in connection with the mysteries. In so far as the scandals have a political dimension — and we should not suppose that that was their only dimension — it looks as if there were men in Athens who were trying to prevent the Sicilian expedition and to bring about the downfall of Alcibiades (while a set of accusations concerning the herms by one Dioclide, rejected as false, may have been an attempt to hit back at enemies of Alcibiades). Alcibiades was condemned and driven into exile, as we shall see; but the Sicilian expedition was not prevented, and indeed the sale of property confiscated from the men condemned made a significant contribution towards paying for it.

Thucydides, who contrasts the ambitious beginning of the Sicilian expedition with its humiliating conclusion, describes the festival atmosphere in which the ships set out from the Piraeus, early in June 415 (see plates 15–17).⁴⁸ Cicero reports a story, already disproved by Eratosthenes on the

grounds that some of Eupolis' plays were later than this, that Alcibiades had the comedian Eupolis drowned in the course of the voyage.⁴⁹ Thucydides also gives an account of the reaction in Syracuse: Hermocrates was well informed (though his plan to sail to Italy and encounter the Athenian fleet there would probably have resulted in a disastrous defeat); his opponent Athenagoras refused to believe that the Athenians were coming, and regarded the rumours as scare-mongering by young oligarchs who were hoping to seize power; the Syracusans did make some preparations, but did not sail to Italy.⁵⁰ This is another case of speeches which Thucydides will not himself have heard: it is hard to think that there was a substantial body of opinion which believed that the Athenians were not coming at all; there had been no secrecy in Athens' negotiations and preparations, and there is a temptation to think that Thucydides has exaggerated the unpreparedness of the Syracusans to contrast it with their eventual unexpected victory.

On arriving in the west the Athenians found, as Phaeax had found in 422, that they were not as welcome as they had hoped, and also that Eggesta was not able to provide the money which it had promised. The generals had to reconsider their plans. Nicias wanted to make a show of strength at Selinus, and then, if funding was not provided and no other opportunity of achieving anything arose, to return to Athens. In 413 he would be reluctant to return unsuccessful to Athens,⁵¹ but now he presumably reckoned that they would avoid blame if they returned immediately and made it clear that they had been sent out on false assumptions. Alcibiades wanted to make friends and influence people, winning over Greek and indigenous ('Sicel') cities to the Athenians' side, and beginning with Messana, on the strait between Sicily and the toe of Italy, so that they should at any rate have a base in Sicily. Lamachus wanted to make an immediate attack on Syracuse while it was unprepared. If the city really was unprepared, that might have succeeded; the more Thucydides has exaggerated its unpreparedness, the less the chance of success would have been.⁵² Lamachus backed Alcibiades against Nicias, and Alcibiades' plan was adopted. Messana did not accept the Athenians, but farther south Naxos did, and so did Catana after Athenian soldiers had managed to infiltrate into the city while Alcibiades was addressing the assembly. However, in spite of an encouraging message to the Athenians, Camarina, towards the east end of the south coast of the island, was not won over.⁵³

By now it was early August, and the *Salaminia*, one of two triremes which Athens used for special state business, arrived at Catana to take back Alcibiades and other men who were due to stand trial on the religious charges. In order not to undermine the morale of the expedition, and particularly that of the Argives and Mantineans who had joined it as a result of Alcibiades' influence, the men on the *Salaminia* were told to invite him to return to Athens but not to arrest him. Accordingly he and the others set out not on the *Salaminia* but on his own ship (literally his own: like his great-grandfather

Cleinias I at Artemisium in 480,⁵⁴ he had contributed a ship to the fleet at his own expense); and when they reached Thurii, in southern Italy, they escaped.⁵⁵ Men in Messina were about to take their city over to the Athenian side, but before leaving Catana Alcibiades warned the supporters of Syracuse in Messina, and they acted to thwart the plot: he had realised quickly that his future did not lie with Athens.⁵⁶

According to Thucydides, Alcibiades and the other accused travelled in a merchant ship from Thurii to Cyllene, the harbour of Elis on the west coast of the Peloponnese, and then in the autumn went to Sparta after he had been promised a safe refuge there.⁵⁷ Whether Elis still considered itself to be an ally of Athens at this point⁵⁸ or had returned to membership of the Peloponnesian League is not clear. According to Isocrates' speech for Alcibiades IV c. 397, Alcibiades went first to Argos, not wanting to damage the Athenians, and moved to Sparta only after the Athenians had condemned him to banishment from the whole of Greece and had sent to Argos to demand his extradition.⁵⁹ If that were right, Thucydides will have represented him as more immediately anti-Athenian than he actually was. However, we have seen that before leaving Sicily he had frustrated the Athenians' plans to win over Messina; and it was about the end of July when Alcibiades' friends in Argos had come under suspicion and the Athenians had returned the oligarchic hostages to the Argive democrats,⁶⁰ which suggests that Argos might not have been a very safe destination for him. It is more likely that in the speech this episode has been invented, to soften Alcibiades' period of opposition to Athens, than that Thucydides has suppressed it.⁶¹ Plutarch writes that Alcibiades had the ability to adapt totally to his surroundings, and despite the luxurious and flamboyant life which he had led in Athens he took wholeheartedly to Spartan austerity.⁶²

Syracuse was a colony of Corinth, and in the autumn of 415 it sent envoys to Corinth, who then went with Corinthian envoys to Sparta, asking for help in Sicily and also for action against Athens in Greece.⁶³ These envoys and Alcibiades addressed the same meeting of the Spartan assembly, and Thucydides gives us a speech by Alcibiades (once more, he will not himself have heard the original). He begins with a defence of his career: by looking after the Spartans captured at Pylos he had hoped to revive the proxeny which his grandfather had renounced, but in making peace in 421 the Spartans had spurned him, so he had justifiably turned to Mantinea and Argos.⁶⁴ His family had always been opposed to tyranny and had therefore aspired to leadership of the people; he had had to accommodate himself to the 'acknowledged folly' of democracy, and while in time of war it was not feasible to overthrow it he had tried to moderate it. [If he did say that, it was a travesty of his behaviour in Athens.] He sketched the most extravagant version of Athens' ambitions in the west.⁶⁵ He advised Sparta to send a force to Sicily, and particularly a Spartan citizen to take command, and also (as the Syracusans had asked) to give the Athenians more trouble by waging war in Greece as well, in particular by establishing a fort in Decelea, in northern Attica, to prevent the

Athenians from using their countryside and especially their silver mines. He ended by replying to the possible accusation that as a man who had deserted his own state he might not be trustworthy.⁶⁶

Thucydides then remarks that the Spartans had been thinking of campaigning against Athens but hesitating, and were now greatly encouraged, and they did now turn their minds to fortifying Decelea and sending help to Syracuse. Gylippus (whose father Cleandridas had been exiled,⁶⁷ and who himself is said to have been a *mothax*, brought up as the foster-brother of a young Spartan in good standing⁶⁸) was to go as commander with the Corinthian reinforcements, and in addition to him Sparta sent just two ships.⁶⁹ Decelea was eventually fortified, but not until 413, after Athens by invading Spartan territory had more blatantly broken the Peace of Nicias.⁷⁰ This prompts us to wonder whether Alcibiades' presence in Sparta made less difference to Sparta's policy than Thucydides suggests: perhaps he drew attention to Decelea as an ideal site for the fort,⁷¹ and/or helped the Spartans to overcome their religious scruples about the site (they had spared it for religious reasons when raiding Attica in the early years of the Peloponnesian War⁷²), but surely what little Spartan help was sent to Syracuse might have been sent without his prompting, and after Athens' invasion of Laconia Sparta might have invaded Attica without his prompting. Perhaps he had more effect on Spartan morale than on Spartan policy; and he will have damaged the Athenian force more by his absence from it than by what he said and did in Sparta: he would not necessarily have secured the adoption of a better strategy, but he would not have let the Athenians relax their momentum as Nicias was to do.


In 414 the Athenians occupied Epipolae, the plateau outside Syracuse, and set about blockading the city with walls to the open sea on the north side and to the great bay of Syracuse on the south side. But Nicias, left in sole command after Lamachus had been killed in a battle, and himself in bad health, did not press on quickly enough, and when Gylippus arrived the wall to the north was still unfinished, and he was able to enter the city just in time to prevent it from surrendering to the Athenians. He built a wall across the line of the Athenians' northern wall, to prevent them from completing that. In 413 the Athenians received substantial reinforcements, but failed in a night battle to regain the upper hand on Epipolae. The Athenians were defeated at sea as well as on land; they finally tried to withdraw by land, but were pursued by the Syracusans, who killed some and caught the others. The Athenians were totally defeated and humiliated: their money had been wasted; their ships had been lost; many men had been killed; the remainder were at first imprisoned in the quarries outside Syracuse, and we do not know how many survived and eventually returned to Athens.⁷³

Alcibiades had incited the Athenians to undertake that venture; since even Nicias on his own almost brought about the surrender of Syracuse, we may guess that if Alcibiades had not been recalled to stand trial the surrender of


Syracuse would have been achieved, and that might well have been followed by the submission of the other Greek cities of Sicily. However, Sicily is large and distant from Athens, and (as Nicias is made to say in 415⁷⁴) it is hard to believe that the Athenians could have kept control of it against opposition for any length of time, let alone that they could have gone on to conquer Carthage or part of Italy. However much or little Alcibiades influenced decisions taken in Sparta, including the sending of Gylippus, after he arrived there, he certainly deserves criticism for urging the Athenians to a campaign in which the likely outcome did not justify the risks.

Meanwhile the intermittent warfare in the Peloponnese continued. The Athenians and the Spartans had fought against one another on various occasions in various places since 421, but the Athenians had not entered Spartan territory and the Spartans had not entered Athenian territory, and it suited each side, while alleging breaches by the other, to assume that the Peace of Nicias was still in force. This situation came to an end in the summer of 414, when Athens at last gave in to pressure from Argos and joined in a raid on the east coast of Laconia. In 431 it was the Peloponnesians who had started the war: the Spartans now drew confidence from the fact that it was the Athenians who had definitively ended the Peace of Nicias.⁷⁵


It was that, together with the fact that after sending reinforcements to Sicily the Athenians were short of forces to defend themselves at home, which led to the Spartans' finally occupying Decelea in 413. The notion of *epiteichismos*, setting up a hostile fort inside or immediately adjoining enemy territory, had been under consideration since the beginning of the war.⁷⁶ The Spartans in the early years of the war had not attempted that, but had raided Attica with a large army which stayed only for a few weeks (until 425, when the Athenians took Spartans as prisoners of war from Pylos and threatened to kill them if Attica were invaded again). The Athenians had occupied Pylos in Messenia in 425 and the island of Cythera off the coast of Laconia in 424, but had not achieved as much as a result of that as they hoped and the Spartans feared. In the spring of 413 king Agis led a large force of Spartans and allies which entered Attica and built a fort at Decelea, on the Athenian side of mount Parnes, about 11 miles north of the city. Once the fort was built, most of the soldiers returned home, but Agis remained with a garrison until the end of the war. The Athenians were thus excluded from their own countryside not just for a few weeks in the spring but all the time, and this harmed them far more, both materially and psychologically, than the earlier invasions.⁷⁷



1. Bust possibly of Alcibiades (photo: Ole Haupt, Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek, Copenhagen).



2. Bust of Pericles in British Museum (© kmiragaya, from [shutterstock.com](https://www.shutterstock.com)).



3. Bust of Socrates (photo: Ole Haupt, Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek, Copenhagen).



4. Athenian vase by the Agrigento Painter, showing boys undergoing a music



5. Athens: acropolis from south-west (© P. J. Rhodes).




6. Athens: agora, model of west side (photo: American School of Classical Studies at Athens: Agora Excavations). The round building on the left is the *tholos*, the headquarters of the council's standing committee; to the right of that is the council house (a smaller and simpler building in the time of Alcibiades than the later complex shown here); in front of that are the statues of the tribal heroes, whose base served as a state notice board (in Alcibiades' time probably located outside the picture to the left).



7. Athens: Pnyx, where the assembly met, speaker's platform (photo: American School of Classical Studies at Athens: Agora Excavations). This platform is from the remodelling of the Pnyx in the fourth century.



8. *Ostraka* used for voting against Alcibiades (photo: American School of Classical Studies at Athens: Agora Excavations).



9. *Ostrakon* used for voting against Hyperbolus (photo: American School of Classical Studies at Athens: Agora Excavations).



10. Egesta, appeal from which prompted Athens' Sicilian expedition of 415: temple (© pseudolongino, from www.shutterstock.com).



11. Name vase of Athens' Pan Painter, showing on the right a herm of the kind mutilated in 415 (photograph © 2011 Museum of Fine Arts, Boston).



12. Eleusis: *telesterion* (photo: Konstantinos Kourtidis; by permission of the 3rd Ephoreia of Prehistoric and Classical Antiquities).



13. Eleusis: figurine of an initiate's sacrificial pig (photo: Konstantinos Kourtidis; by permission of the 3rd Ephoreia of Prehistoric and Classical Antiquities).



14. Fragment from the 'Attic *stelai*', recording the sale of slaves confiscated from Alcibiades in 415 (photo: American School of Classical Studies at Athens: Agora Excavations).



15. **Top:** Piraeus (© Kostas Rossidis, from www.airphotos.gr). The main harbour, in antiquity as now, was the one in the foreground.



16. **Middle:** *Olympias*, replica Greek trireme (photo: John Coates / Trireme Trust).



17. **Right:** *Kyrenia II*, replica Greek merchant ship (Hellenic Institute for the Preservation of Nautical Tradition; THALASSA Agia Napa Municipal Museum, Cyprus).



18. Coin (modelled on Athenian ‘owl’ coins) of Persian satrap Tissaphernes, with whom Alcibiades intrigued (photo: Hirmer Fotoarchiv, München).



19. Athens: fifth-century ‘owl’ four-drachma coin (Alpha Bank Numismatic Collection, inv. no. 2137).



20. Istanbul: site of ancient Byzantium, with the Propontis behind (© Alex Garaev, from www.shutterstock.com).

Chapter V

Sparta, Persia and Athens: 413–411

In spite of the disaster in Sicily and the presence of Agis and his garrison at Decelea, the Athenians decided to fight on. But, particularly after the Syracusans had managed to defeat them at sea, they no longer looked invincible. Accordingly approaches were made to the Spartans, in some cases to the authorities at home, in other cases to Agis at Decelea, by member states of the Delian League offering to defect from Athens to Sparta, and also by the two Persian satraps (provincial governors) in western Asia Minor, Pharnabazus at Dascylium, near the Propontis, and Tissaphernes at Sardis, inland from the gulf of Smyrna (for Tissaphernes see plate 18, and for the Athenian coin on which the design of his was based see plate 19).¹

Since the beginning of the war each side had been angling for Persian support: gaining Persian money offered Sparta the best opportunity of building up a navy which could defeat the Athenian, and Athens needed at least to prevent that from happening. During the Archidamian War the Spartans had achieved nothing; the price for Persian help was the return of the Asiatic Greeks to Persian rule, to which they had been subject until the end of the Persian War in 479 and the founding of the Delian League afterwards, and that could hardly be reconciled with Sparta's declared aim of freeing all the Greeks from Athenian rule.² However, it seems likely that in 423 or soon after Athens did make a treaty with the new King Darius II: Athens would be even less likely than Sparta to agree to return the Asiatic Greeks to Persia, but at that point a simple non-aggression pact would have suited both sides. Thucydides frustratingly mentions an Athenian embassy which set out to see the previous King, Artaxerxes, but turned back on learning of his death, at the end of 424 or the beginning of 423; but then apart from one sentence he says no more about Persia until he mentions the approach of the satraps to Sparta in the winter of 413/2.³ But Andocides in his speech (III) *On the Peace* of 392/1 mentions a treaty with Persia made through the agency of his uncle Epilycus,⁴ and an Athenian decree (which, though inscribed with a later decree in the fourth century, must itself be of the fifth century) honours Heraclides of Clazomenae for his help in connection with a treaty with the King, which is most likely to be the treaty mentioned by Andocides.⁵ That

treaty should be accepted, in spite of its omission by Thucydides.

Why in that case, apart from a desire to switch to what now seemed more likely to be the winning side, should the satraps now offer their support to Sparta? Andocides claims that a Persian rebel, Amorges, induced the Athenians to support him, and that led the Persians to back Sparta. Thucydides tells us that in 413/2 the King was expecting the satraps to collect arrears of tribute from the Asiatic Greeks, and to capture or kill Amorges; and he indicates without directly stating it that Amorges had Athenian backing when the Spartans captured him in Iasus and handed him over to Tissaphernes in 412.⁶ It is possible that the Athenians were already supporting Amorges in 414⁷ — presumably a matter of opportunism, of the adventurous kind of which they were capable until things went wrong in Sicily — and in that case Andocides may well be right to link this with the King's decision to support Sparta.⁸

Sparta had to decide between two strategies: to concentrate on the Aegean and Tissaphernes, with the attraction that Chios, now the only member of the Delian League apart from Methymna on Lesbos which still had a navy of its own, was offering to join in; or to concentrate on the Hellespont and Pharnabazus, with the attraction that, thanks to Agis and his garrison at Decelea, Athens was now wholly dependent on imported grain, and much of that came from the north of the Black Sea through the Hellespont. It was by means of the Hellespontine strategy that Sparta was finally to win the war. But, whatever we make of Alcibiades' influence in Sparta earlier, it is clear that it was important now. He gave his backing to the Aegean strategy; and Endius, of the family with which his family had a particular connection, was one of the five ephors for 413/2 and (however shabbily he may have been treated in the negotiations of 420⁹) was happy to cooperate with him. The Spartans did decide to operate in the Aegean first and to move north afterwards, and while they prepared ships of their own their allies prepared a fleet to set out from Cenchreae, Corinth's port on the Saronic Gulf. But the allies delayed while Corinth celebrated the Isthmian games, about June 412. This gave the Athenians the chance to discover what was afoot, and when the allied fleet did set out an Athenian squadron chased it back to land. It took further pressure exerted by Alcibiades through Endius to make the Spartans try again: he went with five Spartan ships which sailed under the command of Chalcideus to Chios, and on their arrival Chios went over openly to the Spartan side.¹⁰ The allied ships, now including twenty from Syracuse and two from Selinus, followed later.¹¹ Athens, meanwhile, sent ships to Samos: the Athenians supported a democratic rising against the oligarchs there, and Samos then became staunchly pro-Athenian, and was to become their main naval base in the Aegean for the remainder of the war.¹²

Alcibiades had particular links with the leading men in Miletus, on the Asiatic mainland near to Samos and often at odds with Samos: he went there from Chios with Chalcideus, and succeeded in winning over Miletus to the

Spartan side.¹³ Chalcideus then made with Tissaphernes the first of three treaties between Sparta and Persia which are quoted by Thucydides: the King was to possess all the territory which he or his forebears had possessed, and Persia and Sparta were to prosecute the war jointly.¹⁴ If taken literally, that would mean that Persia's claim extended to the whole of mainland Greece north of the isthmus of Corinth, which the Persians had overrun in 480–479; whether the Persians intended that is uncertain, but a second treaty made towards the end of 412 was open to the same interpretation.¹⁵ After the making of the second treaty the Spartan Lichas was aware of that possibility and at a meeting with Tissaphernes objected to it, to which Tissaphernes reacted by storming out in a rage.¹⁶ His objection, according to Thucydides, was to any Persian claim to the Aegean islands as well as to mainland Greece, and probably the Spartans thought that what they were conceding to Persia was only mainland Asia Minor. But they were certainly conceding that, and so they could no longer claim to be fighting for the freedom of all the Greeks.

Thucydides continues the narrative of the war in the Aegean to early 411: the Athenians descended on Milesian territory and killed Chalcideus when he went with a small detachment of men to oppose them.¹⁷ Later, when the Athenians had received reinforcements, they went to Miletus again, were victorious in a battle and planned to besiege the city: the Peloponnesians' main forces then arrived in the region, and Alcibiades, who had been present in the battle, went to tell them to come to the help of Miletus.¹⁸ Alcibiades does not appear again in that part of the narrative.

Already at the point when Alcibiades was about to leave Sparta with Chalcideus Thucydides remarks that he was at odds with Agis: for that reason he suggested to Endius that it would be an honourable achievement for him if a rising against Athens in Ionia and an alliance with Persia were secured through the two of them and not through Agis.¹⁹ Thucydides is presumably alluding to the story told by Plutarch that Alcibiades had an affair with Agis' wife Timaea. (According to Plutarch an earthquake had led to Agis' giving up intercourse with his wife; according to Xenophon it led to the detection of the lover when he fled from Timaea's bedroom.) When Agis died, c. 400, he was succeeded not by his son Leotychidas but by his brother Agesilaus, because Leotychidas was judged illegitimate.²⁰ If the whole of that were true, it would require that Agis, who was old enough to have been a king ruling in his own right and commanding the army in 426,²¹ had no son, or at any rate no son still living, born earlier than about 413, but that is by no means impossible, and what we know of Alcibiades makes it entirely possible that he had an affair with Timaea, even if he was not in fact the father of Leotychidas.²²

Having reached early 411, Thucydides backtracks to the autumn of 412 to deal with the estrangement of Alcibiades from the Spartans. 'After the death of Chalcideus and the battle at Miletus he was suspected by the Peloponnesians.'²³ He can hardly have been blamed for the death of Chalcideus; the battle was presumably not the skirmish in which Chalcideus

was killed but the later battle, in which Alcibiades had been involved, and for whose outcome some people may (whether justifiably or not) have blamed him. More generally, however, those two episodes signalled the fact that by the end of summer 412 the Athenians were beginning to regain the upper hand, and the strategy which Alcibiades had urged on the Spartans was not proving as successful as they had hoped: dissatisfaction with Alcibiades can easily be understood.²⁴ 'After that, a letter had come to Astyochus [now the Spartan admiral] from Sparta ordering that Alcibiades should be put to death, for he was at enmity with Agis and in general appeared untrustworthy.' Afraid of what the Peloponnesians might do to him, Alcibiades moved to the court of the satrap Tissaphernes, at Sardis. By now Endius and his colleagues, with whom Alcibiades had been working, will have ended their year of office as ephors, and that may have made Alcibiades' position with the Spartans less secure.²⁵ The problem is that, as we shall see shortly, far from trying to obey this order, Astyochus was to pass on to Alcibiades the letters which the Athenian Phrynichus sent him in an attempt to undermine Alcibiades' position.²⁶ It has therefore been suggested that there was no letter from Sparta to Astyochus, but that this was invented by Alcibiades to explain why he had joined Tissaphernes, and Thucydides accepted this piece of misinformation.²⁷ It is at any rate clear that Astyochus was not himself hostile to Alcibiades, even after Alcibiades had joined Tissaphernes: either the letter has been invented or Astyochus took the risk of disobeying it.

We now have the beginning of what is to be an on-going problem. We have already had reason to wonder how much influence Alcibiades had had in Sparta,²⁸ and we now have to consider how much influence he had on Tissaphernes. When Alcibiades acts as Tissaphernes' spokesman in dealing with the Spartans or with the Athenians, how far is the message the one which Tissaphernes has instructed him to convey, and how far is it the one which he himself has chosen to convey on Tissaphernes' behalf? When we are told that Tissaphernes considered supporting the Athenians instead of the Spartans, is that true, and would Tissaphernes have been able to sell that change of policy to the King? Did Tissaphernes convey that impression to Alcibiades, whether truthfully or not? When Alcibiades conveyed that impression to the Athenians, did he believe it to be true or not? Thucydides at this stage accepts a maximum interpretation of Alcibiades' influence: 'He proceeded to damage the Peloponnesian cause with Tissaphernes as far as he could; and he became his teacher in all things.'²⁹

One result was that Tissaphernes now provided pay for the Peloponnesian forces at the rate of only 1/2; drachma per man per day instead of 1 drachma, and did not provide even that regularly, and he bribed the trierarchs and generals (other than Hermocrates of Syracuse, who objected) to acquiesce in that.³⁰ Thucydides remarked earlier, at the beginning of his account of winter 412/1, that Tissaphernes went to Miletus, gave a month's pay at the rate of 1 drachma, said that in future he would give only 1/2 drachma, but when

Hermocrates protested said he would give slightly more, ^{60/55} of 1/2 drachma.³¹ Probably Thucydides has not given two inconsistent accounts of the same reduction but accounts of two separate reductions, the first from 1 drachma to slightly over 1/2 drachma, and the second from slightly over 1/2 drachma to exactly 1/2 drachma.³² Alcibiades himself on Tissaphernes' behalf dismissed deputations from the cities which asked for money, while claiming that Tissaphernes would pay more generously if he received money for the purpose from the King. He urged Tissaphernes not to be too eager to enable Sparta to win the war: it would be better for Persia and cheaper to let the two sides wear each other out; and indeed it would be better for Persia if Athens won the war, since the Athenians would be willing to rule the Aegean and allow Persia to rule the Asiatic mainland, whereas the Spartans' aim was to liberate the Greeks. (We shall see later that the Athenian oligarchs, hoping that Persian support would be diverted to them, were willing to relinquish to Persia the Asiatic mainland, and also the offshore islands [such as Chios and Samos], but no more than that.³³ In the 390s Sparta was to fight on behalf of the Asiatic Greeks, and in doing so penetrated further inland than the Athenian empire had done, but the Athenians did not acquiesce in the abandonment of the Asiatic Greeks until they were forced to accept the King's Peace in 387/6.) Tissaphernes accepted that advice: he told the Peloponnesians that in due course a Phoenician fleet would come, with which he would fight on their behalf, but for now it was clear that he was not helping them enthusiastically.³⁴

Thucydides goes on to say that Alcibiades did believe that was the best policy for Tissaphernes, but at the same time he was beginning to plan for his return to Athens, and thought he could best achieve that if he made the most of his influence on Tissaphernes.³⁵ He began to make contact with influential men in the Athenian force on Samos, suggesting that he would like to return to Athens as long as the city was governed by an oligarchy and not by the democracy which had driven him out (some of these men were on their own account already contemplating a move against the democracy), and that he could make Tissaphernes a friend of Athens. Some of the Athenians from Samos crossed over to the mainland and met Alcibiades, and he encouraged them to believe that with the democracy overthrown he could make Tissaphernes and indeed the King friends of Athens. Back on Samos, the oligarchic movement among the Athenian forces gathered momentum. The ordinary sailors, though they had their doubts, acquiesced in the hope of receiving pay from the Persians, and the planning proceeded among the members of the upper-class *hetaireiai*.³⁶

One of the Athenian generals, Phrynichus, remained unconvinced: he thought Alcibiades was no more committed to oligarchy than to democracy, but was simply manoeuvring to secure his own return to Athens. For the Athenians, he insisted, what was most important was to avoid factional

division. In spite of Alcibiades' claims, it would not be in the King's interests to support the Athenians, whom he distrusted,³⁷ rather than the Peloponnesians, who had done him no harm. Nor would it make the allies better disposed to Athens if there was a change from democracy to oligarchy in their cities as well as in Athens, since what they wanted was freedom rather than subjection, whether the subjection were combined with an oligarchy imposed by Athens or a democracy imposed by Athens.³⁸ As for the Athenian leaders, if they had an oligarchy free from popular control they would do more harm to the allies than they had done in the past. Phrynichus failed to convince the others, and they pressed on with their plans, arranging to send Pisander and others to Athens 'to negotiate about the return of Alcibiades and the overthrow of the democracy there, and to make Tissaphernes a friend of the Athenians'.³⁹

Next Thucydides reports a strange episode in which Phrynichus and Alcibiades tried to undermine each other. Phrynichus was afraid that the Athenians would recall Alcibiades and that Alcibiades would find out about his own opposition. In late December, not realising that Alcibiades and the Spartans had fallen out, he wrote to the Spartan admiral Astyochus to tell him that Alcibiades was betraying the Spartan cause and making Tissaphernes transfer his support to the Athenians. Astyochus himself still did not distrust Alcibiades.⁴⁰ He went from Miletus to Magnesia on the Meander, on the way to Sardis, he met both Alcibiades and Tissaphernes there, and he told them about Phrynichus' letter. (Thucydides reports, as something that was alleged, that Astyochus also sold himself to Tissaphernes.) Alcibiades wrote to the men in authority in the Athenian forces, revealing what Phrynichus had done and demanding that he should be put to death. Phrynichus learned of that, but nothing was immediately done to him. He then hatched a second plan. He wrote again to Astyochus, assuming that his second letter like his first would be reported to Alcibiades. This time he complained of Astyochus' breaching his confidence before, and said that (since as a result of the first round of correspondence he was now in mortal danger) he would enable the Spartans to destroy the whole Athenian force, since Samos was unwallled. As he expected, Astyochus informed Alcibiades again, and Alcibiades wrote to the Athenians on Samos again. But this time Phrynichus had himself warned his fellow-Athenians to expect a Spartan attack and fortify Samos. When Alcibiades' letter arrived, it seemed to bear out Phrynichus' warning, and so Phrynichus' reputation was restored, while Alcibiades was judged to be untrustworthy and to be activated by malice against Phrynichus.⁴¹

It was perhaps in February 411 that Pisander and his colleagues went from the Athenians on Samos to Athens, and their main message was that it was possible for the Athenians, 'by recalling Alcibiades and not keeping to the same form of democracy, to have the King as an ally and to get the better of the Peloponnesians'. Many men spoke up for the democracy, and the Eumolpidae and the Kerykes, the members of the two 'clans' which provided

the officials of the Eleusinian cult, objected to the recall of Alcibiades. Pisander replied that Athens had no hope of winning the war unless it adopted a more 'prudent' and oligarchic form of government in order to gain the trust of the King, and that could not be achieved without the recall of Alcibiades; but it would always be possible to reconsider the constitutional change later. In the end the people consented. Phrynichus and a colleague were deposed, on the grounds that they had betrayed Iasus and Amorges to the enemy (the Peloponnesians' success there occurred after Phrynichus had insisted on withdrawing rather than risk defeat by superior numbers⁴²). Pisander encouraged the *hetaireiai* to join forces in working against the democracy, and with ten colleagues he was sent back to Samos to negotiate with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes.⁴³

In the meantime Alcibiades continued to exert pressure on Tissaphernes, and according to Thucydides Tissaphernes wanted to transfer his support to the Athenians, because Lichas' objections to the two treaties of 412 had made him realise how far apart he and the Spartans were, and had borne out Alcibiades' claim that Sparta's aim was to liberate all the Greeks.⁴⁴ However, when Pisander and his fellow-envoys arrived Thucydides paints a different picture: Alcibiades' standing with Tissaphernes was not firm, and Tissaphernes wanted to keep to Alcibiades' earlier advice and let the two sides wear each other out. Tissaphernes therefore did not want to make an agreement with the Athenians, and Alcibiades realised that he did not, but it suited both of them to pile up the Persian demands to the point where it was the Athenians who felt bound to withdraw from the negotiations. The Athenians agreed to give up 'the whole of Ionia' (which in this context probably means the whole Asiatic mainland); then the offshore islands (such as Samos and Chios). The breaking-point was reached with the demand that 'the King should have the right to build ships and sail along his own coasts, wherever and with as many ships as he wished', that is, that there could be an unrestricted Persian naval presence in the Aegean. The Athenians broke off the negotiations and thought they had been deceived by Alcibiades;⁴⁵ and, perhaps in March, the Persians made a third treaty with the Spartans. This has a more elaborate preamble than the other two, and involves Pharnabazus as well as Tissaphernes, but the other two were not mere drafts: they were actual agreements which had come into effect. This time the King's territorial demands are limited to Asia, but there they are total, and once the King's Phoenician ships arrive any further money paid by Tissaphernes to the Peloponnesians will be only a loan. Tissaphernes then made a great show of preparing to support the Peloponnesians.⁴⁶

As I remarked above,⁴⁷ it is hard to be sure who was deceiving whom: whether Tissaphernes at least for a time seriously considered changing sides (and thought he could obtain the King's agreement to that), or as a way of putting pressure on both sides insincerely suggested that he might; whether Alcibiades originally believed that Tissaphernes might change sides, or in

order to secure his own return insincerely suggested to the Athenians that he might. Both men were masters of intrigue, and no doubt both enjoyed seeing how much they could get away with. In the short term, the uncertainties were now at an end: the Persians had reaffirmed their commitment to the Spartan side, and Alcibiades had failed to deliver the change which he had promised. But we shall see that, however unjustifiably, Alcibiades continued to think that he had some influence with Tissaphernes, and until in 407 Darius sent his son Cyrus to give more effective support to the Spartans some Athenians continued to hope that the Persians might yet change and support them.⁴⁸

The Athenians on Samos who were planning the change to oligarchy gained some supporters from among the Samians, and, since they were already compromised, decided to go ahead without Alcibiades and the Persians, and to persist in the war against Sparta. Pisander and half of the envoys were sent back to Athens, and the other half were sent to set up oligarchies in the allied states (Thucydides remarks that, as Phrynichus had predicted, the new oligarchy in Thasos, far from being grateful to the Athenian oligarchs, was emboldened to revolt against Athens).⁴⁹ In Athens the members of the *hetaireiai* had prepared the ground, and in June the democracy's assembly was induced to set up the régime of the Four Hundred: there was to be a powerful council of four hundred, in theory a body of five thousand qualified citizens 'able to serve with their wealth and their bodies' (those of hoplite status and above), and, because richer men did not need salaries and the disaster in Sicily had left the state short of money, almost all stipends for civilian service were abolished. Phrynichus, now that the oligarchs had broken with Alcibiades, supported the oligarchy.⁵⁰ Whereas on Samos the oligarchs had said they would persevere with the war, they now tried to make peace with Sparta, but they achieved nothing: Thucydides suggests that in the end they would have accepted almost any terms as long as they could save their own skins; the *Athenian Constitution* states that they refused a demand that Athens should give up its rule of the sea, and that may be true of one stage in the negotiations — but it must have been a major problem that in any case they were not in a position to commit the substantial body of Athenians on Samos, who were now going their own way.⁵¹

About the time when the Four Hundred came into power in Athens, an oligarchic plot among the Samians (one offshoot of which was the killing of the ostracised Hyperbolus, who was in Samos) was disclosed to some of the more democratically-minded of the Athenians there, the oligarchs' attempt to seize power was defeated, and both the Samians and the Athenians there committed themselves to democracy and to carrying on the war against Sparta. As Isocrates' speech of c. 397 puts it, the democrats regarded the oligarchs in Athens as their greatest enemy, while the oligarchs in Athens would rather surrender to Sparta than share power with the democrats.⁵² The Athenians on Samos now thought of them-selves as the true city of Athens, from whom the oligarchs at home had defected; and among other things they

hoped that if they recalled Alcibiades he could obtain Persian support for them.⁵³ The leaders of the democrats were Thrasybulus, who in the years to come would be closely associated with Alcibiades, and Thrasyullus, who was perhaps more firmly democratic. Thrasybulus gained the approval of an assembly of this city-in-exile and brought Alcibiades from Tissaphernes' court to Samos. Alcibiades made the most of his influence with Tissaphernes and claimed that Tissaphernes did want to support the Athenians if only they would take back Alcibiades: whatever may have been the case earlier, it is hard to believe that that was true now (though Tissaphernes continued to disappoint the Peloponnesians by his niggardly support for them⁵⁴), and Thucydides does not seem to have believed it. It is harder to be sure whether Alcibiades himself believed what he was saying to be true, but he was the kind of man who could believe his own propaganda, and here perhaps he did. The Athenians at Samos elected him general, and from now until 407 he served with the fleet as a general because the fleet wanted him, though as far as the city of Athens was concerned, except under the intermediate régime of 411/0,⁵⁵ he remained an exile who had been condemned in his absence to death. Some men wanted to sail back to Athens and attack the oligarchic régime there, but Alcibiades refused to abandon the war in the Aegean and went back to confer with Tissaphernes. To Thucydides' mind, 'the upshot was that Alcibiades was using Tissaphernes to frighten the Athenians and the Athenians to frighten Tissaphernes'.⁵⁶

News that Alcibiades had rejoined the Athenians increased the dissatisfaction of the Peloponnesians, and particularly of their independent-minded western allies, with Tissaphernes and with the Spartan admiral Astyochus. The situation was made worse when Astyochus threatened Dorieus, the commander of the contingent from Thurii, with his stick,⁵⁷ as a result of which he came close to being stoned. The allies were pleased when the Milesians captured a fort which Tissaphernes had built in their territory, though the Spartan Lichas (who earlier had resisted Persia's claims⁵⁸) rebuked the Milesians, saying that 'they and the other inhabitants of the King's land must slave for Tissaphernes to a moderate extent, and even cultivate him, until they ended the war well'. Astyochus was succeeded as admiral by Mindarus, and when Astyochus went back to Sparta there also went to Sparta a representative of Tissaphernes to defend Tissaphernes (Gaulites: described by Thucydides as 'a bilingual Carian'; he will in fact have been trilingual, in Greek, Carian and Aramaic), and Hermocrates of Syracuse, to complain about Tissaphernes and Alcibiades.⁵⁹ We learn from Xenophon that with Astyochus as witness Hermocrates succeeded in convincing the Spartans of Tissaphernes' perfidy.⁶⁰

The Four Hundred had sent envoys to Samos to give a favourable account of the changes in Athens; and when they were at Delos, half-way across the Aegean, they heard about the developments in Samos and delayed there.⁶¹ It was when Alcibiades had returned to Samos, after the visit to Tissaphernes

mentioned above, that they finally arrived in Samos and found him there. At an assembly they were first threatened with lynching but eventually were allowed to speak: they insisted that the change had been made for the salvation of Athens, that in due course all of the Five Thousand would be involved in affairs (in fact that had not happened, and it did not happen while the Four Hundred remained in power), and — correctly — that rumours of the maltreatment of the Athenians which had reached Samos⁶² were false. As before, some men wanted to sail back to Athens and attack the oligarchy, and, as before, Alcibiades prevented this. Thucydides makes the surprising comment that ‘Alcibiades first then, and to an exceptional extent, benefited the city’, because otherwise victory would have been ceded to the Spartans. Since Athens was in the end defeated, in 404, we might think it would have been better for Athens if the end had come sooner. What helps to explain Thucydides’ judgment is the further comment, ‘In that situation no other man would have been capable of restraining the mob’. This recalls the comment on his hero Pericles, that he ‘held the masses on a light rein, and led them rather than let them lead him. This was because he did not have to adapt what he said to please his hearers, but his standing allowed him even to speak against them and provoke their anger.’⁶³ For once Alcibiades had shown leadership of a Periclean kind. He sent a message back to Athens, that he would accept the limited citizen body of the Five Thousand, but the Four Hundred should be replaced by the democracy’s council of five hundred;⁶⁴ he accepted economies made for the sake of paying the armed forces (that is, the abolition of civilian stipends), and he insisted that they should not weaken in the war effort. Envoys offering help from Argos were thanked and told that that would be asked for when needed.⁶⁵

Tissaphernes, still under pressure from the Peloponnesians, went to Aspendus on the south coast of Asia Minor, saying that he would bring back the promised Phoenician ships.⁶⁶ He did not bring them, and Thucydides uncharacteristically wavers between possible explanations before concluding that his purpose was still to hold a balance between the two sides and exhaust both. Alcibiades followed Tissaphernes, believing, Thucydides thought, that Tissaphernes would not bring the ships and hoping to damage him further in the eyes of the Peloponnesians.⁶⁷ In Isocrates’ speech for Alcibiades IV we read that ninety Phoenician ships had come to Aspendus, but Alcibiades demonstrated his loyalty to Athens, persuaded Tissaphernes not to pay the Spartans, paid Athenian soldiers from his own resources (but it is not clear what resources he had while he was in exile from Athens and his property had been confiscated), restored political rights to the people (a considerable exaggeration of his messages from Samos to the oligarchs in Athens) and turned back the Phoenician fleet.⁶⁸

The Four Hundred’s envoys returned to Athens, and the news which they brought from Samos encouraged those who were disillusioned by the autocratic nature of the régime. The leaders of these men were Theramenes

(son of Hagnon, often a general in the Periclean period), a man who had been involved in setting up the oligarchic régime but was to become notorious for his vacillations between democracy and oligarchy, and Aristocrates, perhaps more straightforwardly democratic in his sympathies. The Four Hundred had started building a fort at the Piraeus, and in September, when Peloponnesian ships appeared in the Saronic Gulf, fears that they had been invited by the Four Hundred led to a mutiny among the men building the fort. In the course of this, Phrynichus was assassinated after he returned from one of the unsuccessful missions to Sparta. The Four Hundred offered to negotiate with the malcontents, but eventually the Peloponnesian ships sailed into the Euripus, the strait between Athens and Euboea. A hastily-manned Athenian fleet followed them, was forced to fight a battle and was defeated. This caused a panic in Athens, because with Agis' garrison at Decelea the Athenians were heavily dependent on Euboea for provisions, and most of the cities there now revolted against Athens, and because if the Peloponnesians had been more energetic they might have followed up their victory by sailing immediately to the Piraeus.⁶⁹

In Athens an *ad hoc* assembly deposed the Four Hundred (most of whose leaders fled to Agis at Decelea) and created an intermediate régime based on the Five Thousand. Unfortunately our sources praise this régime but provide very little information about it: Thucydides describes it as 'a moderate mixture with regard to the few and the many', and most probably what he is referring to is a combination of the oligarchic principle of a limited citizen body, the Five Thousand, with the democratic principle that power should reside with the citizen body rather than with a powerful council.⁷⁰ This régime voted to recall Alcibiades and to co-operate with the navy at Samos.⁷¹ Diodorus, whose account of these years is generally favourable to Theramenes, twice attributes Alcibiades' recall to him; but Plutarch mentions a decree for his recall proposed by Critias (related to Plato, and the most notorious of the Thirty who ruled Athens in 404–403), which could belong either to this occasion or to Alcibiades' return to Athens in 407.⁷²

Chapter VI

Alcibiades and the Athenian Navy: 411–406

In late summer 411, while Tissaphernes was still away from the Aegean, visiting Aspendus, the Peloponnesian forces were still not receiving the Persian money they hoped for, and Spartans who had gone with him were reporting that there was no hope that he would bring the Phoenician ships. Pharnabazus, the satrap at Dascylium, was inviting the Peloponnesians to move north and cooperate with him instead. Mindarus set sail from Miletus for the Hellespont, and Athenian ships under Thrasyllus sailed from Samos, hoping to arrive there first. Mindarus was delayed by a storm, but the Athenians paused on Lesbos, joining a contingent which had gone there earlier under Thrasybulus to besiege the city of Eresus, which had defected, and the Peloponnesians did reach the Hellespont first. They based themselves at Abydus, on the Asiatic side; most of an Athenian squadron at Sestos, further from the Aegean on the European side, managed to get past them and into the Aegean; they then joined the Athenian ships coming from Samos and Lesbos, and these based themselves at Elaeus, just inside the Hellespont on the European side.¹

There followed a battle, in the waters around Cynossema, a headland on the European side, between the Athenian position at Elaeus and the Spartan position at Abydus, around which the Hellespont bends. This was the narrowest stretch of the Hellespont, where the Peloponnesians hoped the Athenians would be least able to profit from their greater skill. The Athenians moved eastwards into the Hellespont from Elaeus, and the Peloponnesians put out to meet them. As the Peloponnesians tried to outflank the Athenians on the west, the Athenians by moving their wing in response weakened their centre. The Peloponnesians attacked there successfully, but then fell into disorder, and the Athenians were able to recover and finish victorious. This recalls the second of the two battles in the Gulf of Corinth in 429, when the heavily-outnumbered Athenians had similarly been able to turn defeat into victory.² On this occasion, their first victory in a major naval battle since the disaster in Sicily greatly strengthened the Athenians' morale. After the battle they

brought Cyzicus, on the Propontis, back onto the Athenian side.³

At this stage Alcibiades was not present with the Athenians in the Hellespont. On returning to the Aegean he went back to Samos, claiming that he had prevented Tissaphernes from bringing the Phoenician ships to the Peloponnesians and had made him more friendly to the Athenians; and he obtained money from Halicarnassus and fortified Cos. Tissaphernes returned from Aspendus to find that at Antandrus, on the gulf opposite the north of Lesbos, the people, who were being badly treated by his subordinate Arsaces, had expelled their Persian garrison.⁴ He therefore headed north to talk to the Peloponnesians, pausing to sacrifice to Artemis at Ephesus (St. Paul's 'Diana of the Ephesians') ...⁵

...and at that point, in the autumn of 411, Thucydides' narrative abruptly ends. All that we now have of Thucydides' text is all that was ever made public: there are no quotations of later passages, and Xenophon and some other historians deliberately began their accounts at (approximately) that point. Some passages in Thucydides' surviving text make it clear that he lived, for however short a time, beyond the end of the war,⁶ but whatever material he had on the period after autumn 411 has been wholly lost.

Xenophon's *Hellenica* (Greek history) is the one contemporary narrative of the period from 411 onwards which survives complete. Xenophon was an Athenian who, after his involvement in the oligarchy of 404/3, spent many years in exile as a dependant of the Spartans, and who wrote on many other subjects as well as history. As a historian he was not as penetrating, and does not seem to have been as energetic in searching for the truth, as Thucydides; he dealt with several matters which he found distasteful by omitting them altogether. The *Hellenica* runs to 362 and was finished in the 350s; but the part on the last years of the Peloponnesian War is somewhat more Thucydidean in certain respects than the rest, and may have been written earlier than the rest.⁷

One of the more Thucydidean features of the early part of the *Hellenica* has given rise to a chronological problem. In the last years of the war Xenophon marks a new year at the beginning of summer, as Thucydides did; but he does not number the years (the dating material present in the manuscript text, e.g. by Olympiads and Athenian archons, seems to have been added by an interpolator), and whereas there should be seven new years, from 410 to 404, he marks only six. The last three, 406–404, are secured by other evidence, but one of the new years 410, 409, 408 and 407 has been omitted. No solution is so clearly right that everybody has accepted it; but the solution adopted here is that the missing new year is that of 410, after the battle of Cyzicus, and that the first new year which Xenophon marks is that of 409.⁸

We have another surviving narrative of this period in the *Library of History* of Diodorus Siculus, written in the first century BC. For the fifth century and the first half of the fourth Diodorus' main source on the history of Greece and the Aegean was the universal history of Ephorus (of Cyme, in

Asia Minor), who wrote in the mid fourth century. However, whereas for the period 431–411 Ephorus seems to have had no reliable material independent of Thucydides, after 411 he represents a tradition independent of Xenophon, and we now have papyrus fragments of his source for the period 411–(perhaps) 386, the so-called *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (the Greek history of which the first papyrus was found at Oxyrhynchus, in Egypt). These are fragments of a sober, serious and detailed history, by an unknown writer (of the names suggested, the least unlikely is Cratippus, but we know so little about Cratippus that identifying him as the author would make us little the wiser). There are two fragments for the last years of the Peloponnesian War, concerned with 409 and 407 (on the chronology which I adopt: cf. above), and a larger fragment concerned with the mid 390s.⁹ At these points we can compare the original source with what Diodorus (after Ephorus) made of it; and it is clear that, in spite of the simplifications and distortions (and some spectacular errors: for instance, Diodorus uses the name Pharnabazus both for Pharnabazus and for Tissaphernes), for this period we need to take seriously Diodorus' account as well as Xenophon's.¹⁰ We shall see that frequently Xenophon's account of an episode is more favourable to Alcibiades than the alternative.

Xenophon begins his *Hellenica* in a problematic way, not perfectly linked to the end of Thucydides' text: 'a few days later' (than the battle in the Euripus which led to the downfall of the Four Hundred,¹¹ or than the battle of Cynossema in the Hellespont¹²) the Spartans and Athenians fought a naval battle 'again' (in the region of the Euripus, or of the Hellespont), and the Spartans won.¹³

The Spartan admiral, Mindarus, summoned the Peloponnesians' ships from Euboea, but these were wrecked when caught by a storm off the promontory of Athos.¹⁴ Late in the campaigning season of 411 further ships were brought to him by Dorieus, a famous athlete who was now a citizen of Thurii in Italy but was originally from Rhodes, and had been sent to Rhodes by Mindarus to prevent an anti-Spartan revolt there.¹⁵ Their arrival led to the first of many episodes of which Xenophon and Diodorus give differing accounts. As Dorieus approached the Hellespont with thirteen or fourteen ships he was seen by the Athenians, who put out against him (but perhaps not with all seventy-four of their ships, as in Diodorus). He fled to the land; Mindarus came by sea and Pharnabazus by land to support him. Another naval battle began, in the Hellespont near Abydos, and this ended with an Athenian victory after Alcibiades arrived with a contingent of Athenian ships from Samos.¹⁶ (If Alcibiades had been delaying at Samos to keep watch on Dorieus, he had been unsuccessful in that.¹⁷)

The Athenians dispersed to collect money (and in the case of one general, Thrasyllus, to report the news to and fetch reinforcements from Athens); Mindarus called for reinforcements from Sparta.¹⁸ At the end of Thucydides' narrative Alcibiades had claimed that he was making Tissaphernes more

friendly to the Athenians, and Tissaphernes was heading for the Hellespont to talk to the Peloponnesians who were increasingly unhappy with him.¹⁹ Alcibiades clearly himself believed that his standing with Tissaphernes was good, and he went in state with presents to call on Tissaphernes. But, however much or little Tissaphernes may have entertained Alcibiades' suggestions earlier, he now considered himself bound by the King's orders to fight against Athens, and so he arrested Alcibiades and took him to Sardis, where he had another Athenian prisoner, Mantiitheus. After a month the two men obtained horses and escaped to Clazomenae. Consistently with his story that Tissaphernes really favoured Athens, Alcibiades claimed according to Plutarch that Tissaphernes had enabled them to escape. Tissaphernes was a cunning man, and he could have reckoned that his reputation with the King and the Spartans would gain more from arresting Alcibiades than it would lose from subsequently letting him escape. But it suited Alcibiades to damage Tissaphernes' reputation with the Spartans, and for his own reputation with the Athenians he needed to maintain the impression that his relations with Tissaphernes were good; and it is as likely that Tissaphernes was just careless and Alcibiades invented the story.²⁰

In the spring or early summer of 410 Alcibiades rejoined Athens' Hellespont forces, and another naval battle was fought: the battle of Cyzicus, the most important of this part of the war. Xenophon and Diodorus are agreed that the Athenians left in the Hellespont, out-numbered by the Peloponnesians, moved outside to Cardia, on the neck of the Chersonese facing the Thracian coast. Reinforcements were brought to them by Theramenes, from Athens via Macedon and Thrace, and by Thrasybulus, one of the previous summer's commanders, from Thrace, as well as by Alcibiades, who came via Lesbos. Mindarus recaptured Cyzicus, in the Propontis, and he assembled his ships there and was again supported on land by Pharnabazus. The Athenians returned to the Hellespont, trying to conceal the extent of their reinforcements, and headed for Cyzicus. Xenophon writes as if Alcibiades was in sole command; the Athenians put out to sea in heavy rain, and when the sky cleared they found that Mindarus was out at sea exercising his ships and that they were themselves between Mindarus and Cyzicus. The Peloponnesians fled to the land with Alcibiades in pursuit; Mindarus was killed in the fighting and the survivors from his force fled. Diodorus' account is much more elaborate. Alcibiades, Theramenes and Thrasybulus each commanded one Athenian naval squadron, and Chaereas with soldiers approached Cyzicus by land; to the west of Cyzicus, Alcibiades went ahead by sea to tempt Mindarus to attack and, by feigning flight, to draw him away from the city; Theramenes and Thrasybulus lurked out of sight of Mindarus, and were able to cut off his retreat when Alcibiades turned to attack. Mindarus fled to the land where Pharnabazus was stationed; Alcibiades pursued, and was joined first by Thrasybulus and then by Theramenes and Chaereas. Mindarus fought nobly but was killed, and the survivors from his force fled to

Xenophon's account gives all the glory to Alcibiades, its version of what led to the beginning of the battle is improbable, and its treatment of what happened on land is extremely perfunctory. Diodorus is not clear about where particular contingents were at particular times, but, fitting what we know from the surviving fragments of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, he has a much more detailed and credible series of plans and manoeuvres. It is arguable that, while Alcibiades played the role of decoy, it was Thrasybulus, who had been in command for the earlier victories of Cynossema and Abydos, who was the true architect of the Athenian victory. Nepos remarked in his *Thrasybulus*: 'In the Peloponnesian War Thrasybulus accomplished many things without Alcibiades but Alcibiades nothing without Thrasybulus; but Alcibiades by some inborn quality gained the credit for everything.'²²

After this the Athenians clearly had the upper hand throughout the region of the Hellespont, Propontis and Bosphorus. They regained the allegiance of various cities, and they established a fort at Chrysopolis in the territory of Calchedon, on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, and began to levy a 10 per cent tax on goods brought from the Black Sea. The Peloponnesians sent back to Sparta a message quoted by Xenophon and Plutarch in thirteen words of Greek: 'Ships gone; Mindarus dead; men starving; at a loss what to do' — but Pharnabazus enabled them to regroup and to have new ships built at Andandrus.²³

It now seemed increasingly likely that Athens might win the war after all. Offers of peace by Sparta are reported at this point by Diodorus and in a fragment from the third-century historian Philochorus, both attributing Athens' rejection of the offer to the demagogue Cleophon;²⁴ in 408/7 in a fragment from the fourth-century historian Androtion, when an exchange of prisoners was arranged;²⁵ after the battle of Arginusae in 406, again rejected at the instance of Cleophon, by the *Athenian Constitution* and (derived from that) an ancient commentator on Aristophanes;²⁶ without date, and rejected at the instance of Cleophon, by the fourth-century orator Aeschines.²⁷ After the battle of Aegospotami in 405 it was Athens which tried to make peace with Sparta, and Cleophon was opposed to peace then too.²⁸ We should not doubt that Cleophon was consistently opposed to peace with Sparta, but we should not expect repetitions of the same scenario on too many occasions: probably Arginusae in the *Athenian Constitution* and the Aristophanes commentary is a simple error for Cyzicus, which of those two Athenian victories was the one which had the greater impact.²⁹ According to Diodorus the Spartan delegation to Athens after Cyzicus was headed by Alcibiades' contact Endius: presumably now that Alcibiades was once more on the Athenian side the Spartans thought that Endius would be a suitable man to negotiate with Athens.

In Athens the ending of the intermediate régime of the Five Thousand has been lost between the end of Thucydides and the beginning of Xenophon, it is

absent also from Diodorus, but I believe (though not all do) that it is what is alluded to in the first sentence of *Ath. Pol.* 34. i.³⁰ The strongest indication that the restored democracy came into effect at the beginning of 410/09 is the decree of Demophantus, dated to the first prytany of that year (the first of the ten segments into which the council's year was divided).³¹ Probably what triggered the restoration was the victory at Cyzicus, with the reminder that Athens' success depended on the success of its navy.

The change of régime had an impact on the position of Alcibiades. We have seen that in the summer of 411 he had on the proposal of Thrasybulus joined the Athenian forces at Samos after they had declared their allegiance to democracy, and had been elected general by them.³² The intermediate régime of the Five Thousand had voted that Alcibiades and other exiles should be restored:³³ probably Alcibiades and the other men elected at Samos were not re-elected in Athens, but the cooperation between Athens and the navy, marked by Theramenes' taking reinforcements to the navy, indicates that their appointments were accepted. However, the restored democracy was not bound by the decisions of the previous régime, and Alcibiades remained technically a man under sentence of death until he returned to Athens in 407.³⁴ It seems likely that from 410 to 407 not only Alcibiades but with him Theramenes and Thrasybulus were generals *de facto* because the force in the Hellespont continued to accept them as generals, but were not formally elected as generals by the assembly in Athens.³⁵

Thrasyllus, the most staunchly democratic of the generals with the navy, had been sent back to Athens after the battle of Abydos late in 411.³⁶ If the solution to Xenophon's chronological problem which I have accepted is correct, he did not leave Athens until the summer of 409.³⁷ Not only has the beginning of Xenophon's year 410/09 not been marked (its proper place is probably before *Hell.* I. i. 11 and the battle of Cyzicus), but there is at least one further chronological problem in the latter part of Xen. *Hell.* I. i, in that Xenophon mentions the exile of Hermocrates and his fellow generals from Syracuse there, after Cyzicus, while Thucydides mentioned it in the context of 411.³⁸ Xenophon mentions also a sortie by Agis from Decelea to the walls of Athens, who withdrew when Thrasyllus mustered the Athenian army in the Lyceum, outside the city walls to the east, and that presumably did occur in 410, probably after the restoration of the democracy, when Thrasyllus had been re-elected general by the assembly.³⁹ Probably Athens did not in 410 have the ships or the money needed to reinforce the navy, but when Thrasyllus did leave Athens in 409 he did not immediately return to the Hellespont but first undertook a campaign in the Aegean. It has been argued that that was due to tension between the restored democracy in Athens and the fleet under Alcibiades, Thrasybulus and the politically ambiguous Theramenes.⁴⁰ In the meantime, while a new fleet was being built for the Peloponnesians, the Athenians in the Hellespont had too few hoplites and no cavalry to counter Pharnabazus, and achieved nothing further until they were

joined by Thrasyllus; Thrasybulus with part of the Hellespontine force moved to campaign along the coast of Thrace.⁴¹ (He probably remained there until 407: he is not mentioned again in the Hellespontine region in that period, while Xenophon sends him to Thrace in 407 and Diodorus records Xenophon's campaign in the context of 407/6.⁴²)

When Thrasyllus left Athens, with a force which included cavalry, he sailed first to Samos. He had some successes, but by the time he was ready to attack Ephesus Tissaphernes had arrived to defend the city, and both arms of Thrasyllus' divided force were defeated.⁴³ He then went north to Lesbos, where he seems to have lingered for some time, successfully intercepting a northbound squadron of Syracusan ships which had been with Tissaphernes at Ephesus. He sent his captives to Athens (where they were imprisoned but escaped) — with the exception of Alcibiades' cousin, Alcibiades of Phegus, who was another of the men condemned for involvement in the religious scandals of 415:⁴⁴ according to the manuscript text of Xenophon, Thrasyllus had him stoned to death.⁴⁵ Late in the year Thrasyllus did join the Athenian force in the Hellespont, and they set about fortifying Lampsacus. Xenophon and Plutarch report that Alcibiades wanted to integrate the two forces but Alcibiades' men were at first reluctant to join the others, while Diodorus writes of Thrasyllus' being given a separate command. But after a successful raid on the territory of Abydos (though the city was not captured) a full amalgamation was achieved, and further raiding followed.⁴⁶

After this lull the Athenians had an energetic and successful year in 408. Xenophon's year begins with their moving to Calchedon to attack that and Byzantium, but Diodorus may be right to have the campaign against Calchedon begun earlier, perhaps as an immediate sequel to the occupation of Chrysopolis, by Theramenes.⁴⁷ The Calchedonians entrusted their movable property to the Bithynians, the surrounding people, but Alcibiades threatened to attack and succeeded in obtaining it from them. The Athenians controlled the sea, and by land Calchedon was blockaded by means of a wooden palisade; the Spartan governor Hippocrates attacked but after a lengthy battle was defeated and killed. In Xenophon's account Pharnabazus had come to support Calchedon with an army including cavalry, Alcibiades was apparently engaged against him, and Thrasyllus was not able to defeat Hippocrates until Alcibiades joined him. After that, while Alcibiades went elsewhere to raise money, the other Athenian generals made a truce with Pharnabazus, agreeing that Calchedon would pay tribute to them but be immune from attack, and Pharnabazus should pay an indemnity to the Athenians, while he escorted Athenian envoys to the Persian King. Diodorus gives the credit for defeating Hippocrates to Alcibiades, but has no mention of Pharnabazus, and then has Theramenes make a treaty directly with Calchedon by which it agreed to pay tribute.⁴⁸ That the Athenians should settle the fate of Calchedon not with itself, or even with the Spartans who had been in control of the city, but with Pharnabazus, would be strange.⁴⁹ There is a story that (perhaps in 410–409, to

crush a pro-Athenian movement) Pharnabazus had castrated the young men of Calchedon and sent them to the King; if so, Calchedon may well have been happy to return to the Athenian fold, and Xenophon may have brought Pharnabazus to defend the city and have combined with the settlement a later agreement to send Athenian envoys to the King, in order to save his reputation.⁵⁰

After Cyzicus Selymbria, on the Propontis, had given Alcibiades money but had not allowed his forces into the city;⁵¹ now he captured it, and then he headed for Byzantium with a force from the Chersonese and from Thrace. Plutarch has an exciting story, not in Xenophon or Diodorus, that there was a party in Selymbria willing to betray the city to Alcibiades, but after one of the plotters defected the signal to Alcibiades had to be given prematurely; the gate was opened and he and a few of his men rushed in ahead of the rest, but the Selymbrians mustered to oppose him. He gave a trumpet signal and proclaimed that the Selymbrians ought not to fight against Athens; this undermined the opposition until his main army arrived. He was afraid that his Thracian troops would sack the city ('there were many of them, and they were campaigning enthusiastically out of favour and good will towards Alcibiades'), so he sent them out of the city and then imposed a mild settlement.⁵² This episode is our first indication that Alcibiades had Thracian connections which he could exploit; after the battle of Notium in 406 he went to Thrace as an exile.

As we shall see below, when Alcibiades returned to Athens in 407 he had his settlement with Selymbria ratified by the assembly. There is an inscription which gives part of that settlement (the beginning is lost) together with the subsequent decree of ratification, proposed by Alcibiades. In the settlement Athens restored hostages and promised to take none in future, gave the Selymbrians freedom to decide their own constitution, perhaps cancelled debts owed to Athens and provided for a restoration of exiles, abandoned claims to property in Selymbria lost by Athenians and allies apart from land and houses, and made arrangements for the resolution of outstanding disputes. The oath was sworn by all the Athenians present and all the Selymbrians, and the Athenian swearers include 'the generals' (plural).⁵³ The only other general known to have taken part in this year's campaign is Thrasyllus; Xenophon and Plutarch attribute the settlement for Calchedon to 'the other generals', but Diodorus attributes it specifically to Theramenes. There may have been one or more other generals present who have not found their way into the record, but otherwise we must assume that Thrasyllus went to Selymbria with Alcibiades and that (as in Diodorus) Theramenes was left on his own to handle the settlement with Calchedon.

For Xenophon and Plutarch, since Alcibiades was absent when the agreement was made with Pharnabazus about Calchedon, when he returned Pharnabazus insisted that he too should swear to the agreement, and he did so only after ensuring that Pharnabazus also swore to him.⁵⁴

Byzantium (see plate 20) remained to be captured. Diodorus again has the siege begun by Theramenes, which is likely enough since Alcibiades was away when the Athenians gained Calchedon; Xenophon by implication (he names no other general) and Plutarch directly claim that Alcibiades began the siege. The Athenians attacked the walls of the city, and as at Calchedon built their own palisade to cut it off from contact by land with its surroundings. There was again a party willing to betray the city to Athens. The Spartan governor Clearchus⁵⁵ after organising the resistance as well as he could went to Pharnabazus to obtain money and ships, hoping to distract the Athenians by making attacks elsewhere, but in his absence the city was betrayed to the Athenians. Diodorus and Plutarch have a story which Xenophon omits even though it was to Alcibiades' credit. Alcibiades sailed away by day, spreading a rumour that he needed to go to Ionia, but he then returned at night, and while his ships caused consternation by sailing into the harbour he was able to enter the city unopposed.⁵⁶ When the men in the city formed up against the Athenians, there was a battle in which Alcibiades was victorious on the right wing and Theramenes on the left. Clearchus, like other Spartan governors, had been unpopular (he was alleged to have given provisions only to the garrison and to have let the Byzantines starve); the settlement was a mild one, as had been promised to the men who betrayed the city (in Diodorus' version, Alcibiades made this promise in a proclamation as the battle was raging, and this led the Byzantines in the force opposing him to change sides).⁵⁷

All three settlements which we know of from this year were generous. Calchedon was to pay tribute at its previous rate; Selymbria, as we have seen, was left free to decide its own constitution and was well treated in other respects; Byzantium became an ally again and, in accordance with Alcibiades' promise, none of its citizens was killed or exiled. It was clearly a policy of Alcibiades and his colleagues that regaining the support of cities brought back to the Athenian side was important and that punishment for their earlier defection was to be avoided.

Xenophon and Plutarch, for whom the arrangements for Calchedon were made not with the Calchedonians but with Pharnabazus, include in these arrangements an agreement that Pharnabazus was to conduct Athenian envoys to the Persian King;⁵⁸ Pharnabazus remained in Calchedon until Alcibiades returned from Selymbria and swore to the arrangements.⁵⁹ If, as in Diodorus, Calchedon was dealt with directly, the agreement about the envoys was something separate, and probably later in 408; it may be part of a truce which also involved his paying an indemnity. Pharnabazus set out in person with five Athenians, two Argives, Pasippidas and other Spartans, and the now exiled Hermocrates and Proxenus of Syracuse.⁶⁰ A separate Spartan embassy was already negotiating with the King, as we shall see below; Pasippidas had been exiled *c.* 410;⁶¹ so more probably he and his colleagues were Spartan exiles, pursuing their own interests, and Hermocrates and Proxenus had now left the Spartan camp: this was an anti-Spartan deputation to the King, and after the

Athenian successes of 408 Pharnabazus presumably thought that he should provide for the possibility of an eventual Athenian victory.⁶² Pharnabazus and the envoys were at Gordium, in central Asia Minor, in the winter of 408/7, when they heard of the fall of Byzantium.⁶³

In the spring of 407 they met a returning Spartan delegation, comprising Boeotius and others, who brought the news that the King had granted all they wanted and had appointed his younger son Cyrus to support them in the war. The Athenians wanted either to complete their journey to the King or to return home, but Cyrus persuaded Pharnabazus to detain them so that the Athenians should not learn of the latest developments. According to the manuscripts' text of Xenophon he detained them for three years, but there was no need or indeed possibility for the Persian arrangement with Sparta to be concealed for anything approaching that length of time, and three months' detention has been suggested instead of three years.⁶⁴ Moreover, of the Athenians named, Euryptolemus could be the cousin of Alcibiades who was in Athens to greet him when he returned in 407,⁶⁵ and Mantitheus could be the Mantitheus who was Alcibiades' fellow prisoner in Sardis in 411⁶⁶ and/or the Mantitheus who was one of the men left in command in the Hellespont when the generals returned to Athens.⁶⁷ We must always reckon with the possibility that two men with the same name were active at the same time, though we should not go to the other extreme and postulate too many men with the same name. On a chronological scheme which places the generals' return in the year after Athens' recovery of Calchedon, Selymbria and Byzantium, the Mantitheus left in the Hellespont will have to be different from the Mantitheus who served on the deputation to see the King, but the other identifications remain possible and attractive.

We shall look at the impact of the King's sending of Cyrus below, but we should consider here the claim made by Boeotius and his colleagues that the Spartans had gained all they wanted from the King. In 412–411 the Spartans had undertaken to return the Asiatic Greeks to Persia in return for Persia's support against Athens.⁶⁸ After they had won the Peloponnesian War, they did not return the Asiatic Greeks to Persia; and indeed in 400, when Tissaphernes demanded the Asiatic Greeks' submission, the Spartans began fighting against Persia on their behalf, though at more than one point they were prepared to consider a compromise by which the Asiatic Greeks would pay tribute to Persia but would be autonomous otherwise.⁶⁹ Either at the end of the Peloponnesian War Sparta ungratefully refused to keep its bargain with Persia or in the meantime the bargain was renegotiated but Tissaphernes assumed (after Sparta had supported Cyrus' failed bid for the throne against his brother Artaxerxes) that the renegotiation involving Cyrus could be disregarded — and I find the second scenario easier to believe and therefore accept a 'treaty of Boeotius' in 408/7.⁷⁰

Remarkably, even after that the Athenians did not totally abandon any

hope that Persian support might be diverted to them. In 407/6, probably at the instance of Alcibiades, whose influence was then at its height, they made an approach to Cyrus through Tissaphernes, suggesting as Alcibiades had suggested to Tissaphernes earlier⁷¹ that it would be in Persia's best interests not to secure a Spartan victory but to let the two sides weaken each other; but Persian policy was now settled and Cyrus refused to see the Athenians.⁷² There is also a frustrating inscription, fragmentary and undated, but most probably belonging to the period 412/1–407/6, in which the Athenians confer citizenship on Evagoras, the ruler of Salamis in Cyprus: an amendment mentions Tissaphernes, and has been restored to refer to 'the King and the other [allies]', i.e. to regard the Persian King as an ally of Athens.⁷³ The King never did become an ally of Athens. 408/7 before the arrival of Cyrus in Asia Minor would perhaps be the least unlikely time for the Athenians optimistically to refer to him as an ally, but the restoration is far from secure, and it may be rather that the inscription referred to Evagoras himself as a 'king', as another Athenian decree was to do in the 390s.⁷⁴ Cyrus' rejection of the approach made through Tissaphernes did finally mark the end of Athenian hopes that Persian policy might change to their advantage. To us now it seems remarkable that they continued to hope for so long, and we are left to wonder how much encouragement they were given, and how far Tissaphernes at various times and Pharnabazus at the end of 408, if not the King himself, seriously considered supporting Athens.

The Athenians' successes in the region of the Hellespont were spectacular, and at the end of 408 it must have seemed more likely than at any time since 413 that they would win the war. Pharnabazus, hitherto the satrap who was the more reliable supporter of Sparta, was escorting Athenian envoys to the King, and there was another Spartan peace offer, which resulted in an exchange of prisoners. How great Alcibiades' contribution to the successes was is hard to work out from the accounts of Xenophon and Diodorus, with their differing slants, but there is no reason to doubt that it was substantial. In 411 he had been recalled first at Thrasybulus' instance by the semi-independent fleet at Samos, and later by the intermediate régime of the Five Thousand, but he had not yet returned to Athens since his condemnation in absence in 415, and it seems that since 410 the restored democracy had left him in limbo, tolerated but not formally reinstated. He will have had both friends and enemies in Athens, but now was his best opportunity to achieve the restoration for which he had been working since 411.

In 407 he and the other generals from the Hellespont returned to Athens. It is not clear how much mopping up remained to be done after the capture of Byzantium, but Diodorus reports that all the cities in that region were now in the Athenians' hands except Abydos, which remained the Spartan base.⁷⁵ He states that a sufficient force was left there (Mantitheus, one of its two commanders, will probably be different from the Mantitheus serving on the aborted mission to the King⁷⁶), and gives the impression that the remainder

sailed to Athens as a single body.⁷⁷ Xenophon tells a more elaborate story. Thrasyllus sailed directly to Athens (and probably Theramenes with him⁷⁸), while Alcibiades with twenty ships went first to Samos, and raised money in Caria (but hardly as much as the 100 talents of Xenophon's manuscript text), then went to Gytheum on the south coast of Laconia, to confirm rumours that Sparta was having new ships built there, and only when he was sure of his welcome returned to Athens.⁷⁹ By this time the board of generals for 407/6 had been elected, and he was among them. (The elections were held 'in the first prytany after the sixth in whose term of office there are good omens',⁸⁰ i.e. as soon as possible after about February, but they seem to have been delayed this year.) It is possible that we should place here rather than under the intermediate régime of 411/0 the decree of Critias for his recall.⁸¹ Xenophon's account of Alcibiades' arrival in Athens is low-key, but Diodorus writes of a magnificent entry by the whole fleet, and Plutarch also writes of a magnificent entry by Alcibiades, though he rejects the wilder fancies of Duris of Samos (who wrote in the third century and claimed to be a descendant of Alcibiades), which were not borne out by his better sources; Plutarch and Xenophon maintain that Alcibiades was anxious until it was evident that he was welcome. Our sources agree that a crowd had gone to the Piraeus to see his arrival, and Xenophon and Plutarch mention among the crowd his cousin Eurypotemus (probably recently returned to Athens after the aborted mission to the King). They date his arrival to an inauspicious day, that of the Plynteria (about late May), something which we should have expected Alcibiades to avoid.⁸²

Election as a general had implied the annulment of Alcibiades' condemnation in 415, but had not guaranteed it. Xenophon, continuing his low-key treatment, gives a short and simple account of his appearing before the council and assembly, claiming that he was not guilty of impiety and had been treated unjustly. Diodorus and Plutarch give a more high-pitched version, including the details, which ought to be correct, that his confiscated property was to be restored to him (presumably its cash value: the various items could hardly be recovered from the men who had bought them in good faith⁸³), and the curses pronounced on him by the officials of the Eleusinian cult should be revoked (according to Plutarch the chief of these, Theodorus the hierophant, to save face claimed that if Alcibiades was not guilty he had not cursed him). Diodorus adds that the *stelai* recording his sentence were to be thrown into the sea (it was common practice to demolish a *stèle* in order to annul the decision recorded on it, but throwing the *stèle* into the sea was not normal). Alcibiades was also made Athens' supreme commander — the only occasion when it is certain that one of Athens' ten generals was made formally superior to his colleagues.⁸⁴ According to Diodorus he was given the colleagues whom he wanted, Adimantus and Thrasybulus. If there is any truth in that, it must mean only that he asked for and was given these men, out of those elected for 407/6, to be his colleagues on the next campaign. Adimantus

was one of the men condemned for profaning the Mysteries in 415, presumably reinstated in Athens together with Alcibiades, and we shall see that he was indeed one of Alcibiades' colleagues when he left Athens in the autumn. Thrasybulus, as far as we know, was still in the region of Thrace, so this is probably one of the passages in which Diodorus names Thrasybulus in error for Thrasyllus: he in the autumn accompanied Alcibiades as far as Andros.

While away from Athens, the generals with the fleet had made treaties with cities on their own authority, without reference to Athens. These were now presented to the assembly for ratification, and we have two inscriptions resulting from that exercise, in each case including a decree proposed by Alcibiades: that for Selymbria has been mentioned above;⁸⁵ there is also a small fragment concerning an agreement with 'those occupying Daphnus' — presumably the Daphnus in the vicinity of Clazomenae, reflecting an episode there later than those of 412/1 reported by Thucydides.⁸⁶

There was also an opportunity for a flamboyant demonstration of Alcibiades' reconciliation with the Eleusinian cult. About September every year the Mysteries were celebrated, and the rituals at Eleusis were preceded by a procession from Athens to Eleusis. Since the Spartans had occupied Decelea, in 413, the Athenians had been afraid that the procession might be attacked, and instead the worshippers had travelled from the Piraeus to Eleusis by sea. In 407, by arrangement with the Eleusinian officials, Alcibiades provided a military escort, and lookouts on the hills, and so enabled the traditional procession and subsequent return to Athens to take place by the traditional route— and the Spartans did not attempt to interfere.⁸⁷

Time was needed to rest the Athenian forces and to make preparations for the next campaign. If an adventurously restored inscription can be relied on, in 407/6 on the proposal of Alcibiades the Athenians arranged not to import timber from Macedon to build ships in Athens but to have ships built for them in Macedon, and then sent to Athens and manned and dispatched to Ionia.⁸⁸ These ships will not have been ready when Alcibiades set out from Athens: that took place 'in the third month after his return' according to the manuscript text of Xenophon, but that would imply August, before the Eleusinian Mysteries, so editors emend to the fourth or fifth month and suppose that he sailed in September or October. He had 1,500 hoplites, 150 cavalry and 100 ships, and he went first to Andros, south-east of Euboea, which had revolted from Athens. He seized a fort called Gaurium, and won a battle against the Andrians and their Spartan garrison, but he was unable to take the city. Leaving a garrison with Thrasyllus to command it, he continued across the Aegean to Samos, from which he made raids to fund his campaign with booty.⁸⁹

Meanwhile the relationship between Sparta and Persia had been transformed. King Darius' younger son Cyrus (aged just sixteen: according to Plutarch he was born after Darius' accession in winter 424/3, but had the

support of the queen, Parysatis⁹⁰) was sent to be *karanos*, or satrap of Lydia, Greater Phrygia and Cappadocia, and general of those who mustered in the plain of Castolus (east of Sardis).⁹¹ Essentially that meant that he was in charge of the whole of Asia Minor apart from its northern and southern coasts; Pharnabazus was made subordinate to him,⁹² and Tissaphernes was perhaps limited to Caria, the south-west corner of Asia Minor.⁹³ One of his duties was to support Sparta against Athens, but there were also troubles in the interior of Asia Minor which he had to deal with.⁹⁴ At Sparta the position of admiral had by now become an annual (and unrepeatable) office beginning in the spring,⁹⁵ and the man appointed for 407/6 was Lysander, from a once-distinguished family doing less well than in the past: he had been brought up as a *mothax*, a client-companion of a more prosperous young Spartan.⁹⁶ He will have been at least twice the age of Cyrus, perhaps significantly more, and he was an ambitious man who was skilled at attracting supporters to himself, both inside Sparta and outside. He established a very good relationship with Cyrus. He chose as his base on the Aegean coast Ephesus, convenient for access to Sardis, and when Cyrus arrived at Sardis he went to see him, and found him very willing to spend money on the war: he could not be persuaded to double the rate of pay for the sailors from 3 obols to 6 obols (= 1 drachma), but when he invited Lysander to put a request to him Lysander asked for an increase to 4 obols and that was granted.⁹⁷ It is after this that Xenophon mentions the unsuccessful Athenian approach to Cyrus through Tissaphernes.⁹⁸

Alcibiades and the Athenians were short of money, and after their previous campaign they had a momentum which they needed to maintain, so they wanted to fight a battle as soon as possible, but Lysander was in no hurry. When he refused to fight, the Athenians stationed themselves at Notium, the harbour town of Colophon, about 8 miles / 14km north-west of Ephesus. After a while Alcibiades departed with the land forces and their transport ships to a more northerly stretch of the Asiatic coast: Xenophon and Plutarch's *Lysander* mention Phocaea, which was being fortified or attacked by Thrasybulus; Diodorus mentions Clazomenae, to the south of Phocaea. His intention was presumably to make gains for Athens in the northern part of Ionia while the fleet kept Lysander at Ephesus.⁹⁹ The other known generals, Aristocrates and Adimantus, presumably went with him, since they were described as generals for land operations.¹⁰⁰ Probably there were no generals left with the fleet, but it is arguable that one should have been left: indignation has been aroused both in antiquity and in modern times by Alcibiades' choice of the man to be left in charge, the 'helmsman' (i.e. working captain) of his ship, Antiochus. Unfortunately for his reputation, the only earlier detail attested about Antiochus is that he was the man who caught the quail which flew out of Alcibiades' cloak in one of his youthful exploits, as a result of which he had become one of Alcibiades' favourites.¹⁰¹ Defenders of the choice have pointed out that we know of no naval divisional officers ranking

below the generals, while the trierarchs responsible for the individual ships were rich men given that duty for the year and would not necessarily have any suitable experience; Antiochus may have been a companion of Alcibiades but he was also an experienced seaman.¹⁰² He was instructed at any rate not to attack Lysander while Alcibiades was away (Xenophon), perhaps not even to fight if Lysander tried to attack him (Plutarch's *Alcibiades*).¹⁰³ He had perhaps a hundred ships, perhaps eighty; Lysander had ninety.¹⁰⁴

But some time early in 406 Antiochus disobeyed his orders. On the course of the battle Xenophon (followed with embellishments by Plutarch) and Diodorus again diverge, and here we have a fragment (but frustratingly not a full text) of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, the original which lies behind Diodorus. In Xenophon's version there is no sign that the battle was planned: Antiochus sailed up to the Spartans with just two ships to taunt them, Lysander put out in pursuit with a few ships, more Athenian ships arrived in support of Antiochus, Lysander attacked with his whole fleet, and finally the Athenians launched their remaining ships but were unable to beat the Spartans. In the alternative and better version Antiochus and Lysander may each have tried to use a version of the tactics which had succeeded for the Athenians at Cyzicus, but without the possibilities of concealment which the topography there had provided. Antiochus sailed to Ephesus with ten ships, perhaps tempted by a small squadron which Lysander was in the habit of sending out, and warned the remaining Athenian ships to be ready; he perhaps went ahead of the others with just one or two of his ships. Lysander in response put out a few ships, perhaps thirteen (this stage has been lost by Diodorus, who has Lysander respond with his whole fleet), and he attacked and disabled Antiochus' ship (according to Plutarch Antiochus was killed). Antiochus' other ships fled in disarray; Lysander pursued, now with the whole of his fleet; the remaining Athenian ships were not ready, put out in confusion and were defeated. The Athenians lost several ships: fifteen according to Xenophon, twenty-two according to the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* and Diodorus; after their defeat (though not immediately according to the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* and Diodorus) they withdrew to Samos.¹⁰⁵

Alcibiades on learning of what had happened hurried back to join the Athenian fleet. According to Xenophon the Athenian ships still out-numbered the Spartan: he sailed to Ephesus hoping for another battle, but Lysander did not respond.¹⁰⁶ Diodorus turns his attention to Thrasybulus' successes in the north Aegean and then to an unsuccessful attack on Athens by Agis from Decelea,¹⁰⁷ and then returns to Alcibiades: he took his whole force north from Samos, invented an excuse for attacking and plundering Cyme (though it was on the Athenian side), but when he had landed and started pillaging the citizens mustered in force and drove him away; he then brought his hoplites from Mytilene but the Cymaeans refused to come out and fight against him; and they complained to Athens about his attack.¹⁰⁸

Strategically the defeat at Notium was not a disaster, but psychologically

it was of great importance: Athens' run of successes since 411 had ended, and the Spartans had defeated the Athenians in a major sea battle. Various complaints were sent to Athens about Alcibiades, in particular that he had abandoned Notium and placed his drinking-companion Antiochus in charge (so that he could enjoy himself with the prostitutes of Abydus and Ionia, according to Plutarch), that he had built himself forts in Thrace, on the coast of the Propontis, that he had been collaborating in his own interests with Sparta and/or Pharnabazus.¹⁰⁹

Alcibiades did not risk returning to Athens but retired to his forts in Thrace. What happened formally in Athens is not clear. Xenophon and Diodorus both give a list of ten newly elected generals, and these are presumably the generals for 406/5, elected in February or soon afterwards; the Athenians had no reason to depose the whole board of generals for 407/6. Alcibiades of course was not included; other men not included were his recent colleagues Thrasybulus and Theramenes, but the list should not be seen as comprehensively anti-Alcibiades. Among those who were elected were Thrasyllus, and Pericles II, the son of Pericles I by Aspasia.¹¹⁰ It is likely enough that Alcibiades was not just written off but was formally deposed. Deposition commonly led to a trial in court,¹¹¹ and that could have gone ahead in Alcibiades' absence, but only one late text states (without context) that he was prosecuted — by the demagogue Cleophon¹¹² — and none reports a conviction or penalty. Lysias says that he did not undergo *euthynai* (the examination of conduct on leaving office) but 'condemned himself to exile'; Diodorus says that he was afraid of the lawsuits which had been brought against him, including one concerning his controversial chariot team in the Olympic games of 416,¹¹³ and feared that the Athenians would punish him, so (again) he 'condemned himself to exile'.¹¹⁴ It would be surprising if he was condemned when none of our sources says as much, so presumably friends resorted to delaying tactics on his behalf and no prosecution following his deposition was brought to court. The fleet at Samos was taken over by Conon, one of the generals for 406/5, who may already have been a general in 407/6. Xenophon reports him as coming from Andros with the twenty ships which he had: possibly he had been sent to Andros to succeed or reinforce Thrasyllus;¹¹⁵ the twenty ships could either have been brought by him from Athens or have been left there with Thrasyllus by Alcibiades. At Samos he was able to man only seventy ships: probably sailors had been attracted by Lysander's higher pay and by his success at Notium to desert to the Spartans. Despite the impression given by Diodorus, it is unlikely that Alcibiades waited for Conon to arrive and formally handed over to him.¹¹⁶

So, after rejoining the Athenian forces in 411 and being fully reinstated in Athens in 407, Alcibiades went into exile again in 406. What had he achieved in this period? In working for his return to Athens he had held out the prospect of Persian support against Sparta, coupled with a change of régime in

Athens. Persian support was not obtained, and was not going to be obtained before the war ended with Athens' final defeat; how seriously either Tissaphernes or Pharnabazus ever considered changing tack and supporting Athens is hard to make out. The change of régime did occur in 411, brought about by oligarchs who had by then decided to go ahead without Alcibiades: whatever mixture of motives had inspired different men in advance, the Four Hundred proved to be a body of men who were most interested in power for themselves and who did not command enough support to retain power. We know frustratingly little about the régime of the Five Thousand, but it did cooperate with Alcibiades and the fleet. After Cyzicus the democracy was restored, and there seems to have been an uneasy relationship between it and the fleet commanded by Thrasybulus, Theramenes and Alcibiades.

411–408 was a time of considerable success for that fleet: Sparta's Aegean fleet was effectively eliminated at Cyzicus in 410; the Hellespontine region, vital for the security of Athens' imports of corn from the Black Sea, and the northern Aegean were brought back under Athenian control. If at the end of 413 the defeat of Athens had seemed almost inevitable, by the end of 408 it seemed likely that Athens would win the war after all. How much of the strategic planning was due to Alcibiades and how much to his fellow generals our sources do not make clear, but psychologically his contribution must have been considerable. He was flamboyant and ambitious, and he was good at persuading people that what he wanted to achieve could be achieved. 407 marked the high point in his career: the welcome home; the annulment of his condemnation and the revival of the traditional procession for the Mysteries; the unparalleled supreme command.

A great deal was expected of Alcibiades in 407/6, and his failure to take Andros was the first indication that he could not live up to the expectations. Leaving the fleet at Notium while he went further north was not in itself a mistake, though he should have left one of the generals with it; but Antiochus' misjudgment and the defeat to which it led had a disastrous effect on the Athenians' morale. The subsequent attack on Cyme, as reported by Diodorus, was both unjustified and unsuccessful, and after that Alcibiades was wise not to return to Athens. But this was not necessarily the end, either for Athens or for Alcibiades.

Chapter VII

Final Years: 406–404/3

In 406 after Notium Alcibiades retired to his forts in Thrace, where he employed mercenaries to conduct raids in his own interests. We have seen that in the siege of Selymbria in 408 he was supported by Thracian troops who were devoted to him, so he must already have established some Thracian connections by then.¹ After Notium Xenophon states merely that the forts were in the Chersonese; Diodorus mentions Pactye; Nepos has a corrupt text which seems to say that he went to Pactye and founded three forts at Orni, Bisanthe and Neon Teichos; Plutarch refers to forts in the region of Bisanthe.² Lysias says that Alcibiades' son (Alcibiades IV) conspired with an unknown Theotimus against his father and betrayed Orni to him.³ The most substantial of the places mentioned was Bisanthe, on the north coast of the Propontis west of Perinthus: it seems to have been a Thracian possession in 430; it was included in the Delian League's assessment lists of 425 and after (which does not guarantee that it ever paid); it was later offered by the Thracian prince Seuthes II to Xenophon after his return from Cyrus' expedition against Artaxerxes II.⁴ Pactye, on the north coast of the Propontis at the east end of the Hellespont, was one of the border points of the settlement of the Dolonci in the Chersonese presided over by the Athenian Miltiades in the sixth century; it is not known to have been a member of the Delian League.⁵ Neon Teichos and Orni were smaller settlements, perhaps Neon Teichos east of Bisanthe and Orni west; Neon Teichos is another of the sites offered to Xenophon.⁶ In sketching the background to the offers made to him, Xenophon gives an indication of dynastic instability in the region, which Alcibiades could have exploited.⁷ Bisanthe and Pactye were more than 'forts', but it is possible that Alcibiades at least had friends in them.

Meanwhile Lysander was succeeded as Spartan admiral by Callicratidas, whose relations with Cyrus were as bad as Lysander's had been good. When he moved north to Lesbos, in the summer of 406, he was followed by Conon with the Athenian fleet, but he trapped and blockaded the Athenians in the harbour of Mytilene. The Athenians made a supreme effort to equip and man a further fleet. Callicratidas had to divide his force: leaving part to continue the blockade of Mytilene, with the remainder he attacked the new Athenian fleet

near the Arginusae Islands, off the mainland opposite Lesbos. Callicratidas was killed, and the Athenian reinforcements in spite of their inexperience were overwhelmingly victorious, but the weather was bad and they were unable to rescue living survivors or the bodies of the dead from their wrecked ships. That led to an explosion of anger in an extremely tense Athens: Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who were not generals but had been serving as trierarchs, succeeded in passing the blame to the generals, and six generals including Thrasyllus and Pericles II were put to death while two others escaped into exile.⁸ The unsuccessful Spartan peace offer which the *Athenian Constitution* places here is probably the offer made after Cyzicus misplaced.⁹

The surviving Spartans went to Chios, and towards the end of winter 406/5 their allies and Cyrus sent messages to Sparta asking for Lysander to be appointed again. The office of admiral was now an annual office which a man could hold only once,¹⁰ so the Spartans got round the law by appointing Aracus as admiral for 405/4 and Lysander as secretary and effective commander.¹¹ Conon was the one survivor of the Athenian generals for 406/5, and Xenophon reports the election of Alcibiades' associate Adimantus and Philocles for the remainder of that year.¹² A full board was elected in the spring of 405 for 405/4:¹³ it included those three; Theramenes was elected but was rejected at the *dokimasia*, the formal vetting which Athenians had to undergo before entering any office;¹⁴ Thrasybulus, as far as we know, was not elected.

At Athens' Lenaean festival of 405 (about January) the comedies produced included Aristophanes' *Frogs*. That won first prize; and, exceptionally, because of its *parabasis*, the passage in the middle of the play where the action was suspended and the chorus addressed the audience more directly, Aristophanes was awarded an olive crown and the play was given a second performance, perhaps in 404 before the final capitulation of Athens to Sparta.¹⁵ The echoes of the procession to Eleusis and the Eleusinian Mysteries in the early part of the play will have reminded the audience of Alcibiades' actions in 415 and of his restoration of the traditional procession in 407. Scholars have disputed, and will no doubt continue to dispute, how far Aristophanes had a political purpose in his plays, but even the most sceptical¹⁶ tend to accept that there is a clear political message in the *parabasis* of *Frogs* (674–737): the demagogue Cleophon is denounced, those deprived of their citizenship should have their rights restored (primarily these will be men punished for their involvement in the oligarchic movement of 411, but the audience will no doubt have thought of the exiled Alcibiades too); the people should reject their low-class leaders (including by implication Cleophon, though in fact his father had been a candidate for ostracism and a general¹⁷) and instead trust the well born and well educated (a category which included Alcibiades).

The main story of the play is that, after the recent deaths of both Sophocles and Euripides, the god Dionysus goes down to the underworld to

bring back a good tragedian; Sophocles is happy enough where he is, so the play culminates in a contest between the traditionalist Aeschylus and the modernist Euripides. The city is in a desperate state, with Arginusae and its aftermath still very recent, and what is needed is not just a good tragedian but a tragedian who will be good for the city. In interrogating the tragedians Dionysus begins with the problem of Alcibiades:

DIONYSUS. First, then, what opinion does each of you hold about Alcibiades? The city is in sore travail over him.

AESCHYLUS. And what is its opinion about him?

DIONYSUS. What? It longs for him, it hates him, it wants to have him. So you two tell me what you think about him.

EURIPIDES. I hate the citizen who will show himself slow to help his country and quick to do it great harm.

DIONYSUS. Well said, by Poseidon! And what do you think, Aeschylus?

AESCHYLUS. It is best not to rear a lion's whelp in the city;¹⁸ but if you do rear one you must minister to its ways.

DIONYSUS. By Zeus the Saviour, I find it hard to judge: one spoke cleverly and the other clearly. And now each of you is to give me one proposal for the city, what salvation you can offer.¹⁹

— and in the end the winner of the contest is Aeschylus.

Aristophanes was in general more sympathetic to upper-class than to lower-class politicians;²⁰ it is in character that Aeschylus is made to support Alcibiades and Euripides to come down against him; and we may assume from Aristophanes' more general advice to trust well-born and well-educated leaders that he did himself think that Athens should minister to Alcibiades' ways. (One other leading figure mentioned in the *Frogs* is Theramenes: he is represented as a clever man who always manages to end on the winning side, and he is claimed as a pupil by the clever Euripides.²¹) We shall see below that the Athenians did not once more take the risk of ministering to Alcibiades' ways; they did restore full citizenship rights to the men deprived of them, but only after their final defeat at Aegospotami, and it was only after their capitulation to Sparta that as required by the peace treaty they took the further step of recalling their exiles.²²

In the spring of 405 Lysander renewed his friendship with Cyrus, and revived the Spartan fleet; when Cyrus left Asia Minor to visit his father on his

deathbed, he left ample funds with Lysander. After operations by both sides in the south-eastern Aegean, and perhaps a voyage across the Aegean to attack islands including Aegina and Salamis, and to visit Agis at Decelea,²³ Lysander moved north to the Hellespont (where the Spartans had managed to retain Abydus²⁴), and succeeded in capturing the pro-Athenian Lampsacus, towards the east end of the strait on the Asiatic side. The Athenians followed, and on learning of the Spartan capture of Lampsacus they went first to Sestos and then took up a position on the open beach of Aegospotami, near Lampsacus on the European side.²⁵ Aegospotami has traditionally been placed at the mouth of the Karakova Dere, 5 miles / 8km south of west from Lampsacus, but a good case has been made out for the mouth of the Büyük Dere, 3 miles / 5km north of west from Lampsacus. Xenophon and Plutarch say the Hellespont was 15 stades wide there,²⁶ which with an Athenian stade of 160 yards / 176m would imply 1⅓ miles / 2.6km: nowhere in the vicinity is the Hellespont as narrow as that, but distances across water in Greek texts are particularly unreliable.

The Athenians were short of money and supplies, and needed a battle, but Lysander was in no hurry. Day after day the Athenian ships put out for battle, and Lysander prepared his ships, did not put out against them, and did not order his own men to stand down until the Athenians had done so. Alcibiades' forts, as we have seen, were not far from there. He approached the Athenians: according to Xenophon, to warn them that their position was a poor one and that they should move to Sestos; according to Diodorus, to offer the support of his Thracian friends Medocus and Seuthes, and a large army, if they would give him a share in the command. Here both may be true, but Diodorus' is the more important truth: the Athenians did not need Alcibiades to point out the weakness of their position at Aegospotami. In any case the Athenian generals were not prepared to trust Alcibiades, and they sent him away.²⁷

After the battle one of the Athenian generals, Alcibiades' associate Adimantus, was spared by the Spartans when the others were put to death, allegedly because he had opposed the proposal adopted by Athens that the right hand of each man whom they captured should be cut off.²⁸ Generals were often accused after a defeat of having taken bribes — why should a state's forces have been defeated if there were not traitors among them? — and inevitably Adimantus' being spared by the Spartans made him suspect. In the version of this which we are given in a speech against Alcibiades IV, the charge is that Alcibiades and Adimantus had been bribed.²⁹ Recently one scholar has taken that seriously — Alcibiades pointed out the unsuitability of the Athenians' position in the expectation that they would reject him and stay there, as Lysander wanted³⁰ — but it is far more likely that there was no treachery on the part of Alcibiades or any of the Athenian generals, but that after the defeat the Athenians looked for people who could be blamed.

That is the last appearance of Alcibiades in the Peloponnesian War. On the ensuing battle of Aegospotami Xenophon and Diodorus again diverge and

Diodorus again seems to have behind his account the more credible version. The Athenians had 180 ships,³¹ and the Spartans probably a similar number. For Xenophon, after four days of non-encounter, on the fifth, when Lysander was informed that the Athenians had left their ships and dispersed to find provisions, he attacked quickly and caught the Athenians unprepared: Conon and a few fully-manned ships escaped, but most of the Athenian ships and men were captured. For Diodorus, after an unspecified number of days, Philocles was the Athenians' operational commander for the day (that arrangement is entirely credible when two or more generals, theoretically equal, shared the command of a force). He tried once more to repeat the kind of tactic which had worked for Athens at Cyzicus but had failed at Notium: he put out with thirty ships (perhaps actually intending or else pretending to begin a withdrawal to Sestos) to entice Lysander, ordering the remaining Athenian ships to prepare to follow; Lysander, who had learned of the Athenian plan from deserters, put out with the whole of his fleet and pursued Philocles back to shore; but the remaining Athenian ships were not ready, and apart from Conon and his contingent the Athenian ships and their crews were captured. Plutarch repeats Xenophon's version, and adds a chapter on signs in the heavens.³²

Lysander recovered Byzantium and Calchedon, making Spartan control of the route from the Black Sea secure, and proceeded through the Aegean to Athens. During the winter of 405/4 Athens was blockaded. Cleophon still wanted to hold out, though it is hard to see how Athens could have done so. After he had been eliminated on a trumped-up charge, Theramenes negotiated first with Lysander and then with the authorities in Sparta, and in spring 404 Athens accepted Sparta's terms: the long walls and the Piraeus walls were to be demolished, Athens was to give up all its overseas possessions and all but twelve of its warships, political exiles were to be restored, and Athens was to become a subordinate ally of Sparta.³³

In the short term, the war had ended disastrously for Athens, and with the backing of Lysander the oligarchic régime of the Thirty came into power. (Theramenes, as in 411, helped to set up the oligarchy but then fell out with the extremists; this time they got the better of him, and he was put to death.) But Athens was resilient: in 403 the democracy was restored; in 395 Athens joined some of Sparta's former allies in the Corinthian War against an increasingly unpopular Sparta, while in the Aegean Conon created for Pharnabazus a fleet which defeated the Spartan fleet in 394 and in the late 390s Athens seemed to be aiming at a revival of its fifth-century empire. By the King's Peace of 386 Sparta seemed to have gained Persia's backing to settle the affairs of Greece in Sparta's interests, but in 378 Athens founded the Second Athenian League to defend the Greeks against Spartan exploitation of the King's Peace, and in 371 at Leuctra Sparta was so thoroughly defeated by Thebes that it would never again be able to dominate Greece. The next major change in the balance of power in Greece was the victory of Philip II of

Macedon over a combination of Athens and Thebes at Chaeronea in 338.

The end of the Peloponnesian War left Alcibiades at large in Thrace. Diodorus and Plutarch are close to each other on the immediate circumstances of his death, but have very different accounts of how it came about.³⁴ Diodorus begins by telling us that Pharnabazus wanted to gratify the Spartans (as Plutarch will tell us), but then says that Ephorus had a different explanation, which he proceeds to give us. Ephorus linked Alcibiades' death with the plans of Cyrus, with Spartan support, to challenge his brother Artaxerxes II for the Persian throne. Alcibiades got to know of this, went to Pharnabazus and told him, and asked for an escort to Artaxerxes. Pharnabazus instead sent the news to Artaxerxes on his own account, so Alcibiades decided to ask the satrap of Paphlagonia (on the south coast of the Black Sea: his capital was at Gangra, the modern Çankır) for an escort. Pharnabazus, afraid that Alcibiades would get him into trouble, sent men to follow him and kill him, and they caught him in a village in Phrygia (in central Asia Minor). Plutarch sets the beginning of the story in Athens. After the disastrous end of the Peloponnesian War the Athenians came to regret that they had spurned Alcibiades. When the Thirty had come into power, some Athenians opposed to the régime hoped that Alcibiades might yet save them from their troubles. Critias, the most prominent of the Thirty, persuaded Lysander that Sparta's supremacy in Greece would not be secure if Athens was democratic, and that as long as Alcibiades was alive he would not allow Athens to acquiesce in oligarchy. This was clinched by a message from the Spartan authorities telling Lysander to have Alcibiades eliminated — either because his energy and character alarmed them or because they wanted to gratify Agis, whose wife he had allegedly seduced.³⁵ Lysander sent instructions to Pharnabazus, and Pharnabazus sent his brother Bagaeus and his uncle Susamithres to do the deed; and they found Alcibiades in a village in Phrygia with a courtesan called Timandra.

Plutarch adds that shortly before his death Alcibiades had a vision portending it — that he was wearing her clothes and she was painting his face (after his death she wrapped his body in her own clothes), or that Pharnabazus' men cut off his head and burned his body. Some of Plutarch's sources gave another version, with a personal rather than a political motive: the woman with Alcibiades was a well-born woman whom he had seduced, and it was her infuriated brothers who killed him. Nepos combines the Cyrus version reported by Diodorus from Ephorus and the Athenian version given in detail by Plutarch, and has further material which they both lack. After the end of the war Alcibiades first withdrew further into Thrace, but the Thracians trapped him and stole his money, though he himself escaped. He then decided that he would not be safe anywhere within reach of the Spartans, went to Pharnabazus, and captivated him (as he had earlier captivated Tissaphernes), so that Pharnabazus gave him 'Grynium ... a fortress in Phrygia' and the revenue from it (but the only known place of that name was on the coast of

Asia Minor, slightly south of the latitude of Lesbos). Then Nepos mentions first Alcibiades' intention to go to Artaxerxes to give warning of Cyrus' plans, and next Critias' message to Lysander to have Alcibiades disposed of.

Timandra and her daughter Laïs were famous courtesans from Hyccara, in Sicily, and according to Athenaeus Timandra was one of two courtesans whom Alcibiades took everywhere with him.³⁶ Athenaeus calls the place of Alcibiades' death Melissa, and says that he saw a monument to Alcibiades there, while (much nearer to the time of the event) Aristotle in his *History of Animals* refers in passing to the place as Arginusa and mentions Deer Mountain.³⁷ It has been suggested that this was east of Dorylaeum (the modern Ekisehir).³⁸ Melissa is first attested (as Malijassa) in the Hittite period, in the second millennium BC,³⁹ and that region was the home of the Melissenoi, one of the leading Byzantine military families of the tenth and eleventh centuries AD.⁴⁰ Beyond that, it is an enticing possibility that the 'Melitt[enian]' listed among the slaves of Alcibiades in the property which was confiscated and sold after the religious scandals of 415 was in fact a Melissan woman, and that when Alcibiades went on his journey through Asia Minor he paused in Melissa because of that connection.⁴¹

Our sources agree on what finally happened. The killers, whoever they were and whatever their reason for acting, surrounded the house Alcibiades was in with brushwood and set fire to it; he dashed outside, and was shot down with javelins and arrows; Timandra attended to his funeral. Nepos adds that, having been deprived of his sword, Alcibiades took a dagger from an Arcadian guest-friend who had refused to leave him; after his death, his head was taken to Pharnabazus.⁴²

We can accept that Alcibiades went to Pharnabazus: as Nepos says, he would not be safe where the Spartans could get at him, and a position with the satrap would give him the ability to watch events and see what opportunities might arise for him to exploit. And it is likely enough that, if he did no more, Pharnabazus, who had no reason to be grateful to Alcibiades, at least enabled the killers to find him, and that he was killed in the interior of Asia Minor, perhaps indeed at Arginusa/Melissa. But who was ultimately responsible: the Athenian oligarchs? the Spartans? Pharnabazus himself? an outraged family? Though seducing a well-born woman is something of which Alcibiades was eminently capable, it would be surprising if her family pursued him to a town in Asia Minor and killed him there in the manner on which our sources agree, and this is the least likely explanation. It is already alleged in Isocrates' speech for Alcibiades IV, *c.* 397, that the Thirty proclaimed the exile of Alcibiades from the whole of Greece, and that the Spartans and in particular Lysander arranged for him to be killed because their control of Athens would not be secure if he remained alive;⁴³ and the honours for Aristophanes and the second performance of his *Frogs* early in 404 tend to support the view that some other Athenians hoped that Alcibiades might save Athens again. That is in any case more credible than Ephorus' story that Alcibiades had information about

Cyrus which Pharnabazus could not otherwise have had and that Pharnabazus had him killed because he wanted to claim for himself the credit for warning Artaxerxes — though it is entirely possible that Alcibiades, never lacking in ambition, did hope to visit the King. Blaming the Thirty suggests that Alcibiades was killed in 404–403, so he will have been about forty-seven when he died.⁴⁴

Plutarch ends his biography with the exciting story of Alcibiades' death; for a verdict we have to turn to the *Comparison of Alcibiades and Gaius Marcius* (i.e. *Coriolanus*). Alcibiades was dissolute and vulgar while Coriolanus (a Roman aristocrat of the early fifth century who was believed to have fought for the Volscians against Rome) was arrogant and haughty; both used deceit, but the uncontrolled anger of Coriolanus was worse than the purposeful activity of Alcibiades; Alcibiades was a charmer who could not make himself hated, while Coriolanus was an ungracious man who could not make himself loved; Coriolanus obtained successes only for the Volscians against Rome, while Alcibiades did perform services for Athens; Alcibiades was vulnerable only when he was away and unable to respond to his attackers; but Coriolanus despite his personal failings was an upright man while Alcibiades was not.

Nepos began his shorter biography by saying it was agreed that nobody surpassed Alcibiades either in vices or in virtues,⁴⁵ and he ends it by saying that he was not only the most distinguished man in the most distinguished city but wherever he went he surpassed the local people in their characteristic virtues or vices: 'Thus he achieved that, among whoever he lived, he occupied the first place and was held in the greatest affection'.⁴⁶

Pliny the elder reports that when in 343 the Delphic oracle commanded the Romans to set up statues of the bravest and the wisest of the Greeks they chose Alcibiades and Pythagoras (which surprised Pliny, whose choice would have fallen on Themistocles and Socrates), and these remained standing until 80, in the time of Sulla.⁴⁷

As an individual, Alcibiades was a spoiled upper-class man who liked enjoying himself in selfish and ostentatious ways: in some sense attractive, but not admirable and not a man who avoided offending others. As a public figure, he was exciting, and fond of clever and ambitious policies; persuasive, and apt to work by making friends and influencing people. He was behind Athens' alliance with Argos and other Peloponnesian states in 420, but that did not lead to the victory in the Peloponnese for which he hoped; he was behind the ambitious Sicilian expedition of 415, which might have achieved short-term success if he had not been exiled, but could hardly have achieved long-term success. His joining the Spartans probably harmed the Athenians more by his absence from their forces in Sicily than by whatever advice he gave the Spartans, but in 412 he played an important part in Sparta's re-entering the war in the Aegean, and by his preferring an Aegean strategy to a

Hellespont strategy (though it was in the Hellespont that Sparta finally won the war). His machinations in 411 helped to bring about both the institution of the régime of the Four Hundred in Athens (with long-term as well as immediate consequences) and its subsequent collapse, and did lead to his rejoining the Athenian fleet; how far he actually influenced the policies of Tissaphernes it is hard to make out, though it was probably less than he wanted others to believe and less than he believed himself. He played a large part in Athens' recovery in the Hellespontine region in 411–408, though his own contribution was probably more to morale than to strategy: I have already quoted from Nepos' *Thrasybulus*, 'In the Peloponnesian War Thrasybulus accomplished many things without Alcibiades but Alcibiades nothing without Thrasybulus; but Alcibiades by some inborn quality gained the credit for everything.'⁴⁸ But Alcibiades' return to Athens in 407 proved to be the summit of his career. The defeat at Notium in 406 was not primarily his fault, but he could not have escaped the blame for it; and after that we see him looking for opportunities but not achieving anything.

The individual and the public figure cannot of course be kept in separate compartments (as we are reminded when we think of today's politicians and the treatment of them by the media). Characteristics which enabled him to charm some aroused the suspicion and jealousy of others, and the accusation of aiming at tyranny was probably deployed especially by other politicians who found themselves less popular than he was. He was loyal to Athens when loyalty to Athens could be combined with success for himself, and no doubt he would have preferred being successful in Athens to being successful somewhere else, but enjoyment and success for himself were what counted for most.

In 404–403, when Alcibiades was killed in Phrygia, the successful movement for the restoration of democracy in Athens was led by his former supporter Thrasybulus. In the 390s the adventurous policy of working for Pharnabazus to oppose the Spartans in Asia Minor was pursued by Conon, who had supplanted Alcibiades after Notium and was one of the generals who had spurned his offers at Aegospotami; while a little later what looks like an attempt to revive the Athenian empire was begun by Thrasybulus (again) and ran out of steam after his death. What role Alcibiades would have played in this post-Peloponnesian-War world we cannot say, but he would surely have found a role if he could have persuaded the Athenians to trust him again — and it is not inconceivable that he could have persuaded them: Athens longed for him, it hated him, it wanted to have him.

What became of his family is an anti-climax. His son Alcibiades IV, born c. 415, claims that he alone was not allowed to recover his lost property after the democratic restoration⁴⁹ — which suggests that the hankering for Alcibiades died with him. He was prosecuted c. 397, on account of the controversial chariot-team used by his father at the Olympic games of 416,⁵⁰ and c. 395, for getting himself irregularly enrolled in the cavalry and thereby

avoiding the greater danger of service in the infantry:⁵¹ as all too often happens with Athenian trials, we do not know the outcome in either case. He had a daughter, Hipparete II, through whom the line was continued, but the family disappeared from the public eye, and its further history is known only from gravestones.⁵²

Notes

Notes to Chapter I

- 1 On the end of Thucydides' history, and on Xenophon's and other accounts of the last years of the Peloponnesian War, cf. pp 72–4.
- 2 The Latin text and an English translation of Nepos can be found in the Loeb volume of which the earlier part is devoted to Florus.
- 3 Stephens, *ZPE* 105 (1995), 215–24, re-edits and translates one such exercise (the papyrus is of the fifth century AD, but what it contains is probably a copy of a text composed earlier) and gives references to others.
- 4 Thuc. V. 45. ii, VIII. 12. ii.
- 5 Thuc. V. 26. v; IV. 105. i.
- 6 Cf. pp 80, 95–6. Thrace: Xen. *Hell.* I. v. 17; Lys. XIV. *Alc.* i. 38; Plut. *Alc.* 36. iii.
- 7 Notably, Brunt, *REG* 65 (1952), 59–96 = his *Studies in Greek History and Thought*, 17–46. Delebecque, *Thucydide et Alcibiade*, distinguished too mechanically between passages where Thucydides was using Alcibiades and passages where he was not.
- 8 Somebody closely involved with Alcibiades: Westlake, *Mnemosyne*⁴ 38 (1985), 93–108 = his *Studies in Thucydides and Greek History*, 154–65.
- 9 Cf. Brunt, 71–2 = 27; 95–6 = 46: see pp 51–2.
- 10 Cf. pp 59–60, 65.

- 11 Noted, for instance, by Andrewes, in Gomme, Andrewes & Dover, *H.C.T.*, v.94; Hornblower, *Comm. Thuc.*, iii.789, 893.
- 12 Vickers, *Pericles on Stage; Sophocles and Alcibiades*. Sidwell, *Aristophanes the Democrat*, pursues a different line of speculation, also involving Alcibiades.
- 13 See Rhodes, in *Ritual, Finance, Politics ... David Lewis*, 88–91. The speech can most easily be found in vol. 1 of the Loeb collection, *Minor Attic Orators*.
- 14 Cf. p. 40.
- 15 *SEG* 1 45: cf. p. 30.
- 16 M&L 78, translated Fornara 146, contr. Thuc. VI. 8–26; cf. p. 45.
- 17 *IG* i³ 421–30; extracts M&L 79, translated Fornara 147 D; cf. p. 48.
- 18 Selymbria, M&L 87, translated Fornara 162; exiles from Clazomenae, M&L 87, translated Fornara 163; cf. pp. 80–1, 87.
- 19 *C.A.H.*, v².
- 20 Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War; The Archidamian War; The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition; The Fall of the Athenian Empire*.
- 21 McGregor, *Phoenix* 19 (1963), 27–46.

Notes to Chapter II

- 1 Hansen, *The Shotgun Method*, 18–19.
- 2 See Rhodes, *A History of the Classical Greek World, 478–323 BC*², 53–4, 58; but readers

- are warned that in rejecting this treaty as inauthentic I am in a minority.
- 3 Thuc. I. 10. ii suggested that if the cities were deserted people would imagine from their buildings that Athens was even more powerful than it actually was but that Sparta was much less powerful than it actually was.
 - 4 Thuc. II. 41. i, 64. iii.
 - 5 Thuc. I. 70. ii–iii.
 - 6 Thuc. I. 139. iii.
 - 7 Thuc. I. 140–4.
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- 8 G. W. Hunt, in the context of a British warning to Russia in the 1870s.
 - 9 Athens' unusual size made for an unusually elaborate system, but there were precedents in other cities for a new articulation.
 - 10 Cf. Thuc. II. 14–16.
 - 11 The poorest were never made legally eligible, but were in fact admitted to office in the fourth century, when citizen numbers were only half of what they had been before the Peloponnesian War. They were entitled to attend the assembly and to serve on juries.
 - 12 Thuc. II. 65. x.
 - 13 Where I do not cite evidence, it can be found in Davies, *A.P.F.* Individuals with the same name are numbered as in that book.
 - 14 Dem. XXI. *Meidias* 144 carelessly says of Alcibiades what was actually true of his children.
 - 15 Isoc. XVI. *Chariot Team* 26 (calling him great-grandfather).
 - 16 A *genos* was a hereditary association with particular cultic responsibilities (e.g. provision of a priest), and, while not all members of *gene* need have been Eupatrid or *vice versa*, there is likely to have been a substantial overlap (Parker, *Athenian Religion: A History*, 56–66; for the likelihood of an overlap see Rhodes, 'What Alcibiades Did or What Happened to Him', 3–4). On the *Salaminiotai* see Parker, 308–16; Lambert, *ZPE* 119 (1997), 94–103; that Alcibiades' family belonged is argued by Davies, *A.P.F.*, 10–12, and Lambert, *ZPE* 125 (1999), 118, judges that to be attractive but inconclusive.
 - 17 Davies, *A.P.F.*, 369–70.
 - 18 See Davies, *A.P.F.*, esp. 9–22, 455–60 and Table I.
 - 19 Hdt. VIII. 17; Plut. *Alc.* 1. i (Plutarch conflates Cleinias I and Cleinias II).
 - 20 Lys. XIV. *Alc.* i. 39; [Andoc.] IV. *Alc.* 34 (but he was ostracised only once, not twice). See Vanderpool, *Hesp.* 21 (1952), 1–8.
 - 21 Thuc. V. 43. ii; VI. 89. ii.
 - 22 Thuc. VIII. 6. iii. See Davies, *A.P.F.*, 15–16; and, on the practice of adopting names from foreign connections, Herman, *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City*, 19.
 - 23 Thuc. I. 113. i–iii with Isoc. XVI. *Chariot-Team* 28; Plat. *Alc.* i. 112 c.
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- 24 M&L 46, translated Fornara 98. See Rhodes, *CQ* 58 (2008), 500–6.
 - 25 Lys. XIV. *Alc.* i. 39; Plat. *Alc.* i. 105 d; Plut. *Alc.* 1. i. See Davies, *A.P.F.*, 16 (where Megacles III should be Megacles IV), 375–6, 379; on a suggestion that Deinomache had previously been married to Pericles and to Hipponicus II, see p. 23.
 - 26 Davies, *A.P.F.*, 379–80.
 - 27 Davies, *A.P.F.*, 16–17; cf. pp 46–9.
 - 28 Davies, *A.P.F.*, 17; cf. p. 47.
 - 29 Plat. *Alc.* i. 118 e; *Prot.* 320 A. Davies, *A.P.F.*, 17–18, describes him as a 'psychotic delinquent'.
 - 30 Davies, *A.P.F.*, 19, 262–3.
 - 31 [Andoc.] IV. *Alc.* 13; Plut. *Alc.* 8. iii; cf. Isoc. XVI. *Chariot-Team* 31 (simply mentioning a rich dowry).
 - 32 [Andoc.] IV. *Alc.* 14; Plut. *Alc.* 8. iv–vi; discussion Davies, *A.P.F.*, 19. (Apparently formal application to the archon was necessary when a wife divorced her husband but

- not when a husband divorced his wife: Harrison, *The Law of Athens*, i. 40–4.)
 33 [Andoc.] IV. *Alc.* 15; Plut. *Alc.* 8. iv; cf. Harrison, *op. cit.* 234 n. 1.

Notes to Chapter III

- 1 Plut. *Alc.* 15. i; *Nic.* 10. ix, with Thuc. V. 43–8. Thuc. V. 52. ii probably belongs to this year: cf. Andrewes in *H.C.T.*, iv. 69.
- 2 Isoc. XVI. *Chariot Team* 29, with Thuc. I. 64. ii; cf. pp. 27–8.
- 3 In this paragraph I follow Davies, *A.P.F.*, 16–18.
- 4 Plut. *Alc.* 1. iii; *Lyc.* 16. v.
- 5 Plat. *Alc. i.* 122 A–B; Plut. *Alc.* 1. iii.
- 6 Aeschin. I. *Tim.* 9–11; but the law inserted in §12 appears not to be authentic.
- 7 Thuc. I. 113. Tolmides' death: Diod. Sic. XII. 6. ii. Cleinias' death: Plut. *Alc.* 1. i.
- 8 His designation as Megacles IV in Davies, *A.P.F.*, 18, is a misprint.
- 9 This seems to be the implication of Plat. *Alc. i.* 104 B.
- 10 Plut. *Alc.* 1. ii; Isoc. XVI. *Chariot-Team* 28; Plat. *Alc. i.* 118 E; *Prot.* 322 A. (Ariphron II is not shown in the table on p. 17.)
- 11 Nep. VII. *Alc.* 2. i. Pericles' wife: Plut. *Per.* 24. viii.
- 12 Cromey, *GRBS* 23 (1982), 203–12; *Historia*. 33 (1984), 385–401; Bicknell, *AC* 51 (1982), 248–9. Earlier, Bicknell had suggested that Pericles' wife was a sister of Deinomache: *Studies in Athenian Politics and Genealogy*, 77–83.
- 13 Thus Davies, *A.P.F.*, 18 n. 1; cf. 262–3, 457. In having the unidentified woman married to Pericles first and to Hipponicus second, he reverses Plutarch's order. Cromey shows that the implications of Plutarch's order are not impossible, but does not render them probable.
- 14 Davies, *A.P.F.*, 457–8.
- 15 Aloof: Plut. *Per.* 5. iii; household, 16. iii–vi; social life, 7. v.
- 16 Plat. *Prot.* 319 E–320 A; cf. 328 C–D, *Meno* 94 A–B.
- 17 Plut. *Per.* 16. v, 36. i–vi.
- 18 Plut. *Alc.* 7. iii; Diod. Sic. XII. 38. iii; Val. Max. III. i. ext. 1.
- 19 Xen. *Mem.* I. ii. 39–46.
- 20 K.R. Sanders, paper for conference on Xenophon, Liverpool, July 2009.
- 21 Xen. *Mem.* I. ii. 12–28.
- 22 Plut. *Alc.* 1. iv–v.
- 23 Plut. *Alc.* 1. vi–viii, quoting Ar. *Vesp.* 44–6; Archippus fr. 48 Kassel & Austin = 45 Edmonds. (Edmonds' collection of comic fragments is older, and is often given to wild speculation, but includes English translations.)
- 24 Plut. *Alc.* 10. iv; Dem. XXI. *Meidias* 145; Diod. Sic. XII. 84. i.
- 25 Plut. *Alc.* 10. iv; *Praec. Ger. Reip.* 804 A.
- 26 Ar. fr. 205 Kassel & Austin = 198 Edmonds; *Ach.* 716.
- 27 Ar. fr. 244 Kassel & Austin = 554 Edmonds; Eupolis fr. 171 Kassel & Austin = 158 Edmonds (from his *Flatterers* of 421/0); Pherecrates fr. 164 Kassel & Austin = 155 Edmonds; Ar. *Triphales* frs. 556–69 Kassel & Austin = frs. 542–57 Edmonds. Littman, *TAPA* 101 (1970), 263–76, tries to sort fact from fiction in the stories of Alcibiades' sexual adventures; more unconventionally, Thucydides' digressing from the religious scandals of 415, in which Alcibiades was implicated (cf. pp. 46–9), to allege a sexual motive for the assassination of Hipparchus in 514 prompts Wohl, *Class. Ant.* 18 (1999), 349–85, to investigate the sexuality of the Athenian democracy and the transgressive sexuality of Alcibiades.
- 28 Plut. *Alc.* 16. i–ii; Ath. XII. 534 E. Derived from comedy: Littman, *op. cit.*, 267–8.

- 29 Cic. *Ep. Att.* VI. 1. xviii = 115. xviii Shackleton Bailey.
- 30 Plut. *Alc.* 2. i–iii; *Reg. Imp. Apophth.* 186 D; but this is attributed to a Spartan in *Apophth. Lac.* 234 E.
- 31 Plut. *Alc.* 2. iii–iv.
- 32 Plut. *Alc.* 2. v–vii; Plat. *Alc.* i. 106 E.
- 33 Cf. Arist. *Pol.* VIII. 1341 A 26–B 8; and see West, *Ancient Greek Music* (O.U.P., 1992), 34–6; D’Angour in Goldhill & Osborne (edd.), *Rethinking Revolutions through Ancient Greece*, 264–83, and in Osborne (ed.), *Debating the Athenian Cultural Revolution*, 288–300.
- 34 Plut. *Alc.* 3.
- 35 Ath. XII. 525 B.
- 36 Diog. Laert. II. 44.
- 37 Plut. *Alc.* 5. Littman, *TAPA* 101 (1970), 268–9, guessed that the metic was Pulytion, who was to be involved in the affair of the Mysteries in 415 (Andoc. I. *Myst.* 12, 14: cf. pp. 46–9); but at any rate later Pulytion was a rich man ([Plat.] *Eryxias* 400 B; Pherecrates fr. 64 Kassel & Austin = 58 Edmonds), and there is no reason to think he was not a citizen.
- 38 Plut. *Alc.* 7. i–ii, *Reg. Imp. Apophth.* 186 E; Ael. V.H. XIII. 38.
- 39 Plut. *Alc.* 8. i–iii.
- 40 Plut. *Alc.* 9, *Reg. Imp. Apophth.* 186 D.
- 41 Dem. XXI. *Meidias* 147 with schol. (506 Dilts); [Andoc.] IV. *Alc.* 17–19; Plut. *Alc.* 16. v.
- 42 Dem. XXI. *Meidias* 147; [Andoc.] IV. *Alc.* 20–1 (non-Athenian); Plut. *Alc.* 16. v.
- 43 Ath. IX. 407 B–C.
- 44 Krentz, in Sabin *et al.* (edd.), *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare*, i. 164, notes this as an indication that in Athens as opposed to some other states soldiers did not necessarily eat and sleep with other members of the same tribe.
- 45 Plut. *Alc.* 7. iii–v; Plat. *Symp.* 219 E, 220 D–E, with Thuc. I. 56–66; Isoc. XVI. *Chariot-Team* 29–30 mentions Alcibiades’ being given the prize.
- 46 Thuc. IV. 76–7, 89–101.
- 47 We may wonder why he was not in the cavalry at Potidaea: that force was a body of fixed size, and there may not have been a vacancy.
- 48 Plut. *Alc.* 7. vi; Plat. *Symp.* 221 A–C.
- 49 [Andoc.] IV. *Alc.* 13. However, Hipponicus was one of the generals in 426/5 (Thuc. III. 91. iv), and he must have died at about this time, since his death provided the background for Eupolis’ comedy *Flatterers* in 421 (Ath. V. 218 B–C).
- 50 Thuc. II. 47. iii–54, cf. 57–9; III. 87. i–iii.
- 51 See Holladay & Poole, CQ² 29 (1979), 282–300 = Holladay’s *Athens in the Fifth Century and Other Studies in Greek History*, 127–45, followed on pp. 147–65 by reprints of a series of supplementary studies.
- 52 Plut. *Per.* 36. vi – 37. ii.
- 53 Plut. *Per.* 37. v.
- 54 Plut. *Alc.* 10. i–ii.
- 55 Cf. pp. 18, 50.
- 56 The earliest known instance was in 394: Isae. V. *Dicaeogenes* 37–8.
- 57 [Andoc.] IV. *Alc.* 11–12, cf. IG i³ 71 (decree and part of list M&L 69, translated Fornara 136).
- 58 Thuc. IV. 2–41 (captives 38. v).
- 59 Thuc. V. 43. ii; cf. Alcibiades’ speech in Sparta, VI. 89. vii. For the position of *proxenos* cf. p. 18; Plut. *Alc.* 14. i says Alcibiades was *proxenos*.
- 60 SEG 145.
- 61 The exception is IG i³ 1032, 162–3, where in a list of crews of ships probably late in the Peloponnesian War one ship has a Siphnian as its *aulos*-player.

- 62 Thuc. IV. 117–9.
- 63 Thuc. V. 1.
- 64 Thuc. V. 6–11; Cleon and Brasidas eager to continue war, 16. i.
- 65 Above, p. 9.
- 66 Thuc. V. 43, cf. VI. 89. ii. For the acceptance of two explanations in the case of Alcibiades, cf. VIII. 47. i; p. 61.
- 67 Thuc. V. 43–8; deception, 45.
- 68 Thucydides divulges the fact not at this point, where it would have been relevant, but at VIII. 6. iii, when Endius reappears in the story and the connection is relevant once more.
- 69 Plut. *Alc.* 14. vi–xiii (but this extra information is not in his other account, *Nic.* 10. iv–vi).
- 70 Cf. p. 57.
- 71 Hatzfeld, *Alcibiade*, 89–93.
- 72 Brunt, *REG* 65 (1952), 65–9 = his *Studies in Greek History and Thought*, 22–5.
- 73 Andrewes, in *H.C.T.*, iv. 51–3.
- 74 Hornblower, *Comm. Thuc.*, iii. 106.
- 75 Thuc. V. 46. iv names the ephor Xenares, on whose earlier activities see V. 36–8.
- 76 Cf. p. 21.
- 77 Thuc. II. 86. iii; III. 102. ii.
- 78 Thuc. V. 52. ii.
- 79 Gomme, in *H.C.T.*, iv. 70.
- 80 Thuc. V. 53.
- 81 Andrewes, in *H.C.T.*, iv. 77; cf. Hornblower, *Comm. Thuc.*, iii. 147.
- 82 Thuc. V. 56; cf., for the clause in the alliance, 47. v.
- 83 Thuc. V. 57–60.
- 84 Andrewes, in *H.C.T.*, iv. 86–7, noting that no payment for it is mentioned in 418/7: M&L 77, translated Fornara 144, 2–23.
- 85 Thuc. V. 61. i–ii.
- 86 Thuc. V. 57. i.
- 87 Andrewes, in *H.C.T.*, iv. 83.
- 88 Thus Hornblower, *Comm. Thuc.*, iii. 161. Diod. Sic. XII. 79. i states explicitly that Alcibiades was an *idiotes*, not a general but a private citizen, but that may simply have been inferred rather than based on evidence.
- 89 Suggested by Gomme, in *H.C.T.*, iv. 79.
- 90 Thuc. V. 61. iii–75. iii.
- 91 Thuc. V. 75. iv–vi.
- 92 Thuc. V. 76–81; Alcibiades, 76. iii.
- 93 Thuc. V. 82; Plut. *Alc.* 15. iii–iv (cf. the long walls at Patrae, pp. 33–4, which Plutarch proceeds to mention in §§v–vi).
- 94 *IG* i³ 86, dated from M&L 77, translated Fornara 144, 29.
- 95 Thuc. V. 84. i; we should expect him to be general, and Diod. Sic. XII. 81. ii–iii states (perhaps assuming it rather than positively knowing it) that he was.
- 96 Thuc. VI. 61. iii.
- 97 Thuc. III. 91. i–iii; M&L 69, translated Fornara 136, i. 65.
- 98 Cf. Andrewes, in *H.C.T.*, iv. 156–8.
- 99 Thuc. V. 84–116.
- 100 E.g. Isoc. IV. *Paneg.* 100, XII. *Panath.* 63.
- 101 Thuc. V. 83. ii.
- 102 [Andoc.] IV. *Alc.* 22–3 (cf. p. 43); Plut. *Alc.* 16. v–vi.

Notes to Chapter IV

- 1 Cf. pp. 31–3.
- 2 He was born before 469 (Davies, *A.P.F.*, 404).
- 3 He is not attested for 419/8, but Alcibiades is the only one of the ten generals of that year whose name is known.
- 4 Thuc. VI. 86. v; cf. the words attributed to Nicias in 77. ii.
- 5 Thuc. III. 104.
- 6 Plut. *Nic.* 3–4.
- 7 Thuc. VI. 16. ii; [Andoc.] IV. *Alc.* 25–32; Diod. Sic. XIII. 74. ii–iv; Plut. *Alc.* 11–12, the last quoting from Euripides an ode according to which he came first, second and third.
- 8 Isoc. XVI. *Chariot-Team* was written for the defence. Of the texts cited in the previous note Thucydides does not name the victim but the others all call him Diomedes, yet in Isocrates' speech the plaintiff is called Teisias. The solution favoured by Davies, *A.P.F.*, 502, is that the man in question was called Teisias but by 'mythological intrusion' the Argive horses were known as the horses of Diomedes because they were seen as the descendants of the horses taken from Diomedes by Heracles (Diod. Sic. IV. 15. iii–iv). However, L. Rubinstein will argue that Diomedes is the man of that name who was treasurer of Athena in 398/7 and that he and Teisias were partners.
- 9 Davies, *A.P.F.*, 20–1, citing Plut. *Alc.* 16. vii (Nemean games); Ath. XII. 534 D (Nemean and Pythian games); *IG* i³ 422, 21, 41–60 (Panathenaic amphorae among his possessions, pointing to a Panathenaic victory).
- 10 *IG* i³ 82, 5 with 42; cf. Plat. Com. fr. 182 Kassel & Austin = frs. 166–7 Edmonds.
- 11 E.g. Plat. Com., cited above; Ar. *Eq.* 1302–15.
- 12 Thuc. V. 4–5; Ar. *Eq.* 1375–80; Eupolis fr. 116 Kassel & Austin = 91 Edmonds.
- 13 *Agora* xxv, p. 37 no. 44, restoring 'killed' and attributing that to A. E. Raubitschek, though he had restored 'drove away'.
- 14 Plut. *Alc.* 13; *Nic.* 11; and more briefly *Arist.* 7. iii–iv; Thuc. VIII. 73. iii mentions his murder and the fact that he had been ostracised. I discuss this episode at greater length, and give further references, in *Ritual, Finance, Politics ... David Lewis*, 85–98. In a recent reinter-pretation Rosenbloom, *TAPA* 134 (2004), 55–105 and 323–58, rejects Plutarch's analysis and argues that Hyperbolus was prompted by Alcibiades' victory at Olympia in 416 to attack him as a tyrant, and aristocratic leaders generally, and that this led to two generations of conflict between aristocratic and non-aristocratic leaders in Athens.
- 15 *Agora* xxv, p. 33 nos. 13–14.
- 16 Cf. pp. 46–9.
- 17 Thuc. VIII. 73. iii; Theop. *FGrH* 115 F 96 (b).
- 18 *IG* i³ 85, 6–14. Hyperbolus' name as proposer of an amendment to a decree is certain; the text which follows and the interpretation of it are attractive but not certain.
- 19 Some scholars used to argue for 418, which cannot be reconciled with any interpretation of the Theopompus fragment.
- 20 Tribute, [Andoc.] IV. *Alc.* 11–12, cf. p. 29; child, 22–3, cf. pp. 37–8.
- 21 Olympic games, 25–32, cf. p. 40.
- 22 M&L 63–4, translated Fornara 124–5.
- 23 Thuc. II. 7. ii; 412, VIII. 26. i.
- 24 Narrated disjointedly in a number of passages between Thuc. III. 86 and IV. 65. Athens' generals were punished in 424 for abandoning the campaign when (it was thought) they could have got control of Sicily; a reference already in III. 86. iv to 'prospecting to see if it would be possible for them to get control of affairs in Sicily' may be due to Thucydidean hindsight.

- 25 Thuc. V. 4–5.
- 26 M&L 37, translated Fornara 81; c. 427, Thuc. VI. 6. ii. Antiphon was first suggested by Mattingly, *Historia* 12 (1963), 268–9 = his *The Athenian Empire Restored*, 99–101; the reading is confirmed and the view that the inscription records a reaffirmation of an alliance made c. 427 is championed by Matthaïou, ‘*Peri tes IG i³ 11*’, in Matthaïou (ed.), *Attikai epigraphai ... Adolf Wilhelm*, 99–122.
- 27 Thuc. VI. 6, 8. i–ii.
- 28 Thuc. VI. 90. ii–91. iii; cf. 15. ii, 34. ii. For Carthage cf. Ar. *Eq.* 174, 1302–4 (the latter passage in connection with Hyperbolus), written a few months before the Athenians had to withdraw from Sicily in 424; for Alcibiades in Sparta cf. pp. 51–2.
- 29 Thuc. VI. 6. iii.
- 30 Thuc. VI. 8. i: 46. i–iii.
- 31 Cf. pp. 31–3.
- 32 Thuc. VI. 8. ii.
- 33 The explanation of Plut. *Alc.* 18. i–ii, *Nic.* 12. v (cf. the remark attributed to Alcibiades in Thuc. VI. 17. ii) has too often been accepted.
- 34 Notice especially the depiction of him in Ar. *Ach.*
- 35 M&L 78, translated Fornara 146: one general, b. 2–3; generals (plural), c. 9; sixty ships, c. 4, dg. 8; 3,000 [talents?], dg. 9–10.
- 36 Thuc. VI. 8. iii–26.
- 37 Thuc. I. 22. i.
- 38 Thuc VI. 43.
- 39 Cf. p. 33.
- 40 See in particular Thuc. VI. 27–9, 53, 60–1; Andoc. I. *Myst.* 11–70; Plut. *Alc.* 18. vi–21. vi. The most detailed recent treatment is Furley, *Andocides and the Herms*; see also Pelling, *Literary Texts and the Greek Historian*, ch. 2; and, for an exploration of the significance of herms and their mutilation, R.G. Osborne, *PCPS*² 31 (1985), 47–73 = his *Athens and Athenian Democracy*, 341–66(–7).
- 41 Thuc. VI. 28. ii.
- 42 Isoc. XVI. *Chariot-Team* 5–7.
- 43 Isoc. XVI. *Chariot-Team* 38.
- 44 Cf. p. 79.
- 45 *IG i³ 421–30*; extracts M&L 79, translated Fornara 147 D. Cf. Poll. X. 97; Philoch. 328 FF 133–4, translated Fornara 147 A–C. The *stelai* seem to have been set up in the Eleusinium in the agora, not at Eleusis as stated in the manuscript text of Pollux.
- 46 *IG i³ 421* = M&L 79, translated Fornara 147 D, A 12–25; *IG i³ 422*, 21, 41–60; 424, 24–30. See the summary by Davies, *A.P.F.*, 20.
- 47 Andoc. I. *Myst.* 61–2.
- 48 Thuc. VI. 30–32. ii.
- 49 Cic. *Ep. Att.* VI. 1. xviii = 115. xviii Shackleton Bailey. There are various other accounts of Eupolis’ death, one other likewise involving drowning, and stories of his being drowned could easily have been invented on the basis of his comedy *Baptai* (‘The Immersed’): cf. Maidment, *CQ* 29 (1935), 10 n. 3. Tritle’s suggestion that Alcibiades perhaps gave Eupolis a soaking without killing him (*A New History of the Peloponnesian War*, 150) is a nice fancy but probably no more than that.
- 50 Thuc. VI. 32. iii–41.
- 51 Thuc. VII. 48–9.
- 52 Thuc. VI. 42–9.
- 53 Thuc. VI. 50–2.
- 54 Cf. p. 18.
- 55 Thuc. VI. 53. i, 61. iv–vii.
- 56 Thuc. VI. 74. i.

- 57 Thuc. VI. 88. ix.
- 58 Cf. p. 36.
- 59 Isoc. XVI. *Chariot-Team* 9, cf. Plut. *Alc.* 23. i.
- 60 Thuc. VI. 61. iii, cf. p. 37.
- 61 Dover, in *H.C.T.*, iv. 360, inclines in this direction; Hornblower, *Comm. Thuc.*, iii. 510, and Whitehead and Rubinstein, commenting on Isocrates, incline in the other.
- 62 Plut. *Alc.* 23. iii–vi.
- 63 Thuc. VI. 73. ii, 88. vii–viii.
- 64 Cf. pp. 31–3.
- 65 Cf. p. 45.
- 66 Thuc. VI. 88. ix–92.
- 67 Thuc. VI. 104. ii, with Diod. Sic. XIII. 106. x; Plut. *Per.* 22. ii–iv.
- 68 Ael. *V.H.* XII. 43.
- 69 Thuc. VI. 93. i–iii, 104. i.
- 70 Cf. pp. 53–4.
- 71 Thuc. VII. 18. i again mentions his urging the fortification.
- 72 Hdt. IX. 73 (not mentioned by Thucydides).
- 73 Thuc. VI. 96–VII. 87.
- 74 Thuc. VI. 11. i.
- 75 Thuc. VI. 105. ii, VII. 18. ii–iii.
- 76 Thuc. I. 122. i, 142. ii.
- 77 Thuc. VII. 18–19. ii, 27–8.

Notes to Chapter V

- 1 Thuc. VIII. 1–6. i.
- 2 Thuc. I. 139. iii cf. 144. ii; II. 8. iv.
- 3 Thuc. IV. 50. iii; in V. 1 Pharnaces, the satrap at Dascylium, allows the Delians evicted by the Athenians in 422, to complete their ‘purification’ of the island (cf. p. 40), to settle at Atramyttium, a city on the gulf opposite the north of Lesbos which, as far as we know, had never been out of Persian hands.
- 4 Andoc. III. *Peace* 29.
- 5 M&L 70, translated Formara 138, 3–end. An additional fragment previously published as *IG ii² 65* (M&L 1988 addenda, p. 313; not in Fornara) makes the identification of this Heraclides almost certain: a man who by the early 390s was an Athenian citizen and was responsible for increasing the payment for attendance at the assembly from 1 obol to 2 obols (*Ath. Pol.* 41. iii); so this decree, giving him honours which fall short of citizenship, must be earlier than that.
- 6 Thuc. VIII. 5. v, 28. ii with 54. iii.
- 7 M&L 77, 79, with commentary on p. 236.
- 8 However, Westlake, *Phoenix* 31 (1977), 319–29 = his *Studies in Thucydides and Greek History*, 103–12, argued against Andocides that it was the Persians who made the first move by supporting Sparta in 413/2 and that Athens’ support for Amorges was a reaction to that. It now appears from a Lycian inscription that when the Athenian Lysicles was defeated and killed in south-western Asia Minor in winter 428/7 it was Amorges who commanded the army opposed to him: Thonemann, in Ma *et al.* (edd.), *Interpreting the Athenian Empire*, 167–94.
- 9 Cf. pp. 31–3.
- 10 Thuc. VIII. 6. ii–14.
- 11 Thuc. VIII. 20. i, 23. i, 26: cf. p. 44.

- 12 Thuc. VIII. 15. i–16. i, 21.
- 13 Thuc. VIII. 17.
- 14 Thuc. VIII. 18.
- 15 Thuc. VIII. 37: this time the Persians and the Spartans were not to attack each other's territory, and there was provision for Persian maintenance of Spartan forces on Persian territory.
- 16 Thuc. VIII. 43. ii, 52.
- 17 Thuc. VIII. 24. i.
- 18 Thuc. VIII. 25. vi.
- 19 Thuc. VIII. 12. ii.
- 20 Plut. *Alc.* 23. vii–ix; *Lys.* 22. vii–viii; *Ages.* 23; cf. Xen. *Hell.* III. iii. 1–4, who does not name Timaea's lover.
- 21 Thuc. III. 89. i.
- 22 However, Littman, *Phoenix* 23 (1969), 269–77, has suggested that the earthquake which preceded Leotychidas' birth was not that of 413/2 (Thuc. VIII. 6. v) but one in 426 (Thuc. III. 89. i), in which case Alcibiades cannot have been the father, and the story implicating him will have been invented by Agesilaus and his supporters to strengthen Agesilaus' claim to the throne. He regards Alcibiades' adultery with Timaea as not proven.
- 23 Thuc. VIII. 45. i.
- 24 Cf. Kagan, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire*, 71–2.
- 25 Noted by Andrewes, in *H.C.T.*, v. 96.
- 26 Cf. pp. 61–2.
- 27 Andrewes, in *H.C.T.*, v. 95–6, accepting a suggestion made to him by D.M. Lewis, which Lewis himself subsequently retracted.
- 28 Cf. p. 52.
- 29 Thuc. VIII. 45. i–ii.
- 30 Thuc. VIII. 45. ii–iii.
- 31 Thuc. VIII. 29.
- 32 Accepted by Andrewes, in *H.C.T.*, v. 96–7, Hornblower, *Comm. Thuc.*, iii. 887, noting that in Thuc. VIII. 36. i the Peloponnesians are content with the pay provided; but contr. Hatzfeld, *Alcibiade*, 226 n. 5; Kagan, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire*, 73 n. 16.
- 33 Thuc. VIII. 56. iv–v.
- 34 Thuc. VIII. 45. iv–46. v.
- 35 For Thucydides' acceptance of two explanations in the case of Alcibiades cf. V. 43. ii: p. 31.
- 36 Thuc. VIII. 47. i–48. iii. For the *hetaireiai* cf. p. 48.
- 37 Reasonably, if they had indeed reneged on the Peace of Epilycus to support Amorges:
- 38 Thucydides later expresses his own agreement with this: VIII. 64.
- 39 Thuc. VIII. 48. iv–49.
- 40 Cf. p. 59.
- 41 Thuc. VIII. 50–1, on which I follow the interpretation of Hornblower, *Comm. Thuc.*, iii. 901–7. He comments, 'Part of the fun consists in standing by the chess-board to witness the defeat, at his own game, of the tricky Alcibiades'.
- 42 Thuc. VIII. 27–8: cf. p. 56.
- 43 Thuc. VIII. 53–4.
- 44 Thuc. VIII. 52: cf. pp. 57–8.
- 45 Thuc. VIII. 56.
- 46 Thuc. VIII. 57–9.
- 47 Cf. pp. 59–60.
- 48 Cf. pp. 65, 67–8, 74–5, 82–4.
- 49 Thuc. VIII. 63. iii–64; for Phrynichus cf. pp. 61–2.

- 50 Thuc. VIII. 65–70; *Ath. Pol.* 29–32.
- 51 Thuc. VIII. 70. ii–71, 86. ix, 90. i, 91; *Ath. Pol.* 32. iii.
- 52 Isoc. XVI. *Chariot-Team* 16–17.
- 53 Thuc. VIII. 73–7.
- 54 Thuc. VIII. 83–5.
- 55 Cf. pp. 68–9.
- 56 Thuc. VIII. 81–2.
- 57 On the tendency of Spartans to behave to free men as they might have behaved to their helots see Hornblower, in van Wees (ed.), *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*, 57–82.
- 58 Cf. p. 57.
- 59 Thuc. VIII. 83–5.
- 60 Xen. *Hell.* I. i. 31.
- 61 Thuc. VIII. 72. ii, 77.
- 62 Thuc. VIII. 74.
- 63 Thuc. II. 65. viii.
- 64 This suggests a régime organised as I believe the intermediate régime of 411/0 to have been: cf. p. 68.
- 65 Thuc. VIII. 85. iv–86.
- 66 Cf. pp. 60, 63–4.
- 67 Thuc. VIII. 87–8.
- 68 Isoc. XVI. *Chariot-Team* 18–20.
- 69 Thuc. VIII. 89–96.
- 70 Cf. what seems to be the view attributed to Alcibiades in Thuc. VIII. 86. vi: p. 67. For this view of the constitution see Rhodes, *JHS* 92 (1972), 115–27, written in response to de Ste. Croix, *Historia* 5 (1956), 3–23, who argued that this constitution scarcely differed from that of the full democracy.
- 71 Thuc. VIII. 97–8; *Ath. Pol.* 33.
- 72 Diod. Sic. XIII. 38. ii, 42. ii; Plut. *Alc.* 33. i. For 407 cf. p. 85.

Notes to Chapter VI

- 1 Thuc. VIII. 99–103.
- 2 Thuc. II. 90–2.
- 3 Thuc. VIII. 104–7.
- 4 Cf. Miletus, p. 66; and we are told here that Cnidus had expelled its Persian garrison too.
- 5 Thuc. VIII. 108–9; for St. Paul see *Acts*, xix. 23–41.
- 6 Notably, Thuc. II. 65. xii, V. 26.
- 7 There is an edition of the part dealing with the last years of the Peloponnesian War, Xen. *Hell.* I. i. 1–II. iii. 10, with introduction, translation and commentary, by Krentz.
- 8 The three problematic new years are at Xen. *Hell.* I. ii. 1, iii. 1 and iv. 2. See the discussion by Andrewes in *C.A.H.*, v², 503–5. Thrasyllus' departure from Athens in the first of those years is assigned by Dion. Hal. *Lysias* 21 to the Athenian official year 410/09, running from c. July 410 to c. June 409.
- 9 There is an edition of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, with introduction, translation and commentary, by McKechnie & Kern. Though they include the most recently discovered material, the Cairo fragments, they do not give chapter numbers to these as the latest Teubner edition, by Chambers, does, but use the numbering of the older Teubner edition by Bartoletti; cf. p. 125 n. 43.
- 10 I am among those who accept the importance of Diodorus' account after autumn 411, and I cite below a number of studies which favour Diodorus. It should be noted in

- fairness that some scholars have tried to swing the pendulum back in Xenophon's direction: e.g. Tuplin, in Moxon *et al.* (edd.), *Past Perspectives*, 37–66; Gray, *Hermes* 115 (1987), 72–89.
- 11 Thuc. VIII. 95: cf. p. 68.
 - 12 Thuc. VIII. 104–7: cf. pp. 71–2.
 - 13 Xen. *Hell.* I. i. 1.
 - 14 Diod. Sic. XIII. 41. i–iii: not in Thucydides or in Xen. *Hell.*
 - 15 Diod. Sic. XIII. 38. v, 45. i.
 - 16 Xen. *Hell.* I. i. 2–7; Diod. Sic. XIII. 45–47. ii; Plut. *Alc.* 27. ii–vi has material from both traditions. Westlake, *MH* 52 (1985), 314–22, argues that Xenophon's account is based on information from the Spartan side and Diodorus' from the Athenian, and that to a considerable extent they can be combined; cf. Kagan, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire*, 230–3; but Krentz, *AHB* 3 (1989), 10–14, argues that here they conflict and that Diodorus is to be preferred (even on the Athenians' putting out against Dorieus with all their ships).
 - 17 Kagan, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire*, 228–9, after D.M. Weil.
 - 18 Xen. *Hell.* I. i. 8; Diod. Sic. XIII. 47. ii.
 - 19 Thuc. VIII. 108–9: cf. above.
 - 20 Xen. *Hell.* I. i. 9–10; Plut. *Alc.* 27. vi–28. ii.
 - 21 Xen. *Hell.* I. i. 11–18; Diod. Sic. XIII. 49. ii–51; Plut. *Alc.* 28. ii–x has material both from Xenophon, including the omission of Athenian generals other than Alcibiades, and from the other tradition. See Littman, *TAPA* 99 (1968), 265–72; Andrewes, *JHS* 102 (1982), 19–25; Kagan, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire*, 236–46.
 - 22 Nep. VIII. *Thras.* 1. iii, quoted in this connection by Kagan, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire*, 245–6.
 - 23 Xen. *Hell.* I. i. 19–25, quoting the message §23; Diod. Sic. XIII. 64. ii; Plut. *Alc.* 28. x.
 - 24 Diod. Sic. XIII. 52–3 (after Cyzicus); Philoch. *FGrH* 328 F 139 (without context, but under the year 411/0).
 - 25 Andr. *FGrH* 324 F 44, translated Fornara 157.
 - 26 *Ath. Pol.* 34. i (in a short bridging passage between 411–410 and 404 which contains other errors); schol. Ar. *Ran.* 1532. This peace offer is defended by Kagan, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire*, 376–9.
 - 27 Aeschin. II. *Embassy* 76.
 - 28 Cf. p. 100.
 - 29 Cf. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia*, 424–5.
 - 30 Cf. Rhodes, *op. cit.*, 414–5.
 - 31 Quoted by Andoc. I. *Mysteries* 96–8.
 - 32 Thuc. VIII. 76. vii, 81–82. i: cf. p. 65.
 - 33 Thuc. VIII. 97. iii: cf. pp. 68–9.
 - 34 Cf. pp. 85–6. But Krentz in his commentary on Xen. *Hell.* I. iv. 10 thinks that it did accept that decision.
 - 35 Andrewes, *JHS* 73 (1953), 2–9.
 - 36 Xen. *Hell.* I. i. 8: cf. p. 74.
 - 37 Xen. *Hell.* I. ii. 1.
 - 38 Xen. *Hell.* I. i. 27–31; Thuc. VIII. 85. iii. Krentz suspects that Sparta's sending Clearchus to Byzantium in I. i. 35–6 is another dislocation, since Clearchus arrived at Byzantium in 411 (Thuc. VIII. 80. iii) and took part in the battle of Cyzicus (Diod. Sic. XIII. 51. i), but it is generally thought that he returned to Sparta after Cyzicus and was then sent to Byzantium again.
 - 39 Xen. *Hell.* I. i. 33–4.
 - 40 Andrewes, *JHS* 73 (1953), 2–9; amplified by McCoy, *AJP* 98 (1977), 269–84; but doubts are expressed by Kagan, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire*, 265–9, 275; Krentz, *CJ* 84

- (1988/9), 206–15.
- 41 Diod. Sic. XIII. 64. iii.
 - 42 Xen. *Hell.* I. iv. 9; Diod. Sic. XIII. 72. i–ii. See Andrewes, *JHS* 73 (1953), 6–8.
 - 43 Xen. *Hell.* I. ii. 1–10; Diod. Sic. XIII. 64. i (from ch. 64 onwards Diodorus often though not invariably uses the name Thrasybulus for Thrasyllus as well as for Thrasybulus). *Hell. Oxy.* 1–3 in the Teubner edition of Chambers = ‘Cairo Fragments’ without chapter numbers in the edition of McKechnie & Kern is fragmentary but includes details not given either by Xenophon or by the very brief account of Diodorus.
 - 44 Cf. p. 47.
 - 45 Xen. *Hell.* I. ii. 11–14. Some scholars have emended the text of §13 to obtain ‘freed’ rather than ‘stoned’, but Alcibiades of Phegus was an Athenian who had been sentenced to death and was now fighting for the enemy; the manuscripts’ text is not so incredible as to justify emendation.
 - 46 Xen. *Hell.* I. ii. 13–17; Diod. Sic. XIII. 64. iii–iv; Plut. *Alc.* 29.
 - 47 Diod. Sic. XIII. 64. iii, 66. i.
 - 48 Xen. *Hell.* I. iii. 1–9; Diod. Sic. XIII. 66. i–iii; Plut. *Alc.* 29. vi–30. ii, 31. i, follows Xenophon.
 - 49 Almost all scholars have accepted Pharnabazus’ involvement, but a direct arrangement with Calchedon is justifiably defended by Bosworth, *Chiron* 27 (1997), 306–9. But in defence of an agreement between the Athenians and Pharnabazus see Amit, *AC* 42 (1973), 436–57.
 - 50 Arr. *FGrH* 156 FF —80; discussed by Bosworth, *Chiron* 27 (1997), 298–313, who cites in support of his reconstruction Plut. *Cam.* 19. ix, Xen. *Hell.* I. i. 26.
 - 51 Xen. *Hell.* I. i. 20–1.
 - 52 Xen. *Hell.* I. iii. 10; Diod. Sic. XIII. 66. iv; Plut. *Alc.* 30. iii–x.
 - 53 M&L 87, translated Fornara 162, 1–31.
 - 54 Xen. *Hell.* I. iii. 11–12; Plut. *Alc.* 31. ii.
 - 55 Cf. p. 125 n. 38.
 - 56 Polyaeus reports this twice in his collection of *Stratagems*: at I. 40. ii he attributes it to Alcibiades, without specifying the city under attack; at I. 47. ii he does specify Byzantium but he attributes the ruse to Thrasyllus, who otherwise is not mentioned in this year’s campaigning after the siege of Calchedon.
 - 57 Xen. *Hell.* I. iii. 10, 14–22; Diod. Sic. XIII. 66. iv–67. vii; Plut. *Alc.* 31. iii–viii. Westlake, *MH* 42 (1985), 322–7, champions the authenticity of the material omitted by Xenophon but included by Diodorus and Plutarch.
 - 58 Xen. *Hell.* I. iii. 8–9; Plut. *Alc.* 31. i.
 - 59 Xen. *Hell.* I. iii. 11–12.
 - 60 Xen. *Hell.* I. iii. 13–14.
 - 61 Xen. *Hell.* I. i. 32 (according to the manuscripts, as a result of an incident in Thasos, but Tissaphernes was blamed too and it is hard to see how he could have been involved there, so U. Kahrstedt’s emendation of Iasus for Thasos should be accepted: see Andrewes, *JHS* 73 (1953), 7 n. 21).
 - 62 Cf. Amit, *AC* 42 (1973), 454–5.
 - 63 Xen. *Hell.* I. iv. 1.
 - 64 Andrewes, *JHS* 73 (1953), 2 n. 1.
 - 65 Xen. *Hell.* I. iv. 19; Plut. *Alc.* 32. ii: cf. p. 86.
 - 66 Xen. *Hell.* I. i. 10; cf. p. 75.
 - 67 Diod. Sic. XIII. 68. ii; cf. p. 85.
 - 68 Cf. pp. 57–8, 63–4.
 - 69 Compromises: Xen. *Hell.* III. ii. 12–20, iv. 5–6, 25–6.
 - 70 Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 108–35; the case against is best stated by Tuplin, *Achaemenid*

History 2 (1984), 133–53.

71 Cf. p. 60.

72 Xen. *Hell.* I. v. 8–9.

73 *IG* i³ 113: Tissaphernes, line 39; ‘king’, lines 36–9. The proposer of the amendment is Cleo[—], possibly but not certainly to be restored as Cleophon. Restoration of a text which would refer to the Persian King as one of Athens’ allies, which D.M. Lewis accepted in *IG* but considered ‘very optimistic’ (*Sparta and Persia*, 130), is doubted by Osborne (*Naturalization in Athens*, ii. 23–4); and Cataldi offered alternative restorations in which it is Evagoras himself who is called ‘king’ as in Rhodes & Osborne 11. 16 (*Symbolai e relazioni tra le città greche nel Vsec. a.C.*, 287–314 no. 10, with discussion pp. 301–2, cf. *SEG* xxxiv 24).

74 See Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 129–31 with 130 n. 133.

75 Diod. Sic. XIII. 68. i.

76 Cf. p. 83.

77 Diod. Sic. XIII. 68. i.

78 Kagan, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire*, 287. Nep. VII. *Alc.* 6. iii has Alcibiades returning with Theramenes and ‘Thrasybulus’; Plut. *Alc.* 32. i mentions only Alcibiades.

79 Xen. *Hell.* I. iv. 8–12.

80 *Ath. Pol.* 44. iv.

81 Plut. *Alc.* 33. i. For 411 cf. p. 69. If it was now that Critias proposed Alcibiades’ recall, it may have been in 406 after Notium that Critias was exiled at the instance of Cleophon: Xen. *Hell.* II. iii. 15, 36, *Mem.* I. ii. 24; Arist. *Rhet.* I. 1375 B 31–4.

82 Xen. *Hell.* I. iv. 12–19; Diod. Sic. XIII. 68. iii–69. i; Plut. *Alc.* 32, 34. i–ii. Krentz in his commentary on Xenophon is sceptical of the suggestions that Alcibiades was anxious. Probably either Euryptolemus’ father Peisianax was a brother or his mother was a sister of Alcibiades’ mother Deinomache: see Krentz on Xen. *Hell.* I. iv. 19.

83 ‘The equivalent of or identical with his previous property’: Davies, *A.P.F.*, 21.

84 Xen. *Hell.* I. iv. 20; Diod. Sic. XIII. 69. i–iii; Plut. *Alc.* 33. ii–iii. For the equality of the generals see Dover, *JHS* 80 (1960), 61–77 = his *The Greeks and Their Legacy*, 159–80.

85 M&L 87, translated Fornara 162; Ccf. pp. 80–1.

86 M&L 88, translated Fornara 163; 412/1, Thuc. VIII. 23. vi, 31. ii–iii.

87 Xen. *Hell.* I. iv. 20, in a single sentence; Plut. *Alc.* 34. iii–vii, making much more of it.

88 M&L 91, translated Fornara 161. The names of the archon, Antigones, and of Alcibiades are wholly restored, but at any rate each is of the right number of letters. There is earlier evidence of Macedon’s supplying oars to the Athenians: *IG* i³ 89, 31; Andoc. II. *Return* 11.

89 Xen. *Hell.* I. iv. 21–3; Diod. Sic. XIII. 69. iv–v (who has ‘Thrasybulus’ left in command of the garrison: see Krentz on Xen. *Hell.* I. iv. 23); Plut. *Alc.* 34. vii–35. iv (in a passage which has the Athenians afraid that Alcibiades would make himself tyrant and therefore glad to have him out of the city, and makes the failure to take Andros the first of the series of unexpected setbacks for which he was later blamed).

90 Plut. *Artox.* 2.

91 Xen. *Hell.* I. iv. 3, *Anab.* I. i. 2, ix. 7.

92 Xen. *Hell.* I. iv. 5.

93 Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 119 with n. 78.

94 Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 56, 134.

95 Sealey, *Klio* 58 (1976), 335–58.

96 Plut. *Lys.* 2; Ael. V.H. XII. 43.

97 Xen. *Hell.* I. v. 1–10; Diod. Sic. XIII. 70; Plut. *Alc.* 35. v, *Lys.* 4.

98 Xen. *Hell.* I. v. 8–9: cf. p. 84.

99 Amit, *GB* 3 (1975), 1–13.

100 Xen. *Hell.* I. iv. 21.

- 101 Plut. *Alc.* 10. i-ii: cf. p. 29.
- 102 Amit, *GB* 3 (1975), 9–11; Cawkwell, *CQ* 34 (1984), 340.
- 103 Xen. *Hell.* I. v. 11; Diod. Sic. XIII. 71. i; Plut. *Lys.* 5. i. Alcibiades' going southwards to Caria to raise money, in Plut. *Alc.* 35. v, looks like a misplaced reference either to his activities early in 407 or to the raids which he made before taking up position at Notium.
- 104 The Athenians had eighty if the twenty ships which Conon later brought from Andros had been left there by Alcibiades from his original hundred (Xen. *Hell.* I. v. 18; cf. p. 91); the Spartans' total had reached ninety in Xen. *Hell.* I. v. 10.
- 105 Xen. *Hell.* I. v. 12–14; *Hell. Oxy.* 7 Chambers = 4 McKechnie & Kern; Diod. Sic. XIII. 71. ii–iv; Plut. *Alex.* 35. vi–vii, *Lys.* 5. i–ii. See Andrewes, *JHS* 102 (1982), 15–25 at 15–19; Russell, *AHB* 8 (1994), 35–7, suggests that Antiochus did not want to provoke a battle but was engaging in a 'reconnaissance in force'.
- 106 Xen. *Hell.* I. v. 15; Diod. Sic. XIII. 71. iv; Plut. *Alc.* 35. viii.
- 107 Diod. Sic. XIII. 72–73. i.
- 108 Diod. Sic. XIII. 73. iii–vi.
- 109 Xen. *Hell.* I. v. 16; Diod. Sic. XIII. 73. vi; Plut. *Alc.* 36. i–iii. According to Plutarch the man who took the complaints from the fleet was Thrasybulus — not the Thrasybulus from the deme Steiria who has been figuring in the narrative since 411 but Thrasybulus of Collytus, another man prominent in the late fifth and early fourth centuries. On the forts see pp. 95–6.
- 110 Xen. *Hell.* I. v. 16–17; Diod. Sic. XIII. 74. Diodorus has Thrasybulus in error for Thrasyllus; and Lysias [Lysanias, MSS] where Xenophon has Leon, a discrepancy for which various solutions have been proposed. New generals, not named, Plut. *Alc.* 36. iv; Alcibiades deposed, Plut. *Lys.* 5. iii.
- 111 Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes*, 220–1.
- 112 Phot. *Bibl.* 377 A 18–19, from Himerius (fourth century AD).
- 113 Cf. p. 40.
- 114 Lys. XIV. *Alc.* i. 38; Diod. Sic. XIII. 74. ii–v.
- 115 Cf. n. 104, above.
- 116 Xen. *Hell.* I. v. 16–20; Diod. Sic. XIII. 74.

Notes to Chapter VII

- 1 Cf. p. 80.
- 2 Xen. *Hell.* I. v. 17; Diod. Sic. XIII. 74. ii; Nep. VII. *Alc.* 7. iv; Plut. *Alc.* 36. iii.
- 3 Lys. XIV. *Alc.* i. 26.
- 4 430: Hdt. VII. 137. iii. Delian League: *IG* i³ 71, iii. 20 (restored); 77, iv. 10; 100, iii. 9 (restored). Xenophon: Xen. *Anab.* VII. ii. 38, v. 8. See Hansen & Nielsen (edd.), *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*, 914–5.
- 5 Hdt. VI. 36. ii. See Hansen & Nielsen, *op. cit.*, 909.
- 6 Xen. *Anab.* VII. v. 8. See Hansen & Nielsen, *op. cit.*, 914.
- 7 Xen. *Anab.* VII. ii. 32–4.
- 8 Xen. *Hell.* I. vi–vii; Diod. Sic. XIII. 76. ii–79. vii, 97. i–103. ii.
- 9 *Ath. Pol.* 34. i; repeated by schol. *Ar. Ran.* 1532; cf. pp. 76–7.
- 10 Cf. p. 88.
- 11 Xen. *Hell.* I. vi. 36–8, II. i. 1–7; Diod. Sic. XIII. 100. v–viii (wrongly making Lysander a private citizen who held no formal office); Plut. *Lys.* 7. ii–vi.
- 12 Xen. *Hell.* I. vii. 1.
- 13 The three additional generals of Xen. *Hell.* II. i. 16 are probably three of the men elected then.

- 14 Lys. XIII. *Agoratus* 10.
- 15 See, e.g., Dover, *Aristophanes, Frogs*, 73–5; Sommerstein, *Aristophanes, Frogs*, 21–2.
- 16 E.g. Heath, *Political Comedy in Aristophanes*, 19–21.
- 17 Cleophon's father (Cleippides) and deme are indicated by the ostraca cast against him in 415 (Siewert [ed.], *Ostrakismos-Testimonien I*, 59, cf. p. 42); for ostraca cast against Cleippides in the middle of the century see Siewert, *loc. cit.*, and for his generalship in 429/8 see Thuc. III. 3. ii.
- 18 This appears in two slightly different forms, perhaps from the two productions.
- 19 Ar. *Ran.* 1422–36.
- 20 Sometimes denied, but convincingly demonstrated by Sommerstein, CQ² 46 (1996), 327–56.
- 21 Ar. *Ran.* 534–41, 967–70.
- 22 Andoc. I. *Mysteries* 73–80.
- 23 Diod. Sic. XIII. 104. viii, regarding it as unimportant; Plut. *Lys.* 9. iii–iv. Many scholars have doubted this, but Kagan has defended it in *The Fall of the Athenian Empire*, 384–5, and Andrewes was noncommittal in *C.A.H.*, v², 494.
- 24 Cf. p. 79.
- 25 Xen. *Hell.* II. i. 10–21; Diod. Sic. XIII. 104. i–105. i; Plut. *Lys.* 9.
- 26 Xen. *Hell.* II. i. 21; Plut. *Lys.* 11. v.
- 27 Xen. *Hell.* II. i. 22–6; Diod. Sic. XIII. 105. ii–iv; cf. Nep. VII. *Alc.* 8. ii–v. Plut. *Alc.* 36. iii–37. iii; *Lys.* 10–11. i, is primarily in agreement with Xenophon but has a trace of the other tradition in *Alc.* 37. iii.
- 28 Xen. *Hell.* II. i. 32.
- 29 Lys. XIV. *Alc.* i. 38–9; Paus. IV. 17. iii, X. 9. x. Dem. XIX. *Embassy* 191 states that Adimantus was later prosecuted by Conon, but that ought to have been on a different charge, since taking bribes at Aegospotami would have been covered by the amnesty of 403.
- 30 Wylie, *AC* 55 (1986), 125–41 at 129–33.
- 31 Diod. Sic. XIII. 105. i.
- 32 Xen. *Hell.* II. i. 27–9; Diod. Sic. XIII. 106. i–vi; Plut. *Lys.* 11–12. Diodorus envisages a rotating chief command at Arginusae also (XIII. 97. vi); in favour of his version see Ehrhardt, *Phoenix* 24 (1970), 225–8; Kagan, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire*, 390–3. Strauss, *AJP* 104 (1983), 24–7, judges neither Xenophon nor Diodorus adequate; but what is at issue is whether a superior version underlies Diodorus. Wylie, in the article cited above, argues for various improbabilities in Xenophon's account of the battle and of what happened afterwards.
- 33 Xen. *Hell.* II. i. 30–ii. 23; Diod. Sic. XIII. 106. vii–107; Plut. *Lys.* 13–14. Cleophon: Lys. XIII. *Agoratus* 7–12, XXX. *Nicomachus* 10–14.
- 34 Perrin, *TAPA* 37 (1906), 25–37, austerely noted that, of the earliest texts which might have told the story, Lys. XIV. *Alc.* i and XV. *Alc.* ii say nothing of his death, and Isoc. XVI. *Chariot-Team* 40 says only that the Thirty in Athens banished him from the whole of Greece and the Spartans and Lysander arranged to have him killed (cf. below); and he suggested that everything beyond that is invention.
- 35 Cf. p. 58.
- 36 Ath. XIII. 574 E, cf. XII. 535 c.
- 37 Ath. XIII. 574 E–F; Arist. *Hist. An.* VI. 578 B 26–9.
- 38 See Talbert (ed.), *Barrington Atlas of the Greek and Roman World*, map 62: about 30° 45' E by 39° 45' N. There is a thorough study by Robert, *À Travers l'Asie Mineure*, 257–99.
- 39 Forlanini, *Hethitica* 13 (1996), 5–12. I am very grateful to Dr. P. Thonemann for the information on Melissa in the last part of this paragraph.
- 40 John Cinnamus 294; Sabas, *Life of St. Ioannikios (Acta Sanctorum Nov.* II. i. 348 B).
- 41 *IG* i³ 421, 48 (included in M&L 79, translated Fornara 147 D).

- 42 Diod. Sic. XIV. 11. i–iv; Plut. *Alc.* 38–9; Nep. VII. *Alc.* 9–10.
- 43 Isoc. XVI. *Chariot-Team* 40, cf. 37.
- 44 Not forty, as in the manuscripts' text of Nep. VII. *Alc.* 10. vi.
- 45 Nep. VII. *Alc.* 1.
- 46 Nep. VII. *Alc.* 11. §iii takes him in his exile to Boeotia, which is not mentioned elsewhere and is probably a simple mistake.
- 47 Plin. *H.N.* XXXIV. 26.
- 48 Nep. VIII. *Thras.* 1. iii: cf. p. 76.
- 49 Isoc. XVI. *Chariot-Team* 46, cf. Lys. XIV. *Alc.* i. 31.
- 50 Cf. p. 40. Isoc. XVI. *Chariot-Team* is his speech in his defence.
- 51 Lys. XIV–XV. *Alc.* i–ii are two supporting speeches for the prosecution.
- 52 See Davies, *A.P.F.*, 21–2.

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Index

Alcibiades III, the subject of this book (referred to below as ‘A’), and Athens, Peloponnesian War and Sparta, are mentioned throughout the book and have not been indexed separately. When pages of the main text are listed, the relevant Notes should be consulted also; only a few passages in the Notes have been indexed separately.

Abydus, 71, 76, 78–9, 85

Adimantus, of Athens, 86, 89, 96, 99

Aegospotami, battle in 405, 77, 98–100, 106, cf. 12

Agis, king of Sparta, 54–6, 58, 78, 90, 98

Alcibiades I, of Athens, great-great-grandfather of A, 17–18

Alcibiades II, of Athens, grandfather of A, 17–18, 29–30, 51

Alcibiades IV, of Athens, son of A, 17, 19, 40, 47, 51, 67, 95, 99, 103, 106

Alcibiades, of deme Phegus, of Athens, 17–18, 47, 79

Amorges, Persian rebel, 56, 63, cf. 11

Amphipolis, 9, 30

Amycla, of Sparta, nurse of A, 22

Andocides, of Athens, 47–8

[Andocides] (IV) *Against Alcibiades*, 3, 27–9, 37–8, 43–4

Andros, 87, 91

Antiochus, of Athens, 89–90

Arginusae, battle in 406, 77, 96, 131 n. 32

Argos, 9, 31–7, 39, 50–1, 67, 82, 105

Ariphron II, of Athens, brother of Pericles I, 23, 26

Aristocrates, of Athens, 68, 89

Aristophanes of Athens, comic dramatist, 3, 25, 96–98, 104

Aspasia, of Miletus, mistress of Pericles I, 23, 28

Aspendus, 67–8

Astyochus, of Sparta, 59, 62, 66

Athenaeus, of Naucratis, writer, 1

‘Attic *stelai*’, 3, 48

Axiochus, of Athens, 17–18, 23

Boeotius, of Sparta, 83–4

Bosporus, *see* Hellespont–Propontis–Bosporus

Brasidas, of Sparta, 9, 30

Byzantium, 79, 81–2, 85, 100

Calchedon, 76, 79–82, 100
Callias III, of Athens, brother-in-law of A, 17, 19
Callicratidas, of Sparta, 96
Carthage, 45, 53
Chalcideus, of Sparta, 57–8
Chios, 56–7, 60, 63, 96
Clazomenae, 4, 75, 87, 89; *see also* Heraclides
Clearchus, of Sparta, 81–2
Cleinius I, of Athens, great-grandfather of A, 17–18, 29, 50
Cleinius II, of Athens, father of A, 17–18, 21, 23
Cleinius IV, of Athens, brother of A, 17, 19, 21, 23
Cleinius, of Athens, possible son of A, 17, 19
Cleon, of Athens, 9, 30, 40
Cleophon, of Athens, 77, 91, 97, 127 n. 73
Conon, of Athens, 91, 96, 100–1, 106
Corinth, 7–8, 34, 51–2, 57
Coronea, battle in 447, 22–3
Critias, of Athens, 24, 69, 85, 102
Cynossema, battle in 411, 71–2, 74, 76
Cyme, 90, 93
Cyrus, son of King Darius II of Persia, 12, 64, 83–4, 88, 96, 98, 101
Cyzicus, 72
——battle in 410, 73, 75–8, 92, 100

Darius II, King of Persia, 55–6, 64, 88, cf. 12, 57, 60–3, 98
Declea, 2, 11, 52, 54–6, 68, 78, 87, 90, 98
Deinomache, of Athens, mother of A, 17–18, 21, 23
Delian League, 6, 11, 15–16, 29, 37, 43, 55
Delium, battle in 424, 28
Delos, 40, 66
Democracy and oligarchy in Athens, 6–7, 11, 12–15, 51, 60, 61–9, 101, 106
Diodorus Siculus, historian, 1, 69, 73–4, 125 n. 43

Egesta, 10, 44–5, 49
Elaeus, 71–2
Eleusinian Mysteries, 10, 18, 47–9, 62, 86–87, 92, 97
Elis, 33, 35–6, 51
Endius, of Sparta, 31–2, 57–9
Ephesus, 72, 79, 88, 90
Epidauros, 34, 36
Epilycus of Athens, treaty associated with, 55–6
Eupolis, of Athens, comic dramatist, 25, 49
Euripus, battle in 411, 68, 74
Evagoras, of Salamis in Cyprus, 84

Five Thousand, in Athens in 411/0, [68–9](#), [77](#), [92](#)

Four Hundred, in Athens in 411, [61–8](#), [92](#), [105](#)

Gylippus, of Sparta, [52–3](#)

Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, fragmentary history, [73–4](#)

Hellespont–Propontis–Bosporus, [11–12](#), [56](#), [71–85](#), [92](#), [98–100](#), [105](#)

Heraclides, of Clazomenae, [56](#)

Hermocrates, of Syracuse, [44](#), [49](#), [60](#), [66](#), [78](#)

Hermes, in Athens, [46–9](#)

Hipparete I, of Athens, wife of A, [17](#), [19](#)

Hippocrates, of Athens, [28](#)

Hipponicus II, of Athens, father-in-law of A, [17](#), [19](#), [27](#), [28](#)

Hyperbolus, of Athens, [10](#), [40–4](#), [65](#)

Isocrates, of Athens, rhetorician, [3](#); *see also* Alcibiades IV

Lamachus, of Athens, [45](#), [49–50](#), [52](#)

Lampsacus, [98–9](#)

Leontini, [44–5](#)

Lesbos, [71](#), [75](#), [79](#), [96](#)

Lichas, of Sparta, [57](#), [63](#), [66](#)

Lysander, of Sparta, [88–90](#), [96](#), [98–104](#)

Lysias, active in Athens, speech-writer, [3](#); *see also* Alcibiades IV

Mantineia, [33](#), [35–6](#), [50–1](#)

—— battle in 418, [10](#), [35–6](#)

Melissa, alleged location of A's death, [101–3](#)

Melos, [37–8](#), [43](#)

Miletus, [23](#), [57–8](#), [60](#), [62](#), [66](#), [71](#)

Mindarus, of Sparta, [66](#), [71–6](#), cf. [11](#)

Nepos (Cornelius Npos), of Cisalpine Gaul, biographer, [1](#), [104](#)

Nicias, of Athens, [10](#), [33](#), [39–53](#)

—— peace treaty of 421 associated with, [9](#), [10](#), [30–3](#), [34](#), [39](#), [52](#), [53](#)

Notium, battle in 406, [12](#), [88–90](#), [92–3](#), [100](#), [105–6](#)

Olympic games in 416, [3](#), [40](#), [43](#), [91](#), [106](#)

Ostracism in Athens, [3](#), [10](#), [18](#), [38](#), [41–4](#), [65](#), [97](#)

Paralus, of Athens, son of Pericles I, [23](#), [28](#)

Patrae, [33–4](#)

Peloponnesian League, [5–6](#), cf. [9](#)

Pericles I, of Athens, guardian of A, [2](#), [7–9](#), [14](#), [17–18](#), [22–4](#), [26](#), [28](#), [41](#), [67](#)

Pericles II, of Athens, son of Pericles I, [23](#), [28](#), [91](#), [96](#)

Persia, *see* Amorges, Cyrus, Darius II, Pharnabazus, Tissaphernes
 Phaeax, of Athens, 41–4; *see also* [Andocides] (IV) *Against Alcibiades* Pharnabazus, Persian satrap, 11–12, 55–6, 71–84, 88, 91–2, 101–4, 106
 Phlius, 35
 Phrynichus, of Athens, 59, 61–4, 68
 Piraeus, 7–8, 49, 68, 86, 100
 Pisander, of Athens, 61–4
 Plato, of Athens, philosopher, 3
 Plutarch, of Chaeronea, biographer, 1, 104
 Potidaea, 27–8
 Propontis, *see* Hellespont-Propontis—Bosporus
 Pylos, 9, 29–30, 32, 34, 51, 54

Rhium, 34

Samos, 11, 57, 60–9, 71–9, 85, 88, 90–1
 Selinus, 10, 44–5
 Selymbria, 3, 80–2, 87
 Sestos, 71, 99–100
 Sicily, 7, 10–11, 25, 29, 39, 41, 44–53, 105; *see also* Egesta, Leontini, Selinus, Syracuse,
 Socrates, of Athens, philosopher, 22, 24, 26–8
 Syracuse, 2, 10–11, 44, 49, 50–3; *see also* Hermocrates

Tegea, 36
 Thasos, 64, 126 n. 61
 Theramenes, of Athens, 68, 75–82, 85, 91, 96, 98, 101
 Thirty, in Athens in 404/3, 101–4, cf. 12
 Thrace, 2, 78–80, 86, 90–1, 95–6, 99, 101–2
 Thrasybulus, of deme Collytus, of Athens, 129 n. 109
 Thrasybulus, of deme Steiria, of Athens, 65, 75–8, 86–7, 90–91, 96, 105–6, 125 n. 43, 129 n. 109
 Thrasyllus, of Athens, 65, 78–9, 81, 85–7, 91, 96, 125 n. 43

Thucydides, of Athens, historian, 1–2, 59–60, 63, 72–3
 Timandra, alleged companion of A at his death, 102–3
 Tissaphernes, Persian satrap, 2, 11, 55–68, 71–2, 74–5, 83–4, 88, 92, 102, 105

Xanthippus II, of Athens, son of Pericles I, 23, 28
 Xenophon, of Athens, writer, 1, 72–4, 95

Zopyrus, of Thrace, *paidagogos* of A, 22